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Following the identity political turn in the Western hemisphere, the social sciences 
in the 1990s witnessed a considerable shift of focus to the notion of recognition. 
Problems of inequality, oppression, injustice, and social struggle have increasingly 
been conceptualized in the framework of a rising recognition paradigm. As Charles 
Taylor aptly summarized, ‘[t]he thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by 
recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person 
or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society 
around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible 
picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a 
form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode 
of being.’ (Taylor, 1992: 25) By raising the problem of the inherent tension between 
two modes of recognition, between the demand for universal dignity (equality) and 
particular identity (difference), Taylor aimed to contribute to contemporary North 
American debates about multiculturalism. However, he did not pay much attention 
in his analysis to the role of the social, historical and geographical context of the 
ongoing social struggles he looked at when he linked social struggles driven by the 
demand for recognition to the modern condition, the transition from collective 
honour to individual dignity. The same is true for Axel Honneth, the other seminal 
early theorist of the social (theoretical) relevance of recognition, despite the 
significant differences between their approaches. When aiming to build a grand 
critical theory à la Frankfurt School applying an immanently social basis of 
normativity, Honneth did not focus on the social historical specificities of the shift 
from the social to the moral grammar of social conflict either.  
Since the early 1990s, the recognition paradigm in the social sciences has 
received various criticisms. From the perspective of this special issue, aiming to 
contribute to the discussion about recognition theory by focusing on its historical 
and social embeddedness, the role of Nancy Fraser is central. Not only because she 
had one of the most influential voices in the critical choir on recognition politics, 
pointing precisely to the shift from transformative politics to the moral grammar 
of social struggles, but because of setting the discourse about recognition in a way 
that for a long time determined further critical questionings. Especially since her 
famous exchange with Honneth (Fraser and Honneth, 2003), critiques of 
recognition have tended to, in one way or another, position themselves in the 
recognition vs. redistribution framework. In this sense, Fraser’s theory on injustice 
proved to be impactful in two aspects. On the one hand, she exclusively 
differentiates between two distinctive logics of social reality, economics and 
culture, each having its own principle of justice. Culture is the field in which 
(in)justice is framed as (mis)recognition, while economy would be the sphere of 
(un)equal (mal-/re-)distribution. This ontological differentiation rendered the 
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systematic critique of (post-1970s) capitalism with the concomitant recognition 
discourse more difficult (Leeb, 2018). Moreover, by conceptualizing the shift of the 
1980s in the feminist movement as a transition from redistribution to recognition, 
Fraser radically limited the critical assessment of the role of early (feminist) social 
movements with a clear anti-systemic agenda, given that the concept of 
redistribution as the affirmative remedy for mal-distribution, leaving the basic 
economic structure intact, is rooted in the liberal welfare state. On the other hand, 
‘[t]he problem with Fraser’s dual model of redistribution-recognition is that it 
accepts the ideal of “mutual recognition”, which covers over, rather than exposes, 
class antagonisms at the heart of capitalist societies’ (Leeb, 2018: 552). Fraser’s dual 
model oriented criticism on ‘too much’ recognition, thus it paradoxically 
contributed to the legitimacy of the ideal of mutual recognition. By taking these 
two aspects into account, the articles of this special issue aim to critically approach 
the recognition paradigm by breaking out from the iron cage of the recognition-
redistribution antagonism.  
Our point of departure is the growing awareness of the cases when 
reconciliation, based on the model of mutual recognition, actually fails. When 
looking at the recurrently arising social conflicts around the unjust distribution of 
recognition, the promise of reconciliation of the recognition paradigm seems to be 
less realistic than ever. Presupposing an ideally equal distribution of recognition, 
the politics of recognition paradigm typically focuses on how parts of society 
presented as voiceless, groupings of individuals subjected to past or present 
oppression, are given voice by various sorts of activism. The articles of this special 
issue seek to explore when and why the actual politics of recognition results in the 
competition of at least two exclusive, self-totalizing moral universes mutually 
degrading each other. In the often unfolding victimhood competition each side 
strives to get its own social suffering publicly recognized by the other, and the 
position of victimhood functions as the condition of possibility of entering into the 
field of recognition claims. In this social dynamic, recognition appears not so much 
as a basic human need but as prestige. The socially hyper-valorized notion of 
trauma well exemplifies that what is at stake is the redistribution of symbolic 
resources among those speaking in the name of the victims (Fassin and Rechtman, 
2009).  
In order to face the lost illusions of reconciliation in those cases, the articles 
of this special issue aim to critically approach the paradigm of recognition politics 
in diverse empirical fields, not only feminism but also the housing crisis, memory 
politics, or restitution. We believe that this diversity, both thematic and 
geographical, is an apt reflection of the fact that recognition politics has deeply 
embedded into various domains of our social and political life. The papers of the 
special issue apply two main perspectives when critically discussing empirical or 
theoretical questions of recognition: politics and representation. One approaches 
recognition politics as a crisis of political representation. From this perspective, 
competitors for equal recognition have more direct experience about each other 
than about the society at large or the particular social group they claim to 
represent. The crisis of politics (moralization, extreme polarization, two-sidedness, 
exclusive competition) has not so much to do with fatal cleavages in the value 
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system or ideological landscape of society but with the institutional transformation 
of political representation. As Péter Csigó and Máté Zombory demonstrate in their 
paper, the recognition politics of European integration resulted not in the 
historical reconciliation of different regional and local memories, but to a 
compromised, declarative and unstable moral union in which the humanitarian 
norms of recognition are easily reappropriated and reversed by the outright 
enemies of liberal-European values. The paper introduces a theoretical framework 
in which the failures of recognition politics are addressed as the crisis of political 
representation. Questions of representation, that is, who can speak in the name of 
the victims in a legitimate way, are central in Roma memory politics too. Gergely 
Romsics’s case study deals with the occupation of the Roma Holocaust memorial in 
2016, Berlin, by activists of Roma not holding German citizenship. Struggles 
around the event were structured by different principles of political representation 
that Romsics terms the opposing referentialities of the memorial site: should it 
represent Roma in the national German framework or every Roma as a (potential) 
victim of Nazi aggression? The paper argues that governmental action was 
constitutive in the eventual co-optation of one memory political initiative to the 
detriment of the other. Questions of representation arise sharply in the continuing 
debate about prostitution. Noémi Katona studies the conflict between the 
abolitionist and the sex work movement as a social field in which players strive for 
the legitimate representation of victimized women, influenced by the actors’ 
position in the global relations of force.  
The other critical approach of the special issue has to do with the global 
ideological-political embeddedness of the recognition paradigm. Cristian Cercel 
investigates the possible routes of research addressing the apparent historical 
parallel of the memory boom, one of the main fields of recognition politics, and the 
rise of neoliberalism. The global neoliberal hegemony is in the focus of the article 
of Dalma Feró as well, who aims to reconstruct the shift from liberation to the 
recognition paradigm in Western feminism that she terms as a transition from ‘the 
personal is political’ to the ‘politics is personal’. Both papers address the crucial 
question of the radical transformation of politics, usually designated by a prefix 
such as post-politics. This emphasis on post-1970s developments is 
counterbalanced by the historical case study of Dustin Stalnaker who explores how 
early Cold War ideological considerations shaped the ways in which the West 
German state processed recognition claims of two distinct groups of German 
veterans of the Spanish Civil War: German antifascists and those who fought in 
support of the National Socialist regime. Last but not least, Kata Ámon’s paper 
investigates the responses to the post-2008 housing crisis on Europe’s two 
peripheric countries, Spain and Hungary. She proposes to adjust the Fraserian 
model with Karl Polányi’s theory on the double movement, the tension between 
market extension and social protection. Connected to the topic of the special issue, 
Zoltán Háberman reviews Jelena Subotić’s recent book Yellow Star, Red Star, 
which, going beyond the criticism of relativization, discusses the way geopolitical 
insecurity and cultural ressentiment influenced post-communist states in 
appropriating the memory of the Holocaust in order to legitimately represent a 
different suffering. 
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Though the picture the cases presented in this special issue provide is far 
from exhaustive, the diversity it shows hopefully calls for the further reassessment 
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In this article, we present how the recognition framework of 
political and historic representation has enabled reactionary 
political forces, which increasingly recognize its inner 
contradictions and turn them against the basic principle of 
universal dignity, with the clear aim of corroding the whole 
recognition political edifice from the inside out. Taking the field of 
the symbolic construction of European identity as our main focus, 
we will reconstruct how the takeover of recognition politics has 
destabilized political and historic representation in Europe and 
ended up undermining European integration rather than enhancing 
it. Following one of the most important theorists of political and 
historic representation, Frank Ankersmit, we introduce the 
conceptual distinction between antifoundationalist vs. founda-
tionalist representation in order to account for the series of decisive 
institutional changes that since the 1970s have contributed to the 
intersection of two separate fields into ‘memory politics’ and led to 
the rise of a new and inherently non-democratic foundationalism, 
of which recognition politics is one of the main symptoms. 
 
Keywords: politics of recognition, political representation, historic representation, European 
enlargement, symbolic violence.
RESPECT MY RIGHT TO DOMINATE 9 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 8-26.  
1. Introduction 
 
In this article, we address a parallel process of decay that we see taking place in the 
fields of political and historic representation that is related to the takeover of 
recognition political discourses in both fields. The first process is the degradation 
of political antagonism to symbolic struggles of mutual delegitimation. Unlike in 
the social democratic past of the twentieth century, when political actors fought 
for particular goals inside an institutional system that they all accepted as 
legitimate, today’s competitors play a game of mutual delegitimation: under the 
flags of liberalism and illiberalism or populism they struggle to settle what should 
be the only legitimate order for the whole political community (Orsina, 2017: 8). 
Parallel to this is the decay of historic memory to a symbolic ‘victimhood 
competition’ (Chaumont, 1997; Novick, 1999), which makes historic memory the 
prey of increasingly mythological and moralizing narratives that reduce historical 
complexity to black-and-white lessons and incite a symbolic struggle of mutual 
degradation, impeding genuine historical understanding (Todorov, 1995; 2000). 
These two processes have been closely interrelated in past decades, as 
political representation has become ‘historicized,’ historical representation 
‘politicized,’ and institutional boundaries between the two spheres of social action 
began to be dismantled (Nora, 2011; Habermas, 1988). The intertwined processes of 
delegitimation and victimhood competition manifest the takeover of recognition or 
identity politics in the representation of the conflicts of the present and the past. In 
the recognition paradigm, all actors use the same codes of self-legitimation and 
delegitimation: they legitimate themselves as bearers of a universal moral language 
and delegitimate their opponents for their reluctance to accept this universal moral 
code, and even worse, for pressing an alternative vision of universalism that serves 
only to veil their particularistic interests. 
In this article, we present how the recognition political framework of 
political and historic representation has enabled reactionary political forces, which 
increasingly recognize its inner contradictions and turn them against the basic 
principle of universal dignity, with the clear aim of corroding the whole 
recognition political edifice from the inside out. Following Frank Ankersmit, we 
introduce the conceptual distinction between antifoundationalist vs. founda-
tionalist representation in order to account for the series of decisive institutional 
changes that since the 1970s have transformed the fields of political and historic 
representation in parallel, and through the intersection of these fields triggered the 
rise of ‘memory politics,’ which we see as a main symptom of today’s non-
democratic, foundationalist representational régime. 
We argue that no natural alliance exists between liberalism and the 
discourse of recognition, the rise of which is related only indirectly to ideology, as 
its direct roots lie in a new institutional régime of political representation that 
emerged in the seventies and eighties and took the place of the former class- (and 
social cleavage-) based representation régime of post-WWII social democracy. 
These institutional transformations have allowed the rise of the seemingly 
universalist but in fact foundationalist and perspectivist discourses that have taken 
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over the fields of political and historical representation. The foundationalist logic 
of the post-class representational régime urges actors to justify their action with 
universalistic moral declarations, which means evading the democratic procedures 
of will formation, bargaining, and accountability. In the current régime of post-
class representation (see Mair, 2002; Ankersmit, 2002), mainstream liberal and 
progressive radical forms of recognition politics are equally urged to give in to the 
antidemocratic temptation of arbitrarily declaring their particularistic moral rules 
as universally valid – and illiberals and extremists are more than happy to join 
them on this path and fight their struggle against universal dignity on the very 
recognition political platform that announces it. 
We will reconstruct how the takeover of recognition politics has destabilized 
political and historic representation in Europe and ended up in undermining 
European integration rather than enhancing it. The tacit memory political 
agreement between ‘integrators’ and the ‘yet to be integrated’ less resembles the 
genuine reconstruction of a commonly shared European historical identity 
narrative than a mutually beneficial power deal, in which new members have 
recognized the old members’ hegemony in relation to narrating European identity 
in a liberal universalist memory political framework, and, by contrast, old 
members have recognized the special claims of post-communist countries to be 
respected as victims of the evils of Communism. Symbolic declarations cannot 
substitute for open negotiations undertaken on explicit terms: the function of such 
‘foundational’ acts is not to establish new ground for the future, but to naturalize 
established power relations. 
 
2. The symbolic violence inherent in recognition politics 
 
There is a tension around recognition politics that is commonly observed: its 
protagonists have claimed to act in the name of universal and inclusive principles 
such as equal dignity and mutual respect. Still, in whichever form these principles 
have been put into political practice, they have stirred bitter controversy and 
rebuttal from actors who have felt that the seemingly emancipatory process in fact 
undermines their own equal recognition, and marginalizes and oppresses them. 
These ambiguous dynamics urge the parties in the debate to mutually deploy the 
same liberal principle of equal recognition against each other as was eloquently 
analyzed by Charles Taylor (1992). Taylor distinguished two modalities of 
recognition politics, one that stands on the ground of common-sense liberalism 
and seeks the ‘equalization of rights and entitlements’ in the name of universal 
dignity, and one that he called the politics of difference, which – he claimed – 
‘grows organically out of the politics of universal dignity’ (Taylor, 1992: 39), and 
asks for differential treatment for disadvantaged groups and positive 
discrimination in the name of the same universal nondiscrimination principle. 
‘These two modes of politics,’ Taylor argues, ‘both based on the notion of equal 
respect, come into conflict’: identity groups who do not belong to the rule-setting 
(individual rights-centered) paradigm of mainstream liberalism regularly complain 
that the equal treatment being offered under the auspices of liberal universalism 
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does not in itself guarantee to end their systemic oppression (cf. Samuel, 2013). 
Controversies, however, have rarely endangered the underlying principle of equal 
dignity. At the dawn of a liberal global era, even a communitarian like Taylor laid 
more stress on balance than on conflict: in the end, the debate between liberal 
mainstreams and their identitarian challengers maintains a common liberal force 
field, since the parties in the debate differ mostly in terms of the glasses they use to 
read the same universal Enlightenment principle of equal dignity that each of them 
seeks to implement.  
Today, three decades later, the above-described delicate balance has been 
upset: the recognition discourse is increasingly deployed against the principle of 
equal dignity. The politics of recognition has lost so much of its liberal pedigree 
that it is called by Fukuyama (2020), a core liberal author, the greatest danger to 
liberal democracy. Recognition politics is increasingly used as a Trojan horse of 
social oppression in the hands of extreme-right bullies, fascists, and supremacists, 
who wallow in the joys of using its rhetoric to rip apart its Enlightenment 
foundations. As early as in the 1990s, research documented how white 
supremacists sought to highjack the liberal discourse of cultural pluralism with 
two ‘rhetorical strategies: equivalence and reversal. These strategies portray 
whites as victims of discrimination and as equivalent to racial and ethnic 
minorities’ (Berbrier, 1998: 436). Reversal, of course, is not a problem in itself: the 
inner tensions of recognition politics have always made certain forms of 
‘victimhood competition’ inevitable. For example, the critique that affirmative 
action is discriminatory has always implied giving voice to its majoritarian victims; 
still, this latter voice had to stand on the universalist ground of equal dignity. 
Today, however, the reversal strategy is increasingly turned against the liberal 
grounds that Taylor assumed to be commonly shared. A politics of recognition 
flourishes even after the vanishing of the liberal consensus, and actively 
contributes to its demolition.  
In this article, we are interested in exploring why the inner ‘code’ of liberal 
recognition politics makes this discourse so vulnerable to extreme-right 
reappropriation. There is, of course, the old dilemma that the liberal system is 
vulnerable because it defends its enemies that seek to destroy it – or, in Taylor’s 
reformulation, ‘the principle of equal citizenship has come to be universally 
accepted. Every position, no matter how reactionary, is now defended under the 
colors of this principle’ (1992: 38). This explanation, however, does not dig deep 
enough to fully reveal the inner contradictions of recognition politics that we will 
seek to unravel in more depth. Liberal universalist recognition politics, as we will 
argue, is not vulnerable simply because it is too tolerant, but, because it entails 
symbolic violence, it asserts its protagonist’s natural right to dominate and uses 
this aggression against its opponents (Perugini and Gordon, 2015). This aggression, 
however, can be turned back against it, not only by more radically equalizing 
identitarians, but also the most reactionary enemies of universal dignity.  
Let us illuminate how this works in practice using a speech by Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, delivered in the European Parliament the day before 
the general vote on the so-called Sargentini Report in 2018 October. The Report 
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provided an overview of the miserable state of rule of law, constitutionalism, and 
human rights in Hungary, and proposed, for the first time in EU history, to initiate 
Article 7 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (which defines the procedure that 
Member States shall follow to sanction a member who breaches fundamental EU 
values).  
Orbán’s strategy aims to normalize ‘illiberal democracy’ as part of the liberal 
universe. This strategy uses the political weaponry of recognition to create the 
semblance that it accepts the basic constitutional rulebook of EU polity. 
Recognition political language allows Orbán to take a legitimate position and 
delegitimize his adversaries.   
 
You will denounce the Hungary which has contributed to the history of our 
great continent of Europe with its work and – when needed – with its blood. 
You will denounce the Hungary which rose and took up arms against the 
world’s largest army, against the Soviets, which made the highest sacrifice 
for freedom and democracy (…) I  stand here now and defend my homeland, 
because to Hungarians freedom, democracy, independence and Europe are 
matters of honour. This is why I say that the report before you is an affront 
to the honour of Hungary and the Hungarian people. Hungary’s decisions 
are made by the voters in parliamentary elections. What you are claiming is 
no less than saying that the Hungarian people are not sufficiently capable of 
being trusted to judge what is in their own interests. You think that you 
know the needs of the Hungarian people better than the Hungarian people 
themselves. Therefore I must say to you that this report does not show 
respect for the Hungarian people. (…) You are assuming a grave 
responsibility when – for the first time in the history of the European Union 
– you seek to exclude a people from decision-making in Europe. You would 
strip Hungary of its right to represent its own interests within the European 
family that it is a member of. (…)  If we truly want unity in diversity, then 
our differences cannot be cause for the stigmatisation of any country, or for 
excluding it from the opportunity of engaging in joint decision-making. We 
would never sink so low as to silence those with whom we disagree.  
(Orbán, 2018)  
 
By denouncing the Sargentini Report in the name of the victimized Hungarian 
nation as illegitimate and violating the Treaty, Orbán’s speech makes any criticism 
or corrective intervention based on the very same treaty illegitimate. This, beyond 
doubt, exercises symbolic violence not only on Orbán’s adversaries (specified only 
as ‘you’), but also on the political community itself within which the whole debate 
emerged. It qualifies a subfield of European politics as undebatable (in this case: 
Hungarian domestic policy). Orbán uses the seemingly universal tropes of liberal 
recognition politics to re-declare the old populist principle of sovereignty vox 
populi, vox dei, which was once inherent in early liberal theory (Kis, 2013) and 
politics, and which today can be rephrased with ease in the language of inverted 
RESPECT MY RIGHT TO DOMINATE 13 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 8-26.  
recognition politics as a call to respect the speaker’s divine (popular) authorization 
to dominate.  
If the illiberal Orbán today constructs himself and his nation as a collective 
victim-hero, and threatens to upset the table, this is not an outside attack against 
European principles, but a position that harmonizes with the tacitly accepted 
framework of the construction of European identity. Orbán exploits the potential 
of symbolic violence that has been encoded from the beginning in the tacit 
memory political agreement between European ‘integrators’ and the ‘yet to be 
integrated’, in which the two parties have mutually recognized each other’s 
dominion, and on these grounds declared the unity of the European family and the 
legitimacy of its institutional order.   
 
3. The tacit political agreement of European integration, and its 
prerequisites: silencing and entrapment 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the symbolic construction of the European 
community has been based on a double reduction of political debate, as this was 
reduced not only to the construction of a shared historical memory, but also to the 
question of a choice between two exclusive memory constructions represented as 
‘constitutive historical legacies’ of Europe. In other words, the political debate 
about the boundaries of the political community that evidently arose with the 
accession of the EU has been degraded into mimetic victimhood rivalry, which 
reached its symbolic endpoint with the 2009 EP resolution on ‘European 
conscience and totalitarianism.’ The road to the common, pan-European 
elaboration of the tacit political agreement during the ‘long nineties’ led from the 
clash of exclusive universalistic moral worldviews to a reluctant consensus based 
on the live-and-let-live principle. Before discussing the main features of this 
process, we first need to look at the historical context in which it took place.  
The origins of the political space of EU accession date back to the 1970s, 
when the emerging, decontextualized global Holocaust consciousness that created 
a new means of moral universalization (Alexander, 2012; Levy-Sznaider, 2006) 
overcame the until-then dominant anti-fascist moral universalism. As a result of 
Cold War tensions regarding the moral significance of WWII, especially the 
communist campaigns that targeted West Germany (Lemke, 1993; Weinke, 2002), 
the Western World began presenting the problem of Fascism and genocide as a 
memory issue which should be dealt with by moral gestures, not criminal law 
(Zombory, 2020). Following the 1970s, it was commonly shared memory – the ‘cult 
of heritage’ (Calligaro, 2015) – that was supposed to create the conditions for 
collective identity, no longer a consensus of common political, military, etc. 
interests. In the ‘end-of-history’ atmosphere of the long 1990s, the discourse of 
integration, with its narcissism of small differences (Freud, 2002[1929]) between 
‘constituent historical experiences,’ took on an ideological-mythical role and 
became increasingly detached from historical reality. Suffice to mention that in 
contemporary European memory culture, WWII appears as a mythic struggle 
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between liberal democracy and totalitarianism fought by an alliance of victims of a 
Western Holocaust and Eastern communism. 
By the final decades of the Cold War, neoliberal human rights discourses 
(Whyte, 2009) had linked up with the developing construction of the cosmopolitan 
memory of the Holocaust, with the latter serving as the moral basis of the former. 
As the historically unique case of absolute victimization, the memory of the 
Holocaust has been universalized as the general framework for establishing mutual 
respect and reconciliation. The humanitarian reason (Fassin, 2012) for 
cosmopolitan liberalism promised the possibility of restituting human dignity; in 
reality, awarding publicly acknowledged victim status to any human being on 
Earth who had been struck by injustice. In the Western political imaginary, there 
were no longer two ideologies in conflict, but an individualized ‘pure’ human 
suffering opposed to any possibility of political or social transformation. When the 
Iron Curtain fell and the enlargement of the EU became a hot political issue, the 
discourse of integration was already completely devoid of the possibility of 
negotiating between conflicting interests. In other words, the discursive 
framework of integration efficiently silenced the articulation of parties’ political 
interests. 
The debate on ‘Europeanness’ began in such political conditions, leading to 
the common social construction of the mimetic reversal of recognition norms. In 
the midst of profound geopolitical restructuring, post-Cold-War Western Europe 
embraced the preexisting cosmopolitan memory of the Holocaust, and made it the 
central element of EU integration policy. The EU presidency statement of 31 
October 2005 affirmed that ‘[t]he significance of the Holocaust is universal. But it 
commands a place of special significance in European remembrance. It is in Europe 
that the Holocaust took place’ (EU, 2005). The ‘special significance’ of the 
Holocaust in European memory derives from the fact that the Holocaust   – ‘the 
negative core event of the 20th century’ (Diner, 2003: 43) – took place on the 
continent. After the ‘cult of heritage,’ the third wave of Europeanization (Karlsson, 
2010) was based on ‘a common European canon of remembrance’ ‘against the 
backdrop of the memory of the Holocaust as the constituting, in effect the 
inaugural event of a commonly shared European memory’ (Diner, 2003: 42). It is 
now the historical lesson of the memory of the Holocaust that is supposed to 
create solidarity and a sense of belonging for European citizens. The ‘founding 
myth’ of Europe rewritten, the core values of ‘Europeanness’ are promoted 
through commemorating the Jewish genocide as a unique historical experience in 
Europe with a universal relevance. The moral order articulated by the 
commemoration of the Holocaust has become the standard of civilization imposed 
by Europe’s international policy: both in terms of the so-called integration process, 
and in the vocation of maintaining humankind’s universal rights in the world. 
From the ‘Western universal’ position, EU enlargement appeared as a process of 
integration through which the continental civilization could be reunited according 
to its supposedly universal values. It followed that the norms of European 
historical consciousness, coming to terms with the past, and the cultivation of 
Holocaust memory, were imposed as soft membership criteria on associated 
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countries; as proof of democratic commitment, even of being civilized; that is, 
being ‘European.’ 
Because of the unequal positions created by the accession process, this 
universalized moral order could not be debated by the addressees. Democratically 
elected national representatives were interpellated as members of civilized nations 
to be, with decades of communist totalitarian domination behind them. The EU 
conditionality of the universal recognition paradigm meant that the prerequisite of 
participating in the debate was the adoption of its normative system. Since 
European political space, especially EU institutions, were closed before the actors 
of the post-state socialist countries striving to ‘return to Europe,’ they took up 
positions in the moral order imposed on them as the universal code of civilization.  
Post-communist state efforts to ‘come to terms with’ their ‘totalitarian pasts’ 
were made manifest in various forms of institutionalization, which provided space 
for and gave credence to political claims. These institutions, be they historical 
commissions, institutes of remembrance, or memorial museums of communism, 
served as laboratories in which an Eastern European identity could be elaborated 
in a legitimate way. Besides adopting European norms of recognition, expressed by 
Europeanized cosmopolitan Holocaust memory, actors of the ‘Eastern specific’ 
presented the memory of communism as their additional ‘historical experience.’ 
This Eastern European differentia specifica, constructed according to the 
representational canon of Europeanized cosmopolitan Holocaust memory, was 
expressed as greater suffering resulting from the ‘double occupation’ related to 
WWII. Its specificity in relation to universalist Holocaust memory is not historical 
but geographical. The nation, characteristically earlier represented as the heroic 
protagonist in the narrative of historical struggles between the mythic forces of 
West and East, is now being constructed as an East European community of 
victims, repressed by both totalitarian regimes but mainly by communism. The 
legitimate political subject position for the associated countries was the outcome of 
mimetic victimization. Far from being a local initiative stemming from a specific 
historical experience, the memory of communism is the result of the localization of 
norms of historical consciousness imposed during the EU enlargement process.  
The symbolic violence inherent in the implicit imposition of a universal 
moral order was thus challenged by applying the norms of the very same moral 
order. Since the post-Cold War eastern position of EU enlargement was 
constructed according to the moral-political rules of the game defined by the 
integrators, the articulation of historical experiences of state socialism were 
silenced in the debate. The principles of historical authenticity were defined by the 
Holocaust-centered norms of European historical consciousness. As a result, the 
question of communism was not a political one, but a memory issue identically 
constructed to that of the Holocaust, and could only be raised as the moral need to 
restore the human dignity of its victims. As a consequence, communism was 
presented as an essentially and exclusively criminal and terroristic totalitarianism 
associated with the possible greatest potential of victimization. The only possible 
way to reverse the symbolic violence was to challenge the universality of the 
imposed moral order; that is, the uniqueness of the Holocaust. The whole 
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conceptual and argumentative repertoire of revisionism, also present in the Orbán 
speech cited above, the reference to the West’s double standards, the idea of 
double victimhood, the calculation of 100 million victims of communism, etc., are 
all examples of the mechanism of the reversal of symbolic violence elaborated in 
the nineties.  
From the civilizatory European position, actors posed not only as 
representatives of the victims of the Holocaust but also as defenders of its unique 
status, stepping up against contemporary perpetrators who would relativize its 
significance. The West defined the recognition of canonical Holocaust memory as 
the proof of democratic commitment and the prerequisite of cultural-political 
integration. From this perspective, the Eastern cause of criminalizing communism 
appeared as a systemic threat to the democratic values of the West. By contrast, 
actors assuming the Eastern European position stood against the ‘Western double 
standard’ of recognizing only the suffering of Holocaust victims, while denying the 
same from the victims of communism whom they self-proclaimed to represent. 
They revolted against the European system biased by a Westernism disguised as 
universal.  
Since anti-integration voices were silenced on both sides, the game of 
mutual delegitimation was strictly limited so as not to threaten the game itself. The 
politics of recognizing communism as a victimizing system destabilized but did not 
change the conditions of legitimacy: it was acknowledged as a constituent 
historical legacy of European identity without denying the primary significance of 
the Holocaust. This tacit political agreement of ‘live and let live’ was codified in 
the 2009 EP resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism. With this 
document, the EU legitimizes the binary political space with its acknowledgement 
that ‘the dominant historical experience of Western Europe was Nazism, and (…) 
Central and Eastern European countries have experienced both Communism and 
Nazism,’ and speaks of the ‘double legacy of dictatorship borne by these countries’ 
(EP, 2009). Though the memory of Communism is recognized as European, the 
resolution also declares that ‘the uniqueness of the Holocaust must nevertheless be 
acknowledged.’ The drive behind the resolution is clearly to unite Europe, which 
necessitates ‘form[ing] a common view of its history,’ yet it respects internal 
differences such as an east-west divide of historical legacies of past suffering. 
Second, the political repositioning led to the escalation of victimization. The 
‘common view of history’ called for in the resolution has been restricted to the 
‘tragic past’ conceived of as human rights violations. In this view of the past, 
potential moral judgement can only differentiate between criminalized totalitarian 
regimes of whatever ideology on the one hand, and the conglomerate of suffering 
innocent individuals on the other. Although the heroes of the Resistance are 
mentioned in the resolution, the only memory community this policy permits to 
construct is the collectivity of victims, the boundaries of which are demarcated by 
pure human suffering. As the document clearly puts it, ‘from the perspective of the 
victims it is immaterial which regime deprived them of their liberty or tortured or 
murdered them for whatever reason.’ 
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The tacit memory political agreement attempted to square the circle, as it 
allowed for the geographical division of an allegedly universal historic memory. 
This nonaggression pact, in our view, reflects less a genuine process of working 
through in which parties could genuinely contrast and reconcile their historic 
experience of conflict and injustice than the mutual interest in silencing these 
contrasts. 
From the integrator viewpoint, the tacit agreement would read as follows: if 
you let me declare the primacy of the Holocaust and define the victim-perpetrator 
narrative and the universal equal dignity of all victims as the ultimate moral code 
(which means you will refuse to return to the dark and barbaric tradition of 
relativizing the Holocaust, elevating national memory above that of other nations, 
and questioning equal dignity on racial or national grounds) – then I will invite 
you to narrate your history in the same universal language. I will give you respect 
as a victim of Evil, a freedom fighter against Evil, and a historic family member 
who now ‘returns’ to its natural community. I will not delegitimize your specific 
self-representation as a victim of Communism (I don’t consider this a relativization 
of the Holocaust). The same deal, read from the Eastern perspective, goes like this: 
if we follow the rules of the universal moral order of recognition and don’t 
challenge the uniqueness of the Holocaust, we will be adopted as legitimate 
political subjects into the European family, not only as collective victims who 
deserve sympathy, but also as collective heroes who have proved their democratic 
commitment as they risked their lives against the region’s universal Evil. If we 
respect your (the West’s) right to regulate common European historic memory in 
the framework of the mutual recognition of victimhood and of anti-totalitarian 
virtue, we expect you to respect our right to position ourselves as double victims of 
the Communist and the Nazi evil at the same time, and as genuinely democratic 
nations. 
The above tacit agreement may be read along the line of Schimmelfennig’s 
analysis (2001) about the broader EU integration process: here, too, declared 
cohesion has been enforced in acts of ‘silencing’ that appeared to be mutually 
beneficial, but resulted in a common ‘entrapment’ of accomplices rather than a 
genuine integration of willing partners. In the discourses about a new Europe, as 
Traverso ironically stated, ‘the West has had a makeover, almost a new virginity. If 
Nazism and Communism are the bitter enemies of the West, the latter ceases to be 
their cradle so it can become their victim, with liberalism assuming the role of its 
redeemer’ (Traverso, 2005: 90–91). There is no need to say that the East was just as 
happy as the West to declare its historic virginity. The tacit memory political pact, 
in other words, allowed both sides to silence the messy constellation of historical, 
political, and economic controversies that would threaten the declared narrative of 
common European identity. The universalist recognition political framework 
empowered all parties to enact this ‘silencing’ and thus to commit the symbolic 
violence they needed to declare their genuine Europeanness.  
With their tacit agreement, the integrators and the integrated entrapped 
themselves in complicit wedlock, as they mutually authorized each other to speak 
from the position of innocence in every conflictual situation and associate their 
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opponents with oppressive evil forces. The tacit agreement opened space for 
aggressive forms of symbolic representation: at the moment, a representative 
speaks directly from the position of a represented victim whose suffering is unique 
and experience is unchallengeable, they become protected from any challenge, 
since potential opponents are automatically catapulted to the side of Evil.  
In Eastern Europe, during the decades of liberal hegemony between 1989 
and 2008, the above-described mechanism allowed for the silencing of controversy 
on the grounds of liberal common sense: critics of intense privatization, 
multinationals, international capital or NATO membership could almost 
automatically be debunked as anti-European, uncivilized, sympathizers of devilish 
régimes (nationalist or Communist). By contrast, today when the liberal hegemony 
is crumbling in each of its constitutive fields, illiberals are taking the lead and 
exploiting the delegitimating potential and symbolic violence that is inherent in 
recognition political discourse.  
 
4. Radicalizing reappropriation 
 
On the whole, the anti-totalitarian memory political pact that buttressed the 
symbolic unification of Europe – by silencing the tensions of the past and the 
present and declaring an antitotalitarian consensus – has greatly shaped the 
language in which tensions related to the Union can be discussed and debated. 
This representational language urges debating parties to use the codes of victim 
and perpetrator to describe themselves as the victimized, bullied, genuinely 
democratic representatives of a legitimate European system. The same code allows 
actors to debunk their opponents as illegitimate, anti-European usurpators with 
tyrannical inspirations. Debates about Europe have decayed to a mutual 
delegitimation game, in which all parties can dress their economic and power 
interests in the clothes of declared victimhood: respect given but not received, 
displays of genuine democratic legitimacy, and the rejection of tyranny.  
This is the result of the reluctant antitotalitarian consensus which, in the 
short term, seemed to be a win-win platform: Western integrators felt they could 
enforce their universalist memory discourse, and Easterners also felt they could 
make hay out of equal recognition as victims of Communism. However, the 
resulting consensus about a Union made of antitotalitarian victims entrapped all 
parts into a highly unstable delegitimation game in which the very foundations of 
the European system are being questioned all the time. This common entrapment 
turned out once again to be damaging to the once-hegemonic liberal center, the 
enemies of which have learned to speak the liberal discourse of recognition as 
their native language – reciting the centuries-old liberal trope of popular self-
government, and legitimating with the principle of equal recognition their natural 
right to autocratic domination in the name of their peoples.  
The illiberal reappropriation of recognition political norms is clearly 
radicalized when the narrative of the country as a collective victim of 
totalitarianism is expanded to all contemporary political debates, with the logical 
conclusion that all opponents of the victim-nation must stand on the side of 
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universal evil. Today, the Hungarian far-right uses the liberal recognition political 
ground to debunk the liberals of Brussels as a totalitarian evil (either Nazi-like, or 
Stalinist).  
Ironically, the Hungarian extreme right has reappropriated liberal language 
and learned how to use it to play the Nazi card – this precious symbolic weapon 
that has traditionally been used by liberals. In a recent interview, the Speaker of 
the Hungarian parliament compared the contemporary EU to the collapsing Third 
Reich, and Brussels leadership to the Führerbunker.  
 
The globalist staff sitting in the Brussels bunker no more believes in victory. 
They have realized their plan has collapsed, they are losing their positions, 
they go on the defensive, and yet, or just because of it, they are losing all 
their good sense and continue the war at any cost, even at the price of 
destroying the union. They are waiting for the ultimate weapon, the 
Wunderwaffe, which is at this moment Article Seven, that they hope will 
bring them the ultimate victory. (Szentesi Zöldi, 2020) 
 
This absurd parallel is not solely acting-out, but part of a concerted operation in 
which government aides and actors play the Nazi card against their opponents. In 
the weeks during which the above interview was published, the spring of 2020, a 
government-sponsored online journal falsely called out Donald Tusk concerning 
his ‘Nazi grandfather’ (explanation: as President of the European People’s Party, 
Tusk is for expelling Fidesz). Although this is certainly not the first time that the 
Nazi blame game has been reappropriated by extremists – think of Rush Limbaugh 
coining the term ‘feminazi’ in the early 1990s – what is certainly new is that, in 
our case, illiberal reappropriation is being performed on the seemingly universalist 
grounds of recognition politics.  
Rogers Brubaker has recently explored the convergence of Western 
European extreme-right parties within a shared civilizational platform against the 
threat of a totalitarian Islam. Envisioning Europe as a secularized Christian 
civilization that is based on the value of tolerance and equal dignity, many 
extreme-right parties perform ‘an ostensibly liberal defense of gender equality, gay 
rights, and freedom of speech’ (Brubaker, 2017: 3). Brubaker draws a line between 
Western and Eastern Europe with good reason: in their biopolitical stance, 
Western extremists are a suffragette movement, in comparison to the Eastern 
‘extreme center.’ However, on the terrain of memory political and European 
identity struggles, the Eastern right does not trail behind at all in performing 
‘illiberal invocations of liberalism’ (ibid.). On the contrary: this is a genuine 
invention of legitimate, Europeanized, universal language with which to perform 
one’s national freedom fight against the totalitarian European Empire.  
The tacit memory political pact that established the mutual recognition of 
victimhood, the memory of Holocaust and Communism, and an anti-totalitarian 
consensus as the identity political foundations of European unification has created 
a dysfunctional and highly vulnerable setting. In the European house, liberal and 
autocratic régimes and forces clash and cooperate with each other in a state of 
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common ‘entrapment,’ desperately trying to enforce their own vision of 
Europeanness and shared fundamental values. The anti-totalitarian consensus and 
universal respect have never been more than camouflage – and today, illiberal 
political entrepreneurs are unleashing one part of the silenced controversies in 
order to universalize their own interests under the liberal auspices of the mutual 
recognition of free European nations. This symbolic battle explains why the vision 
of a shared European civilizational heritage is gaining such a firm hold over all the 
actors, liberal and illiberal, at the very moment when a severely dysfunctional 
Union is closer to the brink of disintegration than ever in its history.    
 
5. The power of foundationalist representation 
 
Recognition political discourse is neither liberal, nor identitarian, nor autocratic: 
we interpret it as a ‘foundationalist’ – and thus, as a potentially anti-democratic 
and ‘speculative’ (Csigó, 2016) – form of representation. Twentieth-century 
representative democracy was based on a democratic corporatist model of political 
representation in which the essence of political struggle lay in the competition of 
organized mass-scale social coalitions for the scarce resources of society (Touraine, 
1997). These social coalitions were formed around the ‘well-founded fiction’ of the 
social class (Bourdieu, 1987) – emergent aesthetic proposals which balanced out 
the aspirations of members and representatives, proposals that no singular actor 
had the privilege to declare directly – as they existed mostly in the form of a silent 
‘inner voice’ (Ankersmit, 2002: 133–163) that all interested parts could hear 
spontaneously emerge from the cacophony of negotiations and conflicts that 
constitute the mass-scale representation process. This ‘inner voice’ of democracy, 
however, has been lost in the transition of the past decades to a new, (‘popular,’ 
‘populist’ [Mair, 2002], ‘plebiscitary’ [Ankersmit, 2002]) representational régime. 
In this régime, political struggles are fought for other stakes and with other means: 
here, elite actors (‘cartel parties’ [Katz and Mair, 1995], political personalities, 
lobbies, corporations, and NGOs) compete via popular campaigns and lobby for the 
power of unilaterally declaring, in the form of state regulation, a compulsory 
universal moral and legal order that all actors are expected to respect and comply 
with. The new régime has been built on the ‘foundationalist’ assumption that it is 
possible to represent the fundamental interests of a ‘disorganized’ society directly, 
right at the point of state regulation.  
While the new representational régime did indeed emerge in parallel with 
the contraction of mass representative organizations – the old ‘corps 
intermediaires’ of social democracy –, on another plane it developed in continuity 
with the social democratic model of governance. The social democratic Welfare 
State, as Claus Offe has shown (Offe and Keane, 1985; Offe, 2006; for a review see 
Lash, 2006), was not simply a corporatist power broker between the best organized 
central groups in society. The welfare state acted equally as a universal regulator 
of social life and stepped up in defense of the disorganized peripheries of society. 
The representatives of the disorganized groups were inevitably elite civil society 
players whose prime resource did not lie in mass organizations and organized 
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masses, but in their direct access to the regulatory powers of the protective state 
from which they hoped for legal and fiscal defense against social oppression and 
marginalization. The representatives of ‘disorganized interest groups’ were able to 
enter politics in the direct vicinity of the state as elite actors themselves, struggling 
for access to the state’s power of legally codifying what they promoted as the 
universal, morally just order of the whole community. If on the plane of party 
politics the old mass party model certainly did surrender to ‘cartel parties’ and 
political personalities and their technocratic rule, ‘disorganized interest groups’ 
and their elite civil representatives survived in the form of social movements and 
NGOs and struggled to ‘manag[e] democracy’ (Skocpol, 2003) through codifying 
the recognition of marginality into law.   
It is certainly not a coincidence that in the historic period when the anti-
foundationalist system of mass representative democracy surrendered to a new 
‘populist’ or ‘plebiscitary’ régime, the system of representing historical experiences 
equally underwent thorough institutional transformation. The institutional walls 
between political and historical representation have been torn down and, in the 
new, historicized public space, new actors have appeared on stage (Habermas, 
1988; Nora, 2011). In this memory political scene, the focusing of attention on 
Holocaust victims was structurally homologous to the above-described process, in 
which the focus of political representation shifted from the mass organized central 
groups of society to the ‘disorganized interest groups’ of the periphery and the 
elite civil representatives campaigning for them. 
After WWII, the main political actors of historical memory formed a 
coalition of those who could claim to be part, in some way or another, of the 
historic victory over Fascism: resistance fighters, leftists, political prisoners, racial 
persecutees, intellectuals, everymen who resisted in their private lives. These 
actors spoke from the position of the central, self-organized makers of history 
who, after the horrors of the past, chose to serve further as remembering 
witnesses, adversaries of Fascism, adding their own particular perspective to the 
common anti-Fascist cause, gathering in national and international associations, 
witnessing in tribunals, journals, and schools, and forming ‘social coalitions.’ Even 
though the Cold War had disrupted the fragile anti-Fascist consensus of the war 
years by the end of the 1940s (Lagrou, 1999), until the 1970s the representation of 
historical experiences was institutionally embedded and particular on all sides. 
This representational regime functioned in an institutional framework in which 
historical experiences were referred to in relation to particular problems by 
various institutional players of justice, politics, history, or education.  
The systemic change of the institutional field of historical representation, 
which is often described as a transition from history to memory, can be best 
analyzed as a shift from witness to victim. In the context of justice, for example, 
one can observe how the representation of historical experience had been 
institutionally disembedded by the fourth quarter of the twentieth century. In the 
post-war period, the witness, testifying typically in the courtroom, represented 
historical truth from a particular perspective defined by the given case. Arguably, 
the Eichmann trial constituted a turning point in this regard due to its politics of 
22  PÉTER CSIGÓ AND MÁTÉ ZOMBORY 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 8-26.  
witness recruitment based not on the connection to the past deeds of the accused, 
but to the dramatic demonstration of the Holocaust as a whole (Yablonka, 2004). 
The new regime of authenticity has been based on the suffering body of the 
suffering individual victim whose ‘biolegitimacy’ (Fassin and D'Halluin, 2005) is 
apparently universally shared.  
The shift from the witness to the victim marks a definitive thread in the 
paradigmatic change of the political representation of history. In the new model, 
attention is focused on the institutionally disembedded ‘testimony’ of the victim 
about a ‘lived through’ bodily experience. A victim’s experience of past injustice is 
no longer seen as a particular, perspectivist narrative of a witness that is connected 
to a particular ‘case,’ and narrated in particular institutional settings for particular 
reasons (judicial, educational, literary, associational) but the direct demonstration 
of a universal truth. The peripheral, traumatized, passive, disempowered victim is 
given voice by an initiated elite representative who asserts in their name a just 
moral order and a legitimate systemic order for the present-day remembering 
community (Zombory, 2019).    
The traumatic and victimized modality of historic experience in the 
recognition political framework serves to short-circuit what Ankersmit calls the 
‘radical brokenness of political reality.’ If liberal-universalist (and radical 
progressivist) versions of recognition politics are in trouble today, this is arguably 
because they are interlocked with illiberal reactionaries in a common anti-
democratic trap in which all actors seek to unilaterally declare the just moral order 
and evade democratic debate with the properly selected historic narratives that 
inevitably drift apart from historical reality through universalization. Directly 
defining the moral foundations of the political community and the legitimate 
systemic order that follows from these foundations – this is the prime temptation 
of antidemocratic political representation, liberal or antiliberal, in today’s age of 
recognition. This antidemocratic temptation has been fully served by seemingly 
universalistic narratives about the historic experience of totalitarianism which 
have established fake ground for ‘universal mutual respect,’ but in fact served to 
veil power games – and illiberals and autocrats have gradually learnt how to win 




The illiberal reappropriation of the liberal universalist memory political discourse 
radicalizes a dynamic that has been present in all recognition political struggles, 
whereby the individualistic, formal, rights-focused streams of mainstream 
liberalism have clashed with forces seeking to empower oppressed communities 
beyond the formal equalization of rights. We have shown how illiberals can exploit 
this dynamic, turn it against the core liberal principles of equal rights and dignity, 
and use it to justify the autocracy’s natural right to dominate.  
The illiberal reappropriation covered in this study unveils the vulnerability 
of a typical recognition political strategy that seeks to preemptively win political 
wars by laying down the universal foundations on the ground of which all further 
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political controversies should be articulated. This strategy, no doubt, entails 
symbolic violence and declares one’s right to domination. In our case, the 
proponents of this strategy – the Western liberal integrators and many of their 
Eastern integrationist partners who also sought to preemptively ‘civilize’ their 
countries (and forget about the possible colonizing instincts of the West) – may 
have drawn all parties into engaging with universalist liberal declarations, which 
may have temporarily silenced controversies. However, today we see these 
returning in an even more threatening and less controllable (because they are 
seemingly liberal, legitimate, sellable, convincing) forms.   
The more its tropes are used by liberals, progressives, and illiberals alike, the 
more apparent it becomes that recognition politics is not an ideological formation 
but a symptom of a broader structural transformation in the institutional system of 
representation that shapes the articulation of all thinkable ideological positions. 
The case therefore is not simply that, as Taylor proposed 25 years ago, a ‘politics of 
difference’ would ‘grow organically out of the politics of universal dignity,’ since 
these two, together with the repressive-illiberal forms of recognition politics that 
reject universal dignity, have all grown out of a new representational régime that 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Recognition politics is part of this broader 
constellation and its dysfunctions can only be understood in the context of the 
broader structural ills of representation in contemporary democracy.  
We have argued in this paper that no natural alliance exists between 
liberalism and the discourse of recognition, the rise of which is related only 
indirectly to ideology, as its direct roots lie in a new institutional régime of 
political representation that emerged in the seventies and eighties and took the 
place of the former class- (and social cleavage-) based representation régime of 
post-WWII social democracy. These institutional transformations have allowed the 
rise of seemingly universalist, but in fact foundationalist and perspectivist, 
discourses that took over the fields of political and historical representation. The 
foundationalist logic of the post-class representational régime urges actors to 
justify their actions with universalistic moral declarations, which means evading 
the democratic procedures of will formation, bargaining, and accountability. In the 
current régime of post-class representation, mainstream liberal and progressive 
radical forms of recognition politics are equally urged to give in to the 
antidemocratic temptation of arbitrarily declaring their particularistic moral rules 
as universally valid – and illiberals and extremists are more than happy to join 
them on this path and fight their struggle against universal dignity on the very 
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The memory boom and the related emergence of cosmopolitan 
victimhood-centred memories, increasingly criticized for 
depoliticizing the past and thus contributing to the depoliticization 
of the present, have been simultaneous with the curtailment of the 
welfare state, the abandonment of the politics of redistribution, the 
erosion of social and economic rights, and the growth in social and 
economic inequalities. Yet if the latter are often being considered to 
be among the reasons leading to the current right-wing populist 
wave in Europe and elsewhere or at least are seen as entangled 
therewith, the relevance of the memory boom for these 
developments has not been properly interrogated. 
Against this background, this contribution makes a plea for a 
critical appreciation of the linkages between the memory boom and 
the global ascension of neoliberalism. It acknowledges the 
contemporaneity of the two phenomena, which have been 
fundamentally informing our present age, roughly since the end of 
the 1970s, and calls for a critical engagement with their interwoven 
character. In doing this, it argues that scholarship should pay 
particular attention to the relationship between past, present, and 
future that the neoliberal turn in its various shapes and guises 
implies, as well as to the regimes of temporality that underlie 
various instantiations of the memory boom. It ends by taking heed 
of recent theorizations in memory studies and by asking to what 
extent can they be used in order to have a better grasp of the 
critical juncture we are currently lying at and to contribute to a 
radical change of the political status quo. Thus, the article makes 
some preliminary steps towards disentangling the interconnections 
between the memory boom and the neoliberal turn, and aims to 
provide a blueprint for a substantial future research project that 




1 Author’s note: I am making a similar argument in an article entitled ‘Whither Politics, Whither 
Memory?’, forthcoming in Modern Languages Open, doi: https://doi.org/10.3828/mlo.v0i0.334. The two 
texts borrow from each other. 
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1. Memory and neoliberalism: Concurrent unfoldings 
 
What links the memory boom and the neoliberal turn? I suggest that in order to 
make sense of the entanglements between the two one has to look closely at the 
relationship between past, present, and future. The argument I am offering for 
consideration is that both the memory boom and the neoliberal turn – particularly 
in their (Eastern) European instantiations – are to a large extent underpinned by a 
contraction of temporal political horizons, characterized by the absence of future-
oriented politics. 
The connections between the two are visible on several levels, including 
both connections between neoliberalism and the memory boom as a historical 
phenomenon as well as between neoliberalism and scholarship on memory and 
memory politics. The analytical vocabulary frequently employed when researching 
and discussing issues related to historical memory is imbued with expressions 
which largely appertain to the corporativist-marketizing-neoliberal jargon. 
Literature speaks for example about the ‘management of the past’ (Tunbridge and 
Ashworth, 1996; Abou Assi, 2010) or about ‘memory governance’ (Hourcade, 2015: 
95), the actors involved in this process of management are seen as 
‘mnemonic/memory entrepreneurs’ (e.g. Levy and Sznaider, 2010: 136; Kubik and 
Bernhard, 2014: 9, 25; Jelin, 2003; Abou Assi, 2010; Sierp and Wüstenberg, 2015; 
Neumeyer, 2017) or ‘memory stakeholders’ (Hourcade, 2015: 93). Furthermore, 
steered by such entrepreneurs or stakeholders, memories and memory discourses 
are often understood as being in a state of competition with each other and hence 
vying for pre-eminence, even if important critical pleas against such interpretative 
frameworks have also been brought to the fore (Rothberg, 2009). Last but not least, 
the past framed as memory is marketized and consumed (Brunk, Giesler and 
Hartmann, 2018). The ‘desire for the past’ unfolds within ‘memory markets’ 
(Huyssen, 2003: 21). 
 Furthermore, any attempts whatsoever to look at the historical 
development of the memory boom in relationship with the advent of what is 
critically called ‘neoliberalism’ would have to acknowledge the concurrent 
character of the two phenomena. The global spread of the preoccupation with the 
past formulated by means of a mnemonic vocabulary and the institutionalization 
of a neoliberal approach in political and economic policies and practices became 
salient roughly in the same time span, that is towards the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s (Harvey, 2007: 2; Olick and Robbins, 1998: 107). They 
subsequently gained in intensity throughout the following decades. Thus, the 
mnemonic turn and the neoliberal turn were both potentiated by the 
contemporaneous dissolution of authoritarian regimes all across the globe, i.e. in 
Latin America, in Eastern Europe (including the bloody dismemberment of 
Yugoslavia), or in South Africa. Against this background, the apparently 
uncontested triumph of liberal democracy has been accompanied by an increase in 
the interest in memory issues and in processes of dealing and coming to terms 
with the past on the one hand and by the intensified dissemination and 
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institutionalization of neoliberal ideas and practices in the political and economic 
realms on the other hand.  
In the 1990s, the scope of political transformations appeared to definitively 
sanction the success of liberal capitalism, which could (at least for a while) free 
itself from the discourse of crisis and malaise that had been largely underpinning it 
in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. For liberal observers in need of some 
reasons to be enthused, history had abruptly and perhaps unexpectedly reached its 
end. Francis Fukuyama’s famous and, with hindsight, much too optimistic dictum, 
had become common currency in the 1990s (Fukuyama, 1992). However, if history 
had allegedly come to its end, it seemed that all that remained – on both the public 
and the private level – was ‘to give oneself to the multiple subjectivities of 
memory’ (Niven and Berger, 2014: 5). Thus, over the past three decades, memory 
and neoliberalism became key elements of hegemonic discourses, practices, and 
politics.2   
Public and political claims became increasingly concerned with the past 
rather than with the present or the future. In Eastern Europe, ‘[t]he range of 
memory practices adopted after 1989, especially by elites, was a continental 
novelty’ (Mark, 2010: xiii). In Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain, 
or Greece, the breakup with the authoritarian right-wing past furnishes at first 
glance a slightly distinct image, with the tension between memory, the surfeit of 
(official) forgetting, and neoliberalism appearing to be configured rather 
differently. Nonetheless, despite differences, largely all across Europe and even 
beyond, memory projects, public condemnations of the past, and various 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms revolved around the articulation of a 
‘new rights culture’, indebted to the human rights paradigm as a ‘last utopia’ 
(Huyssen, 2015: 29; Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 5; Moyn, 2012; Grosescu, Baby and 
Niemeyer, 2019).  
The memory boom is intrinsically linked with the growing interest for the 
memory of the Holocaust. In the footsteps of developments and evolutions 
occurring already in the 1970s and 1980s, the memory of the Holocaust acquired a 
global dimension, and with it came a growing focalization on the figures of the 
victim and of the witness (Novick, 2000; Eder, 2016; Levy and Sznaider, 2006; 
Chaumont, 2010; Wievorka, 2006). Yet the mnemonic institutionalization as well as 
the extraterritorialization of the Holocaust therewith related largely imply its 
depoliticization and decontextualization, its abstractization, its transformation into 
a moralizing story of perpetrators (and bystanders) against victims, of Good 
against Evil (Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 4). Along these lines, the Holocaust also 
turned into something resembling a template – rather imperfect, to say the least – 
for many other processes of and pleas for dealing with the past, informing human 
rights thinking and reparation processes (Torpey, 2006: 159). The 
 
2 In this context, the Latin American case is perhaps particularly interesting, since Chile has been the 
laboratory of neoliberal governance under the right-wing dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. The end 
of the dictatorship and the transition to liberal democracy have been on the one hand associated with 
a salience of memory issues, while on the other hand they did not imply getting rid of neoliberalism 
as a political and economic project (Poblete, 2015). 
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institutionalization of the memory of the Holocaust has been and continues to be a 
multifaceted process, also having straightforward political dimensions at the 
European level, as well as beyond. The official embrace of the memory of the 
Shoah was perceived in Eastern European countries as a necessary condition in 
order to enter the European Union (Judt, 2005: 803; Kucia, 2016). Yet such an 
embrace was bound to lead to discussions related to these societies’ own 
participation in the Holocaust and to tensions between the memory of the 
Holocaust and the memory of the Gulag. Furthermore, often distinctly drawing on 
the memory of the Holocaust, a humanitarian paradigm of human rights – 
generally centred on political and cultural rights rather than on social and 
economic rights and largely emphasizing the need for international interventions 
in humanitarian catastrophic emergencies – as well as a culture of trauma and 
victimhood emerged, expressed by means of a depoliticized humanitarian 
vocabulary (Moyn, 2012; 2017: 103–113; Fassin, 2012). The Holocaust provided ‘the 
foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory’ (Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 4). 
The increasing juridification and legal treatment of the recent and less 
recent past, taking for example the form of memory laws, is another process 
characterizing the memory boom (Koposov, 2018; Teitel, 2000). The apparently 
belated quest to bring WWII perpetrators to justice in the name of human rights 
and of the imprescriptibility of crimes against humanity, is an important aspect of 
this process as well (Hartog, 2015: 201). The debates about whether or how to 
symbolically (by means of gestures, apologies etc.) and legally come to terms with 
the past and to repair past injustices have clearly gained centre stage over the past 
three to four decades (Barkan, 2000; Olick, 2007).  
Throughout the same period of time with this increasing interest in and 
relevance of memory, the broad range of processes that are usually bundled 
together under the umbrella-term ‘neoliberalism’ have also become part and parcel 
of economic, social, and political life. Following the electoral successes of Margaret 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States, the term 
‘neoliberalism’ as such ‘increased sharply in usage in the 1980s, and even more so 
in the 1990s’. At a global level, the term got to be associated with the so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’ (Reinhoudt and Audier, 2018: 4). Concretely, the 
neoliberal turn has been characterized by the a concerted attack against 
Keynesianism, translated into the dismantlement of the welfare state and hence of 
the social consensus (or perhaps compromise) whose backbone was the welfare 
state, the glorification of privatizations and liberalization of markets as the 
solution to economic woes, especially against the background of the apparent 
failure of state socialism in Eastern Europe, and the move towards a financial 
capitalism. 
The increase in social and economic inequalities at both the national and the 
global levels is associated with the hegemonization of the Thatcherite TINA (There 
Is No Alternative) dictum. Eastern European countries morphed into the 
playground of neoliberal shock therapies presented as a necessary and inescapable 
element of the transition to democracy (Ther, 2016). In this context, an 
unprecedented transfer of property from public to private ownership took place, 
TOWARDS A DISENTANGLEMENT 31 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 27-42.  
most often legitimized by the idea that the injustices committed by state socialist 
regimes have to be undone. At the same time, the range of political options at hand 
greatly narrowed, as no political actors seemed willing to see beyond the political 
horizon informed by the ‘triad of liberalization, deregulation and privatization’ 
(Ther, 2016: 17). 
In Western Europe, the social-democratic parties continued to move closer 
to and eventually to almost appropriate the neoliberal mindset of the centre-right. 
Such parties played an important role in the dismantlement of the welfare state 
and in the adoption of entrepreneurship-friendly policies. Thus, the differences 
between Left and Right got increasingly blurred and irrelevant. Tony Blair’s New 
Labour in the United Kingdom and Gerhard Schröder’s Social-Democrats in 
(unified) Germany are perhaps the best exemplifications of this turn, but in effect 
no traditional mass Western European left-wing party has escaped the 
phenomenon. Keynesianism at the level of the nation state and ideas of 
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor largely stopped being part of the 
repertoire of political and economic options at hand. Furthermore, what came 
instead has not been an illusory transnational Keynesianism, but on the contrary, 
an accentuated shift towards neoliberal transnational governance. Thus, in Europe, 
‘[s]overeignty shifted decisively to EU’s unwieldy and undemocratic institutional 
frame’ (Eley, 2002: 408). Fundamentally, the apparent global success of liberal 
democracy that Fukuyama’s hastily announced ‘end of history’ assumed meant the 
consolidation and geographic extension of the neoliberal paradigm shift that had 
been gaining leverage since the 1980s. 
Yet it has to be underlined that neoliberalism as such stands in effect for 
something qualitatively different and broader than just a set of social and 
economic policies. It stands for a new type of reason and a new type of production 
of subjects. Thus, in neoliberalism, subjectivities and social relations are essentially 
remade according to entrepreneurial patterns. Contemporary neoliberal rationality 
‘configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and 
everywhere as homo oeconomicus’ (Brown, 2015: 31; Foucault, 2008; Bowsher, 
2018). 
Thus, the linguistic contamination exemplified at the beginning of this 
introduction reveals itself to be the symptom of a complex interwoven relationship 
of concurrence between the so-called memory boom and the triumphant march of 
neoliberalism. This relationship has not been subjected to an in-depth analytical 
treatment. At this stage, it is also worth emphasizing that the intellectual origins of 
neoliberalism and of what we would call today memory studies are also traceable 
to the same period: the interwar, when French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs 
engaged with the concept of ‘collective memory’ (Niven and Berger, 2014: 3), while 
economists such as Walter Eucken or Friedrich Hayek started developing the 
economic and political theories that are at the basis of contemporary neoliberalism 
(Biebricher, 2018; Slobodian, 2018). The particular political and social context of 
the post-World War I era heading towards another catastrophic conflagration was 
key for both sets of elaborations. Furthermore, at least at the European level, the 
West German postwar Ordoliberalism has been identified as setting the stage in 
32  CRISTIAN CERCEL  
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 27-42.  
the aftermath of the Second World War for the subsequent embrace of 
neoliberalism in the final decades of the twentieth century (Foucault, 2008). 
Similarly, the West German preoccupation for dealing or coming to terms with the 
past, first emerging in intellectual circles in the late 1950s and early 1960s has 
paved the way for the subsequent institutionalization of coming to terms with the 
past as a moral and political desideratum. These considerations are to a certain 
extent speculative, yet it might not be far-fetched to investigate whether some 
sources of the entangled and concurrent character of the memory boom and the 
neoliberal turn can perhaps be found in effect in the intellectual history of the two 
paradigms. 
 
2. Entanglements: Lines of research 
 
The existing literature foraying into the relationship between memory and 
neoliberalism has proposed different ways of looking at their synchronicity, thus 
indicating several research avenues that it would be worth pursuing in a more 
concerted manner in order to disentangle the apparent knots. One line of research 
emphasized for example that the assimilation of the economy to a mathematical 
model, typical of the neoliberal logic, presupposes that social groups do not call for 
redistribution, as such calls would constitute an unwanted and unwarranted 
intervention in the operations of neoliberalism. In this context, the function of the 
focalization on memory is that of muffling potential redistributive calls (Koposov, 
2018: 57; see also Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). In a similar vein, another line of 
research, which looks in depth at the relationship between transitional justice and 
neoliberalism argued that the memory work that transitional justice implies looks 
for a technically understood consensus that is supposed to bring societies together, 
without in any way attempting to interrogate socio-economic power relations, 
structures of inequality, systemic and structural violence. Thus, ‘it sketches out the 
conditions for a present where the antagonisms wrought by the economic relations 
of production’ are not seen in any way as relevant and hence are not critically 
addressed (Bowsher, 2018: 104). Furthermore, processes of juridification – 
underlying the functioning of both transitional justice and neoliberalism – are also 
an indication of the interwoven character of transitional justice (or memory as 
transitional justice) and neoliberalism (Bowsher, 2018; see also Bugarič, 2016). 
The contemporaneity of the memory boom and of the neoliberal turn has 
also been accounted for by situating it in the broader context of the dissolution of 
the post-war consensus, whose cornerstones were economic Keynesianism and an 
official antifascism at the level of the politics of the past.3 Seeing the two as tightly 
 
3 In this context, it is worth quoting from an extensive review of Pierre Nora’s famous Lieux de 
mémoire project. The multivolume work was published between 1984 and 1992 in France: ‘Surely 
every aspect of today’s “crise identitaire” has been accompanied—indeed, all but occasioned—by 
foreign developments, from the ending of the “trente glorieuses” (three decades of prosperity and 
comparative social peace) to the diminution of French sovereignty attendant on integration into the 
new Europe to, above all, the painful social dislocation brought on by increased Islamic immigration 
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related, historian Dan Stone (2014) has pointed out how memory politics and 
socio-economic change are inextricably linked.4 A great merit of his narrative also 
lies in the emphasis he places on the far-right’s re-emergence in Western Europe 
in the 1980s, connecting this phenomenon with the challenges undermining the 
official memories of war and fascism and thus with the re-articulation of memory 
beyond ossified antifascism.  The fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe gave 
another boost to this reconfiguration (Stone, 2014).  However, the more profound 
answers related to the deep causes and reasons of the synchronic dissolution, 
empirically documented, of economic Keynesianism and mnemonic antifascism – 
are not easily extractable from Stone’s otherwise highly readable and engaging 
account. The study does nonetheless indicate that the past and its memory have 
increasingly turned into a key arena of politics over roughly the past thirty years. 
It looks almost as if the potential conflicts related to the neoliberalization of the 
present are predominantly couched in or also in mnemonic terms, as they take the 
form of conflicts over the past. 
Arguments about the orientation towards the past play an important role in 
other analytic accounts as well, such as the one by John Torpey (2006), where this 
orientation is placed in connection to the disappearance of future-oriented politics. 
The global proliferation of reparations politics whose fundamental aim is that of 
‘making whole what has been smashed’, in Torpey’s apt formulation, is presented 
in his work as inextricably linked with or even as a symptom of the ‘unmistakable 
decline of a more explicitly future-oriented politics’ (Torpey, 2006: 5). To a large 
extent, Torpey suggests, contemporary politics looks more often towards the past 
rather than towards the future and functions almost as if it had a redemptory goal. 
Transformative future-oriented projects, normally associated with the political left, 
have stopped being on the political agenda: ‘For many people, even those who 
would unblinkingly regard themselves as progressives, the past has extensively 
replaced the future as the temporal horizon in which to think about politics’ 
(Torpey, 2006: 18). In a similar vein, even if they do not focus exclusively on 
memory-related issues, other critical accounts also point out the disappearance of a 
future redolent of promises, hopes, possibilities, and potentialities, as the temporal 
horizon of politics, against the background of the bankruptcy of ideologies and of 
hope-laden utopias, of the decline of the idea of progress (replaced by the cult of 
the new as a value in itself, no matter how useless or futile), and of the 
acceleration of politics and society (Taguieff, 2000; Leccardi, 2011; Hassan, 2009; 
Hartog, 2017). 
Yet this cancellation of the future did not bring with itself only an apparent 
political, social, and cultural focalization on the past and the mobilization for 
 
and the related, profoundly embarrassing, political backlash that is the National Front.’ (Englund, 
1992: 301) 
4 Historian Enzo Traverso (2016: 10) poignantly summed up one of the main characteristics of the 
phenomenon, namely the mnemonic turn towards victimhood: ‘The memory of the Gulag erased that 
of revolution, the memory of the Holocaust replaced that of antifascism, and the memory of slavery 
eclipsed that of anticolonialism: the remembrance of the victims seems unable to coexist with the 
recollection of their hopes, of their struggles, of their conquests and their defeats.’ 
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acknowledgment of past wrongdoings and for redress of past injustices. It also 
came together with a reconsideration of the articulation of the relationship 
between past, present, and future, a reconsideration best captured by what French 
historian François Hartog called ‘presentism’. If the (short) twentieth century stood 
largely under the aegis of futurism and of future-oriented politics, starting with its 
last third, the ‘present began replacing the future and encroaching further and 
further until, in recent years, it has seemed to take over entirely. The viewpoint of 
the present–the perspective of presentism–has established its dominion’ (Hartog, 
2017: 108). Hartog has argued that ‘presentism’ and the memory boom are closely 
linked. The present ‘in the very moment of its occurrence, seeks to view itself as 
already history, already past’, self-historicizes itself almost instantly (Hartog, 2017: 
114, 193). At the same time, memory is fundamentally about the construction and 
interpretation of the past ‘in and for the present’ (Szpunar and Szpunar, 2016: 381). 
The never-ending present underlies both the preoccupation for memory and 
the neoliberal ethos. The two practically reinforce each other (Traverso, 2016; see 
also Koposov, 2018: 53–57).5  Hence, one should not fall into the easy trap of 
regarding presentism and the aforementioned orientation towards the past as 
contradictory. Presentism is connected with both past and future, is a ‘suspended 
time between an unmasterable past and a denied future, between a “past that 
won’t go away” and a future that cannot be invented or predicted (except in terms 
of catastrophe)’ (Traverso, 2016: 8). The never-ending present is the past being 
reified, being turned into a commodity or into debt, it is an indebted present 
without an outward-looking perspective, which makes the future either impossible 
or simply irrelevant (Traverso, 2016, 8; Hartog, 2015: 193–204; Taguieff, 2000). 
 
3. Past, present and future 
 
The aforementioned explanations and tentative research directions definitely have 
their merits. Nonetheless, they seem to be speculatively circling around over the 
crux of the issue. They thus rather loosen and not completely disentangle the 
knots that appear to inextricably tie the memory boom and the neoliberal turn, as 
well as other related processes and phenomena. This piece does not aim to 
undertake such a complete disentanglement, but rather to recognize its necessity 
and to lay another stone onto a road that in effect still waits to be paved. 
It pays off bringing to the foreground questions related to time, temporality, 
and historicity as they can provide a relevant vantage point from which to address 
the linkage between the memory boom and the neoliberal turn. The implicit or 
explicit construction of the relationship between past, present, and future is 
quintessential for memory discourses and practices. Yet the experience and the 
social construction of time and hence of the triadic relationship between past, 
present, and future, is also at the core of the transformations that neoliberalism has 
 
5 In exchange, in a recent interview, Andreas Huyssen (2018) suggested that memory and 
neoliberalism stand in mutual opposition: ‘If anything, the memory boom of the 1980s and of the 
1990s stood in clear opposition to the idealization of an eternal present of global financialization and 
neoliberalism.’ 
TOWARDS A DISENTANGLEMENT 35 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 27-42.  
been producing. The neoliberal turn involves a transformation in thinking of and 
in constructing time. In this context, it would be both counter-intuitive and 
fundamentally fallacious to ignore the intense preoccupation with memory – 
fundamentally a preoccupation with time, on a scale that surpasses previous 
similar preoccupations – that has been accompanying this turn. 
Time in neoliberal capitalism is the fluid time of constant change, indebted 
to the cult of the new for the sake of newness, it is the time where the future 
already seems to be swallowed by the never-ending present. It is the time of 
(hyper)acceleration and (hyper)speed. Industrialism and modernity were 
themselves marked by acceleration, but this was still an acceleration politically 
held in check. The temporality they nurtured was forward-looking and indebted to 
the idea of progress, to the representation of a future in the process of being built. 
In exchange, the move towards neoliberal capitalism implies an almost unlimited 
expansion of the speed (and space) of capital, in the name of an abstract market 
ideal, presented as consensual, yet far from being so (Hassan, 2009). The future got 
subsumed to the desiderata of the present. Against this background, politics 
constructs the past instead of the future. 
By normatively establishing the primacy of the economic over the political 
(even if the way this primacy is configured might differ from case to case) and by 
situating us in a never-ending present, neoliberalism rejects the future as project 
and hence any potential future-oriented political or social struggle whose 
underlying aim is that of questioning this pre-eminence (see also Taguieff, 2000). 
Critical literature on neoliberalism argues that the future inscribed in the 
neoliberal project is a dystopic future of business markets that have fully 
transcended politics, of individuals shaped according to and by the markets, and of   
technocratic governance in which allegedly apolitical expertise is more important 
than democracy (see also Robinson, 2004). The other potential future that lurks on 
the horizon is the future as catastrophe – environmental, social, economic, 
political, civilizational. 
The short-termism and the unpredictability of contemporary financial 
capitalism make neoliberal presentism and the apparent emphasis on the past as 
memory easier to fathom. In the best case, memory, especially in its 
institutionalized forms, seems to function as an endeavour to introduce something 
of a moral character to the former. Liberal cosmopolitan memory discourses as 
well as the right-wing staunch conservative (antagonistic) memory discourses both 
share a moralizing dimension, which is meant to bestow legitimacy upon two only 
apparently contradictory present political and economic projects: globalized 
neoliberalism and authoritarian right-wing nationalism. However, despite what it 
might seem at a first superficial glance two projects do not stand so much in 
opposition. Presentist neoliberalism has shown itself more than apt to develop an 
anti-democratic symbiosis with past-oriented neoconservatism and various forms 
of nationalism, tightly linked with de-democratization processes (Harvey, 2007; 
Brown, 2006). As if mirroring this process, liberal cosmopolitan discourses, with 
their de-politicizing presuppositions, impulses, and implications, have shown 
themselves particularly apt to be appropriated, at least in their emphasis on 
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victimhood, by right-wing antagonistic memory discourses (see also Cento Bull 
and Hansen, 2016).  
The memory of atrocities and particularly the memory of the Holocaust as 
Europe’s negative myth act as legitimizing props for an essentially neoliberal 
project as the European Union (EU) is (Leggewie, 2008; Traverso, 2016: 15). Hence, 
(institutionalized) memory appears more often than not to provide a legitimation 
rather than a contestation of contemporary neoliberalism. Furthermore, the 
opposition towards the EU as well as towards other instantiations of contemporary 
neoliberalism might resort to mnemonic tropes, yet generally these tropes are 
illustrative of strongly conservative political projects, that do not in effect question 
neoliberalism as such, and its cult of the market, but only, in some cases, its 
globalized dimension. The temporality implied by such memory discourses 
imagines the future as a reiteration of an idealized past. This makes the future 
either impossible or dystopic. The putative future-looking orientation of liberal 
memory discourses aiming to contribute to the global imposition of a consensual 
human rights regime in the name of ‘Never again’ fails to tackle precisely the 
conditions which appear to lead rather to ‘Yet again’ (Levy and Sznaider, 2006; 
2010). The compassion-oriented moralistic humanitarianism that underlies it is 
also a substitution of politics (Fassin, 2012). Not only that the search for mnemonic 
foundations and the attempt to economically and symbolically atone for past 
wrongdoings are far from being interest-free and are prone to be turned upside 
down, but they lead to a never-ending loop from the present to the past and the 
back, in which the future fails to emerge because it has been made impossible. 
Interpreting past atrocities as human rights/humanitarian crises within the 
contemporary politics of memory legitimizes contemporary practices of 
‘humanitarian government’, that largely rely on a politics of inequality and of 
precarious lives (Fassin, 2012). The moral horizon of humanitarian politics, 
undergirded by cosmopolitan memory discourses and practices, precludes the 
construction of political solidarities and radical change. 
 
4. Memory, whereto? From politics of memory to memory of 
politics 
 
Recent scholarship engaging with memory has taken heed of the fact that the 
current political predicament seems to be linked with an impasse of the mnemonic 
models in circulation.6  For example, Anna Cento Bull and Hans Lauge Hansen 
(2016) have argued in favor of an agonistic mode of remembering. The two 
scholars drew on Chantal Mouffe’s theoretical elaborations regarding the need for 
an agonistic type of politics, whereas Mouffe (2005) in her turn had reinterpreted 
Carl Schmitt’s conceptualization of the political (2007). Along similar lines, 
Berthold Molden (2016) developed a mnemonic hegemony theory, conceptually 
related with the theory of agonistic memory. 
 
6 The discussion on Mouffe and agonistic memory largely draws on Cercel, 2018: 5-7. 
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 Mouffe, whose work both aforementioned elaborations rely on, even if to 
different extents, severely criticizes both the ‘post-political vision’ which informs 
neoliberal rationalism as well as the belief in a cosmopolitan, partisan-free, 
consensual order. She pleads for a recognition of the relevance of collective 
identifications and of the related antagonisms in the configuration of the ‘political’, 
understood as ‘the very way society is instituted’, together with the passions and 
emotions such identifications entail (Mouffe, 2005: 9). For her, the construction of 
agonistic spaces is meant to provide legitimate political channels for dissenting 
and counter-hegemonic voices and for the enunciation of opposing passions and 
affect. Without such acknowledgments and provisions, Mouffe argues, various 
nationalist, religious or ethnic forms of identification will eventually hijack and 
dominate the political. Against this background, Mouffe also emphasizes the need 
to recognize the hegemonic nature of social orders, and the fact that ‘every 
hegemonic order is susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic 
practices’ (Mouffe, 2005: 18). Hence, her agonistic democracy is constructed as a 
response to ‘the emergence of a new hegemonic project, that of liberal-
conservative discourse, which seeks to articulate the neo-liberal defence of the free 
market economy with the profoundly anti-egalitarian cultural and social traditions 
of conservatism’, and which would also ‘legitimize inequalities and restore the 
hierarchical relations which the struggles of previous decades had destroyed’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 175–176). 
 The mnemonic ethos of neoliberal hegemony implies the eternalization of 
the present order. The engagement with the past functions either as a prop of the 
latter or simply lacks the critical present- and future-oriented potential to 
contribute to change. The acts of remembrance and recollection oriented towards a 
political action in the present with the goal of producing radical change are largely 
absent, as are political projects with such goals. The left populist movements that 
have emerged in recent years, such as Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, or 
France Unbowed, have in effect oscillated between trying to resuscitate the 
antifascist mnemonic tradition and reinforcing some of the hegemonic tenets of 
mnemonic cosmopolitanism, yet largely failing to provide a proper counterweight 
to the appeal of antagonistic memory discourses promoted by contemporary right-
wing populist movements. 
 One way of putting together the aforementioned theoretical elaborations 
and the recognition that neoliberalism and the memory boom are linked by 
multiple threads is to argue for a concerted move from the politics of memory to 
the memory of politics (Lebow, 2006; Edkins, 2003). The politics of memory is both 
past-oriented and presentist, failing to promote the construction of a future in 
common. In exchange, the memory of politics could bring back to the foreground 
former futures, previous ideas of equality and radical democracy and the collective 
struggles aiming to put them into practice, could remind us that fighting for the 
future could give legitimacy to the present much more than fighting solely for the 
past. Such a conceptualization and an understanding of memory is visible in some 
contemporary mnemonic projects, which for example try to acknowledge for 
example the value of past left-wing struggles in Latin America in the 1970s, or 
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which denounce and criminalize the complicity of multinational corporations in 
wars, dictatorships, or in industrial disasters. Such projects are fundamentally 
counter-hegemonic at this stage. A counter-hegemonic memory of politics could 
play a role in the enabling of the construction of a radically democratic future, as it 
is meant to show us that the current social and political status quo is not 
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In the history of post-WWII Western emancipation movements, a 
marked shift took place from a liberation to a recognition 
paradigm. The latter embodies a distinctly post-political 
conceptualisation of social justice in its (re)formulation of the 
political with respect to the personal and with respect to social 
relations. As a result, recognition politics not only gives way to the 
fragmentation of justice claims, but also weaponises them against 
each other, as for instance ‘sexual and gender minority’ politics 
have expropriated crucial political arenas from feminist politics. 
These permutations of recognition politics are not the result of 
spontaneous, inevitable development, but that of political 
intervention devised to transform, neutralise, and absorb radical 
politics. Recognition politics has thus become a basic hegemonic 
strategy of transformism, consensus-building, and the forging of 
‘common sense.’ Despite the mechanisms deployed to manage its 
internal contradictions (like the rainbow coalition and 
intersectionality), reinvigorated criticisms have blamed recognition 
politics for the crumbling of the current hegemony of liberalism. 
However, recognition seems to have been so deeply embedded in 
the social and cultural imagination that apparently neither internal 
critiques, nor the currently emerging counter-hegemonic projects 
can shake it off. 
 
Keywords: ideology, hegemony, post-politics, personal/political, feminism, intersectionality, rainbow 
coalition.
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1. Introduction: The politics of recognition politics? 
 
Since its revival in moral and political philosophies in the 1990s, recognition has 
been conceptualised in various ways to grasp issues like the ‘adequate’ recognition 
of someone’s universal human dignity and/or particular merits, and the lack of 
such recognition due to, for instance, demeaning stereotypes about certain 
undervalued groups. Recognition and its ‘disturbances’ (also referred to as 
misrecognition) have been approached, for instance, as the satisfaction or 
infringement of a basic (either specifically modern or universal) human need and 
hence as the universal driving force behind social conflicts (compare Taylor, 1992, 
and Honneth, 1992), or as struggles over social status inequalities under the 
specific historical circumstances of the post-socialist age (Fraser, 1995). 
The recognition paradigm of justice has received various criticisms, which 
pointed out, among other things, its inadequacy for grasping (and redressing) the 
complexities of (unequal) social, let alone economic relations. In fact, recognition 
issues have been analysed as increasingly displacing and marginalising concerns 
about economic injustices, since they have been increasingly disembedded from 
and overrepresented to the detriment of redistribution issues (Fraser, 1995: 68). 
Another line of critique contends that recognition embodies the same logic as 
misrecognition if it is supposed to make amends within the same non-reciprocal 
(power) relationship that enacted misrecognition in the first place, and thus often 
it is no more than a paternalistic gesture (Fanon, 1986: 169–173). Moreover, 
recognition advocates frequently presume that the power mechanisms of 
recognition interact with pre-existing identities, while in fact they are integral to 
subject formation, and hence they fail to realise that what they consider 
emancipatory recognition involves the incorporation of power relations into 
individual subjectivity (McNay, 2008: 2). The centring of recognition as the 
primary (or only) foundation for justice has thus been critiqued, inter alia, as 
overlooking or even legitimating certain mechanisms of power and thereby 
coming up short of an adequate analysis of injustices and their causes. 
Many of these and other analyses inevitably touch on questions of ideology 
and politics such as, for instance, the relationship between ideology and 
subjectivation (e.g. Althusser, 1971; Honneth, 2007). However, what the specific 
politics of recognition politics is, and how its conceptualisation of the political (in 
actual recognition claims) appears and plays out in the wider politico-ideological 
landscape of hegemonic struggles has received less attention. 
This theoretical paper will address these questions in the context of the 
emergence and recent cracking of liberal hegemony. After outlining my theoretical 
framework, I will overview the changing tenor of the personal/political 
relationship in emancipation movements from the emergence of New Left 
movements to today’s post-political recognition politics through the example of 
Anglo-American feminism, and subsequently explore how these forms of politics 
were/are embedded in hegemonic projects. As part of this, I will explore in what 
ways recognition politics contributes to hegemony, and what its inherent 
contradictions are that have, according to some of its discontents, enabled the rise 
of the populist right. 
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2. Ideology, hegemony and (post-)politics in a Gramscian 
theoretical framework 
 
The advantage of a Gramscian theoretical framework in approaching such cross-
cutting questions like recognition is that it does not collapse either the economic, 
social, political, or cultural level of the ‘relation of forces’ under any of the other 
levels. For Gramsci, the material forces of production provide the basis for the 
formation of social classes, whose collective political consciousness moves from 
individual mechanical cooperation to organisation based on solidarity and finally 
to full-fledged ideologies that confront each other (Gramsci, 1979: 180–181). The 
prevailing ideology propagates itself throughout society, presenting itself as a 
universal answer to the questions around which political struggles are waged, 
forging an intellectual and moral unity around economic and political aims, and 
thereby creating the hegemony of a social group over subordinate groups (ibid., 
181). 
Ideology in this understanding is not the covering of truth with lies, but the 
mechanism with which the hegemonic group forges the consent of the groups over 
which it asserts its hegemony; for in Gramsci’s conception, hegemony differs from 
domination in that the former rests largely on consent while occasionally also 
resorting to coercion, while the latter relies predominantly on coercion. Thus, to 
establish hegemony, the leading group has to make concessions to the subordinate 
groups, creating an equilibrium in which its own interests prevail with this 
limitation (ibid., 161, 182). Ideological struggles are waged and won in civil society 
(the level of the superstructure that is frequently considered ‘private’), which thus 
becomes an entrenchment of hegemonic ideology (ibid., 12, 235). Thus, unlike the 
situation in 1917 Russia, where civil society was not developed, the extensive civil 
society of modern Western societies functions as a buffer zone against the 
immediate seizure and sustenance of (state) power; for this reason, in such 
societies the strategy of frontal attack (‘war of manoeuvre’) cannot succeed, but 
instead, the ideological foundations of an alternative hegemonic bloc have to be 
laid first (‘war of position’) (ibid., 235–239). Hegemonic endeavours, for this 
reason, are always directed to changing the culture that society’s norms, 
rationality and self-interpretation are grounded in (Kiss, 2018: 232–241). If a 
hegemonic project succeeds, its conceptions of ‘life and man’ sediments itself even 
in the diffuse, uncoordinated, unreflected aspects of thought and sentience – in 
other words, they become ‘common sense’ (Gramsci, 1979: 326–331). 
Neo-Gramscian approaches, mostly following Cox (1981; 1983), have 
theorised hegemonic projects on a global scale led by a group of countries or, in an 
era of intensifying transnationalisation, increasingly by (a certain fraction of) the 
transnational capitalist class. The hegemonic bloc also encompasses an array of 
politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals, media workers and a layer of mostly middle-
class locales (Robinson, 2005: 565), with international organisations playing a 
central role in administering its mechanisms (Cox, 1983: 171–173). 
This hegemonic warfare is strikingly played out today as the current 
Western cultural hegemony is cracking before our eyes. The current hegemony as 
an unfolding project predates the end of the Cold War, yet it was the demise of the 
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Soviet Union that has heralded a unipolar capitalist world order with what some 
have called the uncontested hegemony of liberalism (Mouffe, 2005: 9–10). One of 
the central cultural principles of liberal hegemony is a universalist view of the 
human as an autonomous individual existing prior to (and unformed by) social 
relations, self-interested, and instrumentally rational (Rupert, 1995: 660), which 
construes social and economic problems as individual ones. The other central 
ideological underpinning of the current hegemony is the mainstream liberal 
conception of politics as rational consensus-based decision-making rather than the 
arena where antagonistic forces struggle with each other (Mouffe, 2005: 10–11), 
which stigmatises discontents as irrational and immoral. However, this post-
political denial of rationally unresolvable conflicts and the propelling of politics 
into the moral register only exacerbates conflicts (ibid., 2–5). The unwritten 
thought censorship of anything challenging the liberal consensus (Žižek, 2002: 
544–545) thus made it easier to channel growing discontent into a counter-
hegemonic bloc. After early, arguably ideologically incoherent and undefined 
attempts at contestation following from the internal contradictions and tensions of 
liberal capitalism (Rupert, 1997: 105), liberal hegemony started to be seriously 
challenged in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 2010s, with right-wing populism on the 
rise and alternative historical blocs emerging first in the semi-peripheries and then 
in the core as well. 
In the following, I will examine how recognition politics fits into this 
landscape, beginning with an overview of the major shifts in Anglo-American 
emancipatory politics since the 1960s, choosing feminist (later transmuted as 
gender) politics as an example. My purpose is not to provide a historical overview 
of feminist politics, recognition politics, or radical politics (all of which, of course, 
predate this era), but to explore how the contentions between the different 
conceptions of the political in emancipatory politics are part of a larger hegemonic 
struggle. 
 
3. From the personal is political to the political is personal, from 
liberatory politics to post-politics 
 
New Left theory and movements unfolding in the 1950s and 1960s were 
characterised by a remarkable focus on the key role of ideology in maintaining 
repressive social structures (Kiss, 2018: 45). One of the central questions of 
different traditions such as Critical Theory and American black and feminist 
liberation movements was how individual experiences and identities are (partially) 
produced by ideology. In the mainstream emancipation claims of today, many of 
these key insights about the relationship between the personal and the political 
have changed beyond recognition. In the following, I will highlight a major shift in 
Western emancipation movements through the example of Anglo-American 
feminist organising and theorising. 
‘The personal is political’ is perhaps the most well-known slogan of second-
wave feminism, highlighting its focus on issues considered to be personal. This 
catchphrase has been used in slightly different, albeit connected senses ever since. 
It emerged from women’s experience of organising in New Left and other 
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liberation movements, where men who dominated the movements did not take 
sex-based subordination seriously, impelling women to have discussions separately 
from men. This is also revealed in the first written use of the slogan, a 1969 memo 
entitled The Personal is Political written by Carol Hanisch. The memo, whose title 
and content are both greatly indebted to collective feminist thinking (Hanisch, 
2006), addressed a general nervousness of men in these movements about the 
burgeoning women’s liberation movement. Many of the men and women in the 
New Left political group that Hanisch participated in criticised women’s 
consciousness-raising groups as ‘navel gazing’ and ‘therapy.’ Women were 
typically ridiculed for bringing their ‘personal,’ especially ‘body issues,’ into the 
public arena, which were seen as individual problems only pertaining to the people 
involved. The idea of ‘the personal is political’ contested such separation of 
political and personal issues. 
Consciousness raising, as Hanisch argued in her memo, was not about 
coming together for support or to solve ‘personal problems.’ By sharing ‘personal’ 
stories, women could recognise that many of their experiences in the spheres of 
sexuality, relationships, family, and reproduction were far from unique – they 
were actually rather widespread among women. Consciousness raising often, as in 
Hanisch’s example, fuelled both an analysis of the political origin of ‘women’s 
problems’ and political action aimed at changing the political arrangement instead 
of trying to find individual solutions to political problems. The personal is political 
thus originally meant the criticism of the ideological separation of the private and 
the public sphere, highlighting the political nature of the separation itself as well 
as of the issues deemed to be private and personal. This also involved an analysis 
of the individual personal experience as having been formed in a political 
environment. 
Similar arguments were put forward in the Redstocking Manifesto the same 
year (Redstockings, 1969), interpreting the man-woman relationship as a class 
relationship, and conflicts between individual men and women as class conflicts 
that should be solved collectively. While the manifesto describes women’s 
suffering as a political condition, it also states that the Redstockings regard their 
personal experience and their feelings about that experience as the basis for an 
analysis of women’s common situation. Experience as a key concept connecting 
the personal with the social and the political has a complex, dual status here and in 
many second-wave feminist accounts: it is both the starting point of analysis given 
that existing knowledge is permeated with patriarchal ideology, and also in need of 
analysis given that it is rooted in women’s oppression.1  
 
1 Scott (1991: 787) was partly right in the early 1990s when she claimed that much of Anglo-American 
feminist theorising used experience as a foundational concept, but she played down the fact that 
many feminist critiques did not take experience at face value, but rather as a politically constructed 
phenomenon to be analysed and transformed itself (see e.g. Sarachild, 1975; Women’s Liberation 
Workshop, 1969). Scott suggested an approach that was exactly the opposite of what she 
simplistically attributed to earlier feminist analysis, and was not any less reductive from a theoretical 
and methodological perspective: that experience should not be the origin of explanation, but that 
which should be explained (Scott, 1991: 797). See Alcoff (1997) for a detailed criticism of Scott and a 
feminist phenomenological approach to experience. 
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Feminist approaches, especially since the 1980s, raised questions about the 
consequences of this circular interdependence of the personal and the political for 
feminist politics: if ‘woman’ is (partly) constructed by patriarchal power relations, 
how can the feminist movement contest these power relations by relying on this 
identity as its very basis? Some of the responses, however, subverted the political 
critique of the women’s liberation movement. Probably the most noted 
contribution to this question in academic feminism is the early work of Judith 
Butler (1990). This postmodernist-influenced approach forecloses the political as it 
conflates the politically constructed and contingent with the fictitious by claiming 
that there is only performance without ‘identity’ (i.e. women)2 and by relativising 
the political materiality of reproductive biology. It also paralyses political action by 
liquidating the subject of feminism (i.e. women as agents and matters of politics) in 
arguing that the category of woman should not be the foundation of feminist 
politics (e.g. Butler, 1990: 3–33). Even though some of these claims are toned down 
or revised in Butler’s subsequent work (e.g. Butler, 1992), some feminists have 
critiqued this approach not unjustly as undermining or reversing the idea of the 
personal is political.3 One of the more rewarding approaches to this basic question 
influenced by postmodernist (and postcolonialist) theories is Spivak’s strategic 
essentialism, which strives to carve out a representative essentialist position in 
which to do politics, while remembering the pitfalls of this strategy (Spivak and 
Harasym, 1990: 45). In other words, feminists entering the political arena can 
assert identities as constructed and provisional rather than fixed and 
metaphysically true.4 While the idea that women do not share an eternal, pre-
political essence is not new in feminist politics, the focus of postmodernist 
approaches is increasingly on the subject, as opposed to the women’s liberation 
paradigm’s main interest in the political. 
There were certainly other, often interlocking trajectories that arrested the 
feminist critique of the complex personal/political interrelation. Out of several 
developments in the personalisation of the political, anchored in the increasingly 
prevalent discourses of psychology and human rights,5 I highlight the ones that are 
the most central in today’s gender discourse as paradigmatic examples of wider 
tendencies of individualising, minoritising and victimhood-focused perspectives in 
emancipatory politics. 
Probably the most far-reaching turning point in the changing feminist 
politicisation of the personal was the so-called feminist sex wars, a fierce series of 
debates and clashes in the American and British feminist scene in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (see e.g. Ferguson, 1984, and Dines and Jensen, 2008, for a 
summary). The dissension flared up around questions of sexuality and its 
 
2 Identity here does not refer to self-identification, as opposed to its most widespread use in 
contemporary gender discourse. 
3 That ‘the personal is political’ has been reversed in mainstream (academic) feminism is a frequently 
made claim in certain non-mainstream feminisms, see e.g. Bell and Klein (1996). Postmodernism was 
also subject to intense debates between feminists in the 1990s. 
4 This is the inversion of Hekman’s definition of identity politics (Hekman, 1999: 4). 
5 On the role of the rationalised language of psychology and the moralised language of human rights 
in the exercise of political power in liberal democracies and global relations, see e.g. Rose (1996) and 
Mutua (2002), respectively. 
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relationship to power. There had been serious debates about some of these 
questions among feminists before, yet what had an important role in sparking the 
sex wars was the legal strategy developed by two anti-pornography feminists, 
Dworkin and MacKinnon, of enabling women to start civil suits against 
pornographers to curb a burgeoning industry that they analysed as being based on 
and actively nourishing patriarchal power structures.6 Among the feminists 
opposing the legalist anti-pornography strategy, some were critical of the porn 
industry but rejected what they interpreted as censorship, while others even 
celebrated the allegedly transgressive and beneficial potential of practices like 
sado-masochism and pornography (see e.g. Califia, 1994). Both the anti-porn and 
pro-porn (‘pro-sex’) camps included many lesbians, but many in the latter group 
started to speak less for women than for ‘sexual/erotic minorities’ like 
homosexuals and sado-masochists and of sexuality as external and resistant to 
rather than enmeshed in power relations (see e.g. Duggan and Hunter, 2006 for a 
‘pro-sex’ rendition of the events and actors). 
This ‘pro-sex’ politics was heralded in academia by Gayle Rubin’s Thinking 
Sex (1984). In this momentous piece, Rubin famously claims that sexuality in 
Western societies has been structured in a repressive and punitive framework, 
leading to a sexual oppression that is distinct from other oppressions but whose 
logic is similar to that of racism (Rubin, 1984: 267–284). Certain ‘erotic non-
conformists’ or ‘dissenters,’ as the argument goes, have been persecuted by right-
wing anti-sex ‘morality crusaders’ throughout history in waves of panic (such as 
the AIDS panic), including today’s ‘anti-porn fascists.’ Rubin’s main claim is that 
sexuality and gender are distinct arenas of social practice with their own 
hierarchies and therefore they should be separated analytically; sexuality thus 
should not be considered as the territory of feminist analysis but of an autonomous 
theory and politics of sexuality yet to be developed (ibid., 308–309). The article 
indeed has a lasting legacy: it was instrumental in the consolidation of gay and 
lesbian studies and in the later foundation of sexuality studies as a distinct 
research area with a distinct research matter.7  
As opposed to the radical feminist critique of sexuality as a main site of the 
reproduction, eroticisation and naturalisation of various (including gendered and 
racial) power relations through acts of submission, humiliation, and violence (e.g. 
 
6 There were certainly many other ideological and strategic issues at stake in the sex wars, including 
legalism, censorship, victimhood or liberation centredness, agency, and industrial lobbies. These are, 
however, more distantly related to my topic and therefore not addressed here. 
7 It is more than ironic that Rubin’s call for sexuality studies, an important event in the history of 
inciting discourses of sexuality, actually cites and vastly misreads Foucault as a theorist of the social 
constructedness of sexuality. Foucault analysed how the idea of sexuality appeared in a specific 
historical time to produce knowledge about the vitality of the population, and how the different 
strategies that penetrate and control everyday pleasure have produced rather than repressed 
polymorphous sexualities. Rubin’s programmatic text is, in my analysis, another event in the 
deployment of the biopolitical apparatus of sexuality, which conspicuously employs a rhetoric that 
Foucault referred to as the repressive hypothesis (Foucault, 1978: 1–13) The evocation of repressed 
sexuality and the imminent threat of the ‘prudish,’ ‘right-wing’ anti-porn activists also appeared in 
many other ‘pro-sex’ polemics in the sex wars (and since then), as for instance in Califia’s writings 
(1994). 
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Lorde, 1982), the ‘pro-sex’ approach suggests that this very critique contributes to 
the demonization and persecution of repressed sexual practices like sado-
masochism. What this reterritorialisation of sexuality by ‘pro-sex’ advocates 
means is that the analysis of a vast array of power relations is banned from the 
territory of sexuality. Although Rubin declares that sexuality is political and that it 
is not completely divorced from gender and other relations of power, what her 
description of sexuality suggests is that sexuality is political to the extent that it is 
oppressed by politics, not that it is engendered by and infused with politics (at 
least not the sexuality of ‘erotic non-conformists’). With this shift in mainstream 
American feminism, the analysis of the political nature of sexual desires and 
practices is confined, and the politicality of the personal is proscribed in the name 
of ‘sexual minorities.’8  
The analysis of power relations was pushed back even further in the name 
of newer minorities. With the emergence of transgender activism in the late 1980s, 
the concept of ‘gender identity’ (i.e. the inner feeling about oneself as a man, 
woman, or something else) became a more and more dominant idea about gender 
(Feró, 2019: 173–174). Today’s mainstream (though not only) conception of gender 
identity in transgender activism is that it is inborn (Brubaker, 2016: 36), therefore it 
is unrelated to the materiality of the body and to gender norms (i.e. the sex-specific 
social expectations, unwritten rules, and sanctions, which are instrumental in 
reproducing the hierarchical relationship between men and women). What the 
idea of an innate gender identity entails – and what mainstream transgender 
activists demand to be recognised – is a transcendental feminine or masculine 
essence in our innermost selves. This radically diverts from the idea of the 
personal is political as formulated by the women’s liberation movement, which 
analyses personal subjectivity (including our personal feelings about ourselves) as 
having been formed in relation to the social, cultural, and political environment 
(including gender norms). There is thus a necessarily antagonistic relationship 
between mainstream transgender activism and critical theories (including system-
critical feminism). As transgender activism has become the cutting-edge human 
rights issue (Feró and Bajusz, 2018: 181), the critical analysis of gender identity as 
having been formed in relation to gender norms has been increasingly 
excommunicated and stigmatised as the questioning of transgender identity and 
experience, and as such, as transphobic hatred.9 In other words, while the women’s 
liberation movement attempted to highlight the political nature of the personal, 
newly emerging minorities attempted to withdraw crucial parts of the personal 
from feminist political analysis by claiming it to be their own private territory. 
 
8 There had been various streams of gay and lesbian (or homophile) politics before, some of which 
did not consider gayness or lesbianism as an inborn characteristic, but rather as a radical potentiality 
to liberate sexuality for all, or as a basis of female solidarity and resistance (Jagose, 1997: 30–57). 
9 See Allen et al. (2018) for a philosophical discussion of claims made by a transgender scholar that 
gender-critical feminist views on gender count as “propaganda” because they do not accept 
transgender identity and experience as evidence in themselves without any further analysis. See 
Csányi (2017) for the summary of a debate in Hungarian online media following a leftist feminist 
discussion of experience as politically constructed rather than flowing from some inner gender 
essence, with one response conflating leftist feminist analysis with the right-wing populist 
government’s natalist rhetoric. 
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Even as approaches influenced primarily by postmodern theories on the one 
hand and trends oriented mostly by questions of sexual and gender minorities on 
the other are based on rather different and conflicting theoretical presuppositions, 
there are significant commonalities between them. They each pioneer an extreme 
conception of human subjectivity that is influenced by different psy-discourses 
(Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis and post-war American psychology-
sexology),10 while they do not centre theories of the political.11 Besides, even 
though these two conceptions of the subject contradict each other in many 
respects, these two gender approaches have converged at certain points. For 
instance, Judith Butler oriented herself early towards the ‘pro-sex’ side of the sex 
wars (see Bracewell, 2016: 23), and in spite of her continued suspicion of 
‘identities’ in her later work, she asserted the importance of recognising and 
validating transgender and intersexual identities, and reaffirmed the (partial) 
territorialisation of gender from feminist analysis by these newly emerging 
claimants (Butler, 2004: 1–16). At the same time, Butler’s work has informed the 
idea that gender is a spectrum with countless ‘non-binary’ gender identities, 
combining a concept of gender as unfixed and ‘fluid’ as theorised in gender 
performativity with a concept of gender as a personal and innate characteristic as 
postulated by gender minority discourse. Even though these two currents might 
seem to be substantially diverging, they are also often mixed in contemporary 
gender discourses, especially in activism.  
The above-mentioned events in Anglo-American feminist analysis suggest 
that although the relationship of the personal and the political never had a unitary 
interpretation in feminist analysis, a significant shift in its conceptualisation has 
taken place since the emergence of the women’s liberation movement. This also 
meant a change in the predominant conceptualisation of justice. The women’s 
liberation paradigm did not frame its aims in terms of recognition and did not 
expect recognition from existing social institutions but struggled to be liberated 
from them. Moreover, it typically did not analyse women as a subordinated status 
group but more as an exploited sex class, positing an antagonistic relationship that 
cannot be overcome by recognition. The mainstream gender paradigm of today, on 
the other hand, is markedly characterised by a recognitive logic within the existing 
social system. Mainstream feminism and especially sexual and gender minority 
activism are struggling for the social and legal recognition of their misrecognised 
identities and experiences, which they presume to exist prior to (mis)recognition 
(Fraser, 2005: 298–299; Jagose, 1996: 61). This recognition model does not 
presuppose antagonisms in questions of (in)justice, but rather attempts to solve 
 
10 As accounts of the inner life and conduct of humans through which individuals come to 
understand and act upon themselves, such psy-influenced theories of the subject advance techniques 
of governing the self that feed into techniques of governing others in liberal political settings (Rose, 
1996). These gender discourses are therefore at the forefront of progressing governing techniques. 
11 Their attempts at theorising the political are typically extensions of their theories of subjectivity 
(possibly supplemented with reflections on the content, terrain, strategies or any other facet of actual 
or envisioned politics) rather than theorisations of the driving forces and workings of the political. 
See such attempts in e.g. Butler and Scott (1992). 
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social problems within the same structure through technical means (like, for 
instance, visibility and representation). 
Between these two paradigms there is a fundamental discrepancy: one 
construes social struggles as morally motivated, allowing for the possibility of 
social resolution, the other as springing from clashing antagonistic interests or 
incongruent values (Honneth, 1992: 145–151). The recognition paradigm of justice 
is thus distinctly post-political in that it negates politics on two interrelated levels: 
it denies the antagonisms inherent in capitalist social relations (and hence 
contemporary emancipation politics) as well as the political nature of (some 
aspects of) the personal. Accordingly, the current hegemony of recognitive justice 
not only has marginalised redistribution claims, as its most popular critique states, 
but it has also solidified a post-political conception of social justice struggles as 
resolvable moral conflicts as opposed to radical political challenges that tend(ed) to 
understand them as antagonistic political conflicts. 
This major change in the dominant forms of emancipatory politics, in short, 
can be described as a conversion from the critique of to the convergence with 
hegemonic ideology. With this I do not mean to suggest that emancipatory politics 
were ever uniform with respect to their relationship to hegemonic ideology.12 
There has certainly been a diversity of feminist activisms since the 1960s until 
these days, yet a marked shift can be clearly observed. This striking rearrangement 
from feminist ideology critique that grew out of New Left movements to today’s 
hegemonic recognition politics can be understood through the immense power of 
the capitalist system to absorb and neutralise critiques for its survival (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005: 27). Of course, such absorption is typically not a spontaneous 
process, but a result of political intervention. In the next section I will look at how 
recognition politics has emerged and fared with respect to hegemonic struggles. 
 
4. The unrecognised contradiction of recognition politics and its 
symptom management 
 
The omnipresence and continuous fragmentation of identities and recognition 
claims in late capitalism has been commonly voiced in social sciences. The 
ubiquity of identity claims has been interpreted, among other ways, in the context 
of globalisation’s simultaneous globalising and individualising pressures, the more 
transitory and elusive nature of contemporary power relations, and consumerism 
selling life-styles and brands of identity (Bauman, 2001a; 2001b; Braidotti, 2005–
2006). As for the motivations of corporate, NGO or individual actors to recognise 
or represent identity-based claims, the economic benefits of non-discriminatory 
employment (and marketing), ‘diversity’ as a newer form of symbolic capital, and 
consequently recognition as a new currency in certain social settings are among 
the notable ones (Watkins, 2018; Nagle, 2017). 
 
12 As, for instance, many feminists continued to contest the reversals of the idea of the personal is 
political, yet these critiques have been gradually forced out of the mainstream both in academia and 
the media. 
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Besides the interweaving social, economic, technological and cultural 
aspects, there are political and ideological factors contributing to the ubiquity of 
recognition claims that are worth examining in the context of hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic endeavours. First, it is essential to look at how these forms of 
politics emerged. Not long after the radical liberation movements started to unfold, 
philanthropic foundations like the Ford Foundation started to shovel billions of 
dollars into projects and groups (including black and women’s rights organisations 
and many more) whose visions matched their own, establishing a well-resourced 
institutional basis hidden behind the façade of self-organised services and 
informational networks (Watkins, 2018: 21–24). As a result, a wide array of NGOs 
and lobby groups featuring an anti-discrimination paradigm of emancipation were 
set up, which socialised with the political elite rather than their supposed 
constituency – this way absorbing a large number of cadres from liberation 
movements and engaging their energies with bureaucratic tasks rather than 
militant organising (ibid.). This anti-discrimination model, based on the logic of 
legal and social recognition, did much to entrench the recognition paradigm in the 
common sense conception of social justice. There were other points of 
intervention as well, most notably academic knowledge production. Both black 
studies and women’s studies (later renamed gender studies) were institutionalised 
under the tutelage of the Ford Foundation, which also actively influenced the later 
development of these fields, including encouraging critical thinking within 
acceptable limits (Roelofs, 2003: 44; Watkins, 2018: 24–26).13  
McGeorge Bundy, who played a salient role in this strategy as the president 
of the Ford Foundation for over a decade throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
explicitly stated that this intervention was aimed at preventing organisations from 
radicalisation and served to make the world safe for capitalism (Roelofs, 2003: 125; 
Watkins, 2018: 22).14 This intervention in both the political and the academic fields 
sufficed to absorb and domesticate actors and endeavours antagonistic to the 
ruling elites into hegemonic political structures — a process that Gramsci calls 
‘transformism’ (Gramsci, 1979: 58). Enormous amounts were spent to 
fundamentally shape the social and cultural imagination with respect to social 
conflicts and possible alternatives (or the lack thereof), effectively marginalising 
and sidelining the radical challenges to the prevailing economic, political and 
social system. Today’s mainstream emancipatory politics, thus, is not the result of 
a spontaneous and inevitable institutionalisation and moderation of earlier radical 
politics as the mainstream historical narrative would have it, but that of carefully 
crafted political work.  
The transformism of radical challenges is also strongly related to another 
important requisite of hegemony, namely the forging of consent (Gramsci, 1979: 
181–182). The mainstreaming of recognition politics through the neutralisation of 
liberation movements not only managed to incorporate the active figures of the 
 
13 For a detailed account of how foundations de-radicalised women’s studies, see Proietto (1999).  
14 Besides such statements, the timing and direction of funding also suggests that elite patronage has 
been typically a response to the challenge of grassroots movements rather than motivated by 
conscience: in the case of black organising, funding was primarily reactive and directed at moderate 
organisations (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986: 827). 
54  DALMA FERÓ  
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 43-66.  
antagonistic forces, but also widened the consensus by addressing members of 
their social groups. From this perspective, bigger social groups are more worth 
recognising, as the bigger the specific group is, the more people can be included in 
the consensus. 
This, of course, might clash with other political, economic and social 
considerations, as the fragmentation of identity claims attests. There might be an 
internal logic to the splintering of identity claims based on a group’s purportedly 
shared problems, as certain members of the group always feel excluded because of 
internal differences within the group, as did many black women from both black 
and women’s movements. However, this dismemberment was not as logical and 
necessary a development as it might seem from today’s compulsory 
intersectionality paradigm. As the establishment of identity-based politics itself, 
the further fragmentation of identities serves the hegemonic logic as it further 
fragments the (potentially) dissenting base and the scope of problems addressed. It 
thus should not come as a surprise that the focus on minority women, especially 
black women, and the intersection or interconnection of gender, race, ethnicity, 
class, and sexuality that have come to dominate gender studies since the 1990s, is 
to a considerable extent indebted to the Ford Foundation’s programme to 
mainstream minority women’s studies since the mid-1980s (Chamberlain, 1994: 
222–223; Hill, 1990: 24–38; Goss, 2007: 1186–1187). Thereupon, in the early 1990s, 
philanthropic organisations, including the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation started to 
increase their funding for sexuality research, which was an important factor 
(besides the breakout of AIDS epidemic in the 1980s) in legitimating sexuality 
studies as an academic research area (Aggleton, Parker and Thomas, 2015: 3–4). 
The mainstream approaches of gender studies and activism since the 1990s, which 
are frequently presented as superseding former, allegedly essentialist versions of 
feminist analysis, were thus supported by philanthropic donors at a time when 
legalist radical feminism started to question something as foundational in the 
economic and social structure as patriarchal sexuality. 
Besides its role in transformism and consensus-making, recognition politics 
also contrives to sediment the mainstream liberal conceptions of the human, 
society, and politics as ‘common sense.’ The most mainstream form of recognition 
politics is based on a concept of the human as an autonomous, self-enclosed 
individual whose values, predilections, and choices are independent of its social, 
cultural, political and economic context, as exemplified by some contemporary 
‘feminisms’ calling for a recognition of women’s choices rather than scrutinising 
them in relation to their wider context (see Budgeon, 2015: 307). Furthermore, 
mainstream recognition politics assumes a conception of social problems as a 
matter of old-fashioned stereotypes (rather than following from antagonisms, for 
instance), and of their political redress as a matter of learning tolerance. There are, 
of course, significant differences between various recognition politics as to how 
extreme they are in both these respects. For instance, the problems faced by 
women and American blacks are more difficult to reduce to the recognition 
paradigm because they are deeply embedded in redistributive matters, whereas the 
problems faced by ‘sexual and gender minorities’ are more distantly related to 
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redistributive questions and can easily be presented merely as a matter of 
individual tolerance, interpreted as moral and intellectual advancement (see Feró 
and Bajusz, 2018: 180–182). Besides, ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ (in 
their mainstream conception) presume a fully autonomous, inborn mental or 
psychic domain as the basis of their recognition claim that is unparalleled in black 
and women’s rights claims. The recognition politics of ‘sexual and gender 
minorities’ is thus closest to the ideal type of the hegemonic conception of the 
human, society, and politics, so it is not surprising that they have become so 
central in discourses about social justice. 
The history of Anglo-American feminist and gender-based politics suggests 
that the transformism of radical dissent has been a continuous process of rolling 
out the hegemonic logic of fragmentation and then the mainstreaming of the most 
atomising recognition claims. This not only fractured the dissenting base into 
various minority women camps, but even weaponised newer and newer ‘minority’ 
claims against the bigger dissenting groups. This suggests that there is an internal 
conflict in hegemonic mechanisms: the requirement to forge and extend the 
consensus contradicts the pressure to mainstream forms of politics that embody 
hegemonic logic to the fullest, which, however, not only include very few 
additional people in the consensus, but also alienate or exclude others from it. 
The current state of recognition struggles suggest that the latter aspect of 
hegemonic mechanisms became so dominant (maybe even self-propelling) that it 
started to undermine the consensus in two ways. First, by trumping many 
concessions that were previously granted to other claimants. For instance, while 
radical feminists have for long argued that queer and LGBT politics threaten 
women’s liberation (see e.g. Jeffreys, 2003; 2014; Sweeney, 2004), the conflictual 
relationship between women’s and LGBT activism has become more obvious to 
many women as transgender politics became extremely central, which effectively 
radicalised more and more of them.15 The logic of weaponising recognition claims 
against each other means that the most favoured recognition claims do not stop at 
colliding with just one other rights-claiming group, as for instance transgender 
recognition politics even started to hurt some gay and transsexual interests.16 
Second, as the ideas of the completely autonomous individual, limitless self-
determination, and tolerance as a non-conflictual solution for all social issues are 
brought to their logical conclusion, the values underlying ‘common sense’ become 
more and more transparent and contested. There is some irony in the fact that this 
self-liquidating logic follows from the internal antagonisms of liberal recognition 
 
15 For instance, the 2016 initiative to modify the Gender Recognition Act in the UK to grant legal 
gender recognition on the basis of self-identification only, besides other issues like the exponential 
rise in child referrals to gender clinics, the growing censorship, stigmatisation, and retribution of 
gender-critical voices, including in the Labour Party, etc, drew many women (as well as numerous 
men) to the gender-critical side. See Cooper (2019) for a summary of the debate and a naïve argument 
for ‘interconnected coexistence.’ 
16 See the initiative by some gays and lesbians to drop the T from LGBT 
https://www.change.org/p/human-rights-campaign-glaad-lambda-legal-the-advocate-out-magazine-
huffpost-gay-voices-drop-the-t, or a letter by transsexuals protesting against the transgender activist 
push to amend the Gender Recognition Act https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/transsexuals-
tell-msps-that-act-changes-could-have-horrific-impact-on-women-1-4912495 
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politics, which in turn follow from the inherent political antagonisms that 
recognition politics are meant to handle.  
Of course, certain political strategies have been developed to manage these 
problems. One strategy of forging consensus with fragmented identity groups is 
the rainbow coalition. This concept, not surprisingly, has also been transformed 
through the past decades: the original Rainbow Coalition was an autonomous 
alliance spanning racial, ethnic and class lines founded in Chicago in 1968 by some 
young Black Panthers and other radical group members to fight, among other 
issues, for a classless society, and against divisive ethnic tensions, police brutality, 
and the Democratic mayor’s urban renewal policies that destroyed poor 
neighbourhoods (Williams, 2013: 126–130). The concept was later appropriated for 
forging actual political constituencies, ranging from those of Jesse Jackson, the first 
African-American mayor of Chicago to Barack Obama, the first African-American 
president of the United States (ibid., 13–14). In the meantime, it was incorporated 
by recognition politics. In a paradigmatic reconceptualisation, the traditional 
coalition is contrasted with the rainbow coalition, wherein the former’s members 
work together along shared interests while agreeing not to bring up differences, 
while the latter’s programme is not based on some ‘principles of unity,’ but rather 
on the affirmation and support of each constituting oppressed group’s experiences 
and claims (Young, 1990: 188–189). In this conception, there are no inevitable 
conflicts between different identity groups, and if conflicts should arise, public 
discussion and fair decision-making can solve or handle them (ibid.). Once a code 
word for class struggle (Williams, 2013: 128), the rainbow coalition has become a 
post-political tactic of handling fragmented recognition politics. 
Another conceptual device mitigating the contradictions of recognition 
politics is intersectionality, a quintessential expression in gender studies and 
‘progressive’ activism that is meant to address the interaction of different axes of 
social relations like gender, race, sexuality, and so forth.17 As we have seen, 
intersectionality was to a large extent fostered by the Ford Foundation’s social 
engineering. While this concept is definitely useful in the legal context in which it 
was originally formulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), the problem that it was 
used to address emerged precisely from the Ford Foundation’s own anti-
discrimination approach of disaggregating social problems into discrete obstacles 
faced by disjunct groups (Watkins, 2018: 27). Since then, intersectionality has been 
divorced from this legal context to be championed as a concept of universal 
validity for all social formations. By today, intersectionality has become a rather 
vague buzzword in classrooms and activism, most frequently used as a prescription 
for diversity, representing people or identities of different types (Gordon, 2016: 
346–354). It has served to manufacture a(n allegedly) unified platform not only 
between splintered and shifting identities, but between different theoretical and 
political approaches as well (Davis, 2008: 71–76). Intersectionality is thus meant to 
not only manage the fragmentation of an identitarian base, but also to outsmart its 
conflicts as well: it is typically conjured as a consensus-creating signifier, a 
 
17 Exactly because of its ubiquity, intersectionality is employed in vastly different conceptions and 
theoretical frames, and it has been critiqued in feminist theory from different perspectives. 
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promise of transcending ‘divisions’ while eluding the question of power relations 
to institutionalise an all-inclusive liberal agenda (Carbin and Edenheim, 2014: 233–
241). It is, at the same time, often used as a rhetorical weapon in vicious fights over 
conflicting claims in online and offline activism (Gordon, 2016: 350). In spite of 
extensive black, postcolonial, and leftist feminist criticisms of its recent use (see 
e.g. Salem, 2016 for an overview), intersectionality has remained a shorthand for 
up-to-date and progressive in mainstream gender discourse. Not questioning that 
there is a huge amount of valuable scholarship working with intersectionality, this 
concept is, in its most dominant deployment, a post-political tool of settling 
conflicts in a way that it converges with hegemonic logic under the guise of a 
universal, objective, and all-purpose toolkit of bridging ‘divisions.’ In essence, 
intersectionality and the rainbow coalition with their utopian promise of an un-
conflicting base are post-political symptom management techniques for keeping 
the contradictions of recognition politics under control, remaining within its logic, 
of course. 
 
5. Recognition politics and the rise and fall of hegemonic projects 
 
As recognition politics became such a central strategic element of the hegemony of 
liberalism, it is not surprising that severe blows to the hegemony, especially the 
election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016, reinvigorated 
struggles over the role of recognition with respect to liberal hegemonic 
endeavours. Among the wide range of contributions, many liberals have argued for 
a return to classical liberalism and the abandonment of fallen identity/recognition 
liberalism, deemed as a leftist current in liberalism and a major cause of rising 
right-wing populism (see e.g. Lilla, 2016; 2017; Fukuyama, 2018; The Economist, 
2018). Francis Fukuyama, for instance, who predicted the end of ideology and the 
final triumph and universalisation of liberal democracy after the fall of the Soviet 
Union (1989: 4), now argues that his prophecy was not fulfilled because liberal 
democracy could not fully solve a problem that has grown to become its biggest 
enemy: the part of the soul that craves for recognition (Fukuyama, 2018: xi–xii). 
Responses to such arguments have included assertions that Democratic politics 
must be identity politics and there is no other form of politics at all — in the vein 
of the Thatcherian post-political ‘there is no alternative’ (Goldberg, 2016; Yglesias, 
2016). Of course, debates between similar positions are not new (compare Taylor, 
1992, and Habermas, 1994), but after Trump’s presidential election the stake of the 
debate became the future of the hegemony. 
Another foray of hegemonic rearguard struggles has attempted to 
reformulate the role of recognition in the ailing hegemony in relation to the role of 
redistribution. Economy-focused criticisms of the obscuring of redistribution issues 
by recognition issues, postulated since the ascendency of recognition, are now 
voiced with a new force by some liberal and left-leaning intellectuals in liberal 
establishment media (e.g. Pearce, 2016; G. Fraser, 2016; Klein, 2016). Calling for a 
combination of diversity with redistribution – also referred to as ‘intersectional 
left’ politics – these critiques have, in effect, argued for including more people in 
the consensus by recognising problems of the redistributive sort. Some new 
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political endeavours appearing in this volatile situation have even critiqued certain 
elements of recognition politics. For instance, the Feminism for the 99% manifesto 
argues that certain aspects of so-called progressive recognition-based issues have 
converged with the needs of capital under neoliberal capitalism (Arruzza, 
Bhattacharya and Fraser, 2019: 34–38). The basic assumption is that these forms of 
recognition politics give unsatisfactory responses to misrecognition problems 
because they omit something from the political plane (by obscuring the structural 
conditions fuelling misrecognition problems), not that they add something to it (by 
restructuring structural conditions; i.e. by transforming dissent, manufacturing 
consent, and forging ‘common sense’). The project thus aims to adjust to each 
other recognition and redistribution struggles (by adding an economic perspective 
to cultural claims and vice versa), and thereby unite existing and future 
movements into a broad-based global insurgency by overcoming divisions of 
culture, race, ethnicity, ability, sexuality, and gender cultivated by capital among 
the 99 per cent of society (ibid., 56–57). 
Such approaches are built on the idea explicated in Nancy Fraser’s theories 
that the basic difference between claims formulated in terms of Marx’s economic 
writings on the one hand and in terms of recognition on the other is that the 
former revolve around economic, while the latter around cultural issues. Honneth 
has rightly pointed out contra Fraser that the crucial difference between the two 
paradigms is that one construes social struggles as unresolvable interest- or 
ideology-based conflicts, the other as resolvable moral conflicts (Honneth, 2003: 
127–128). These two matters are, of course, not unrelated: as there are finite 
resources, their redistribution is the arena of social struggles that is most self-
evidently connected to clashing interests (although there do exist moralised 
renditions of redistributive wrongs). While Fraser’s analysis points to an important 
aspect of a historical shift in social justice struggles, it misses the post-political 
reconceptualisation of emancipation struggles that has made the sidelining of 
certain streams in these struggles possible. Her dual model of justice thus tries to 
combine and balance recognition and class struggle (even though not by simply 
adding them together), theorising them as endeavours to redress the inseparable 
cultural and economic realms of injustice, rather than as two contradicting 
paradigms of justice based on incompatible conceptions of social relations under 
capitalism.18 The currently hegemonic recognition claims, as I have argued, have 
been taking shape as underpinnings of the ‘intellectual and moral unity’ of 
ascending liberal hegemony and as a remedy to counteract the antagonism-based 
grammar of liberatory politics, which questioned exactly this unity. Attempting to 
combine elements from these two is hence fraught with contradictions. Lacking an 
adequate theorisation of conflicts, and as such, politics and ideology, the proposal 
of Feminism for the 99% fails to comprehend political conflicts between different 
claims in its desired alliance. Its approach remains trapped within the post-political 
imagination of liberal hegemony in spite of its radical anti-capitalist rhetoric, and 
 
18 This problem is not solved (or is maybe even aggravated) by adding a third, political axis to the 
model, as in Fraser’s later work. The most influential debates on recognition between feminist 
academics (most of all, Judith Butler, Iris Marion Young, and Fraser herself) also do not touch on the 
crucial questions of the political. 
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eventually ends up embracing and amending central strategic elements of 
hegemonic ideology.19   
Despite the renewed debates, recognition politics has not been dethroned as 
the current hegemony’s main strategy even as the hegemony is crumbling. 
Recognition politics has apparently been so deeply incorporated into the cultural 
hegemony of liberalism that very few can imagine a different strategy. Meanwhile, 
as some critiques of recognition politics have rightly pointed out, the emerging 
right-wing counter-hegemonic bloc also relies on recognition politics, which 
demands the recognition of identities not valorised by progressive politics, such as 
white, heterosexual, and man (Fukuyama, 2018: 91–92; Lilla, 2016). Recognition 
politics might even have become an essential foundation of hegemony: the success 
or failure of any hegemonic project seems to greatly depend on how many people 




Contemporary recognition politics is characteristically post-political. As we have 
seen through the history of Anglo-American feminist politics since the 1960s, the 
women’s liberation movement that has grown out of New Left movements started 
to question the ideological division of the private/public and highlighted the 
political constructedness of the personal. Several later streams of gender activism 
and theory undermined this dynamic conception, some even reversing the 
women’s liberation movement’s critique of ideology best summarised in the slogan 
‘the personal is political.’ Some approaches, such as the conceptualisation of (part 
of) sexuality and gender as the untouchable inner essence of sexual and gender 
minorities, have tended to re-privatise and re-personalise what the ideology 
critique of liberation movements uncovered as political. 
As opposed to many critiques of contemporary recognition politics whose 
analysis considers solely recent economic, social, and technological changes and 
presume that ideology critique has magically adjusted to the late capitalist 
Zeitgeist, I have argued that this shift took place through hegemonic recuperation 
that actively shaped rather than merely adjusted to late capitalist norms. 
Recognition politics emerged as the dominant form of emancipatory politics 
through the political intervention of the transformism of radical politics, 
marginalising and stigmatising some forms of politics while supporting and 
fashioning others. Recognition politics, besides neutralising challenges to the 
prevailing hegemony, has also become a crucial mechanism for forging hegemonic 
consensus and for sedimenting certain views about social justice and human 
nature as common sense. 
 
19 At the level of party politics, Jeremy Corbyn in the United Kingdom and Bernie Sanders in the 
United States attempted to (re)introduce the language of class struggle in a political scene dominated 
by recognition politics, several elements of which they also kept. This ‘intersectional left’ strategy, 
however, does not seem to be successful at the current moment: the Corbyn-led Labour Party lost in 
the 2019 general elections to the Tories, and Sanders dropped out of the 2020 Democratic presidential 
race. 
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Although recognition politics proved to be an effective mechanism for 
absorbing and neutralising leftist systemic critique, it is not devoid of 
contradictions. Through the constant fragmentation and weaponisation of identity 
groups against each other, recognition politics continuously shrinks hegemonic 
consensus. It is therefore not surprising that after the most serious blow to liberal 
hegemony to date, namely Donald Trump’s election to the White House, 
arguments against recognition politics reinvigorated on the liberal side. 
Meanwhile, many leftist critiques leave the essence of recognition politics 
unchallenged as they stay captives of an unexamined economism that assumes that 
ideology is hiding something, namely economic structure, from our view rather 
than actively adding something to and changing it by forging consensus and 
sedimenting common sense. They thereby typically downplay the role of civil 
society actors (including academics, intellectuals, media workers and civil activists) 
to centre the economic elite (or Capital itself) as the decisive agentive force behind 
hegemonic struggles, interpreting cultural formations as consequences of capital’s 
working, rather than as the most important form of warfare in the struggles. In 
accordance with this, such analyses often prefer to interrogate neoliberalism (a 
more recent, radicalised version of liberal rationality), rather than liberal 
hegemony (the restriction of our common sense to the different versions of 
liberalisms, as described in Žižek, 2008: 2). Such enterprises end up becoming 
entangled in the post-political rationality of liberal hegemony. It seems that the 
logic of recognition politics has been so deeply embedded in the social and cultural 
imagination that even some (avowedly) anti-capitalist endeavours are trapped in it, 
while the emerging right-wing counter-hegemonic bloc is also founded on it—on 
the recognition of the identities not recognised by liberal hegemony. Currently, it 
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This paper challenges the recognition paradigm through a 
historical case study that shows recognition struggles to be 
ideologically embedded and their success subordinated to, and thus 
contingent upon, the political priorities  of recognition-granting 
authorities. To this end, the paper explores how Cold War 
ideological considerations shaped the ways in which the West 
German state processed recognition claims made upon it by two 
distinct groups of German veterans of the Spanish Civil War: 
German antifascists who fought as non-state actors in defense of 
the Spanish Republic and other Germans who fought in support of 
the Nationalist rebels at the behest of the National Socialist regime. 
Showing that the West German state’s ostensible commitment to 
recognition of historical injustice in connection with the National 
Socialist past was subordinated to the aim of self-legitimation in 
the Cold War present, the paper calls for a broader sociopolitical 
contextualization of recognition struggles. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The decades since the collapse of state socialism have witnessed the redistributive 
projects for which societies of this kind had long offered a moral impetus become 
increasingly eclipsed throughout the world by projects of recognition. Optimistic 
commentators on this phenomenon identify in this shift no cause for concern, 
interpreting the redistributive projects of yore as a subcategory of the social 
dynamic that is now satisfied by a more generalized human need for recognition 
(Honneth, 2003). Some have interpreted this shift towards recognition and away 
from redistribution as an outcome associated with the growing hegemony of 
neoliberalism, which can better accommodate the former than the latter (Fraser, 
2003). Still others have proposed that projects concerned with recognition are no 
mere feature of the neoliberal order but actually play a crucial role in endowing it 
with the moral legitimacy that it would otherwise lose as a consequence of its 
abandonment of redistribution (Michaels, 2007). This more critical perspective 
concerning neoliberal recognition dynamics raises questions about the nature of 
the relationship between the project of recognition and its legitimating function 
for the sociopolitical systems by which recognition is conferred. For instance, to 
what extent is the conferral of recognition contingent upon a convergence of 
interest between the recognizing authority and the recognized? What would a 
symbiotic connection of this kind imply about the role that recognition can play in 
mediating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in a given society? Are such 
dynamics unique to the neoliberal order in which they have been identified, or are 
they indicative of a property more fundamental to recognition dynamics? In short, 
what is the nature of the relationship between recognition and legitimation? 
To answer these questions, it is useful to explore the dynamics of 
recognition outside the historical context in which these observations originated. 
Aiming to establish properties that are not peculiar to the neoliberal age, this 
paper investigates recognition dynamics through a historical case study in the 
context of the Cold War. Focusing on West Germany in particular, it explores the 
response of the West German state to a variety of recognition claims made upon it 
by Germans who fought in the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939. Namely, 
it compares the response of the West German state to claims made upon it by 
Germans who fought on opposing sides of the conflict: German antifascists who 
fought in defense of the Spanish Republic, as non-state actors, in units such as the 
International Brigades; and other Germans who fought in support of the 
Nationalist rebels at the behest of the National Socialist regime. The nature of the 
claims made upon the West German state by these two groups were in many ways 
qualitatively distinct and thus difficult to compare on their own terms. However, 
because the West German state’s response to the claims of each group rested upon 
its official view and value judgments concerning each group’s role in a common 
historical event, the recognition paradigm offers an ideal metric by which to 
evaluate the political dimensions of the recognition struggles in which the two 
groups became engaged. Juxtaposing the outcomes of these struggles for 
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recognition, this paper sheds light on the politics of recognition in Cold War West 
Germany. 
This paper begins by offering a brief historical overview of German 
involvement in the Spanish Civil War. It then sketches the renewed significance 
acquired by this history in Germany during the Cold War and considers two forms 
of recognition claims that were made upon the West German state in this context, 
exploring the role that Cold War-era political considerations played in shaping the 
outcomes of these recognition struggles. Finally, the paper draws on insights 
derived from the sociology of knowledge to show the embeddedness of these 
particular, localized struggles within the broader conceptual struggles of the Cold 
War. Taken together, the paper demonstrates that the West German state 
subordinated its ostensible commitment to recognition of historical injustice in 
connection with the National Socialist past to the aim of self-legitimation in the 
Cold War present. It proposes, for this reason, that recognition struggles must be 
evaluated more broadly to account for their function within the totality of the 
sociopolitical systems in which they unfold. 
 
2. Germany, Germans, and the Spanish Civil War 
 
In the summer of 1936, the Second Spanish Republic became the first geopolitical 
casualty of the triumph of National Socialism in Germany. Though the Spanish 
Civil War was a product of deep divisions that were organic to Spanish society, 
Germany played a role in this conflict that was, from the very first weeks, 
fundamental. Namely, the National Socialist regime created the conditions of 
possibility for what initially appeared likely to prove an abortive coup attempt by 
Spanish generals to transform into a full-fledged civil war that ravaged Spain and 
its people for nearly three years. Moreover, it was precisely fascist intervention in 
Spain, initiated by Nazi Germany and its partner, Fascist Italy, that inspired a 
remarkable display of international solidarity with the Spanish Republic 
throughout the world, thereby expanding the geographic scope of the conflict. 
Often relying on logistical support from various party organizations, such as the 
Communist International, tens of thousands of foreign volunteers ventured to 
Spain in defiance of home governments that had almost invariably adopted a 
policy of non-intervention in the face of this overt display of fascist aggression. In 
this sense, the internationalization of this nominally civil conflict in Spain derived 
in large part from the foreign policy machinations of Germany’s National Socialist 
regime. The regime’s declared aim of extirpating the forces of ‘Bolshevism’ in 
Spain corresponded to the project that it had launched already in Germany, 
through its all-out assault against the Communist Party of Germany and other 
domestic forces of political internationalism upon its rise to power.1 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, in view of these circumstances, thousands of German antifascists, 
 
1 Struggle against an imagined ‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ menace was not only a defining feature of National 
Socialist ideology but also a central feature of contemporary anti-communist politics more generally. 
See Hanebrink (2018). 
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including many who arrived from lives in exile, numbered among the multitudes 
of foreign volunteers who descended on the Iberian Peninsula after 1936, in the 
hope of counteracting the influence of fascist military intervention. 
The largest contingent of German combatants to fight in Spain was the 
Condor Legion, which was deployed there by the National Socialist regime itself. 
This unit was comprised of members of the regular German military who agreed to 
involve themselves in what was an unknown mission, for most, at the conflict’s 
outset. While the veil of secrecy that surrounded the mission prior to these 
soldiers’ embarkation for Spain makes their motivations difficult to evaluate, a 
wide range of factors have been proposed, including the prospect of adventure, the 
opportunity to earn a supplemental income, and especially the sense that 
participation was not truly voluntary (Schüler-Springorum, 2010: 105–111). 
However, soon after their departure from Germany, they were informed of the 
deeply ideological nature of the project in which they had become engaged: to 
confront and defeat the forces of ‘Bolshevism’ that the National Socialist regime 
understood to be threatening Spain. Over the course of the ensuing conflict, some 
19,000 Germans were to pass through the ranks of the Condor Legion in the 
service of this cause. Though most widely remembered for its notorious role in the 
destruction of the Basque city of Guernica on April 26, 1937, the unit also played a 
constant and essential role in the conflict by providing vital air support to the rebel 
Nationalist war effort under the leadership of Francisco Franco, which ultimately 
emerged victorious. Suffering a casualty ratio of less than one per cent in the 
course of combat operations (Schüler-Springorum, 2008: 224), the Condor Legion 
fared quite well in this famously brutal conflict that took a devastating toll on its 
Spanish participants. Through the combat experience that they gained in Spain, 
the German soldiers of the Condor Legion became a great asset to the ambitions of 
Nazi Germany following the regime’s instigation of the Second World War, which 
erupted less than six months later. The utility with which this combat experience 
endowed them was to prove less auspicious for the former Condor Legionnaires 
themselves; fewer than one-fifth of the unit’s pilots are estimated to have survived 
this second, general conflagration that ultimately led to the downfall of both 
Germany and its National Socialist regime (Schüler-Springorum, 2008: 233). 
In stark contrast with their adversaries of the Condor Legion, most German 
antifascists who ventured to Spain to fight in defense of the Spanish Republic 
between 1936 and 1938 arrived there in connection with an enduring plight that 
had begun years earlier, in the immediate wake of the 1933 triumph of National 
Socialism in Germany. Henceforth referred to as ‘Spain-fighters’ (based on the 
contemporary German designation, Spanienkämpfer), these German socialists, 
anarchists, and — above all — communists who joined antifascist military units in 
Spain had generally experienced considerable persecution at the hands of the 
National Socialist regime, including arrest, various forms of physical harm, and 
extended periods of extra-legal confinement in concentration camps. Beginning in 
1933, many of those affected had fled into exile or embarked on a life underground 
as a means of escaping the long arm of the German secret police, or Gestapo, often 
continuing their antifascist political struggle thereafter by nonconventional means. 
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With the aid of their exiled party organizations, some 3,000 German antifascists 
made their way to Spain following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War to fight 
in defense of the beleaguered Spanish Republic. On the basis of imperfect records, 
it is estimated that roughly one quarter to one third of the Spain-fighters were 
killed over the course of the conflict (Uhl, 2004: 53–57). Those who remained in 
Spain upon the collapse of the Spanish Republican war effort were forced to flee 
across Spain’s northern border, into France, where French authorities confined 
hundreds of them to internment camps. Some managed to dodge or escape French 
captivity, and certain of these, in turn, joined either the French Resistance or the 
Allied war effort during the Second World War. However, hundreds of others were 
recaptured by the National Socialist regime in the wake of its occupation of France. 
Regarding their activities in Spain as a continuation of the political activity for 
which it had already taken action against many of them in 1933, the National 
Socialist regime consigned virtually all of the so-called ‘Red Spain-fighters’ that it 
captured to various prisons and concentration camps, where most languished until 
the collapse of the National Socialist regime (Mühlen, 1983: 299–307). 
By the time of the National Socialist regime’s collapse in 1945, the Spanish 
Civil War had been rendered a distant memory for its German combatants, whose 
experiences in the intervening years tended to be no less and oftentimes even 
more harrowing than those connected with Spain. The majority of veteran Spain-
fighters who retained an ongoing commitment to politics after 1945 made an effort 
to settle in the Soviet zone of occupation that was later to become East Germany. 
There, many became enthusiastic supporters of, and sometimes even prominent 
players in, the establishment of a socialist state (McLellan, 2004: 43–56). For 
veterans of the Condor Legion and even for many other antifascist veterans, 
returning home – to whichever zone of occupation where that home happened to 
be – held the highest priority. Gradually, antifascist veterans who had been 
fortunate enough to evade recapture by the National Socialist regime returned to 
Germany from various lands of exile or upon their release by the Allied military 
units to which they had attached themselves during the Second World War. For 
many veterans of the Condor Legion, return was possible only after release from 
prisoner of war camps. In a postwar world in which the future would be 
determined by narratives connecting the past to the present, the legacy of Spanish 
Civil War was to retain far more significance for the fates of German veterans of 
the conflict than most could have predicted at that time. 
 
3. The legacy of the Spanish Civil War in Cold War West 
Germany 
 
3.1 Spain as a symbol in Cold War Germany 
 
In the context of the Cold War, postwar Germany’s division into two ideologically 
hostile states imbued its idiosyncratic past, in connection with the Spanish Civil 
War, with lasting and highly contentious symbolic value. Naturally, this 
circumstance proved highly consequential in shaping the postwar fates of German 
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veterans of the conflict. Following the founding of the East German and West 
German states in 1949, the two states became engaged concurrently, as competing 
successor states of a defeated Germany, in the pursuit of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the international community. The distinct approaches that the two German states 
pursued to this end informed memory of the German past in relation to Spain in a 
manner that was to have direct implications for the Germans who had fought 
there. The East German state endeavored to cultivate a triumphal attitude towards 
the German past by appropriating the legacy of the German antifascist resistance. 
As a result, the legacy of German antifascist resistance in Spain became a vital 
source of pride in East Germany, winning the Spain-fighters considerable prestige 
in East German society (Uhl, 2004: 330–498; McLellan, 73–95). By contrast, West 
Germany adopted an outwardly repentant posture towards the past and sought to 
build legitimacy on the world stage through various forms of public atonement, 
which tended to be concerned with victimhood to a far greater extent than 
resistance. However, because National Socialist crimes in Spain had not been 
perpetrated against the government of Francisco Franco that had since established 
dominion there, the Spanish legacy amounted to a mostly unusable past for West 
Germany and was thus scarcely thematized in the West German public sphere.2 
Consequently, the West German state’s posture with respect to this facet of the 
national past found expression chiefly through obscure channels—above all 
through the legal stances that it adopted towards West German citizens who had 
fought there. 
 
3.2 The Spain-fighters 
 
During the early stages of postwar transition, staunch opponents of National 
Socialism, including many of its surviving victims, were recognized by occupying 
forces as reliably hostile to the vanquished regime, facilitating their entry into 
provisional positions of authority within emerging institutions throughout 
occupied Germany. In the Western zones of occupation, these authorities oversaw 
the implementation of a variety of reparations initiatives consistent with what has 
since become known as transitional justice. Because successful reparations 
initiatives combine symbolic recognition of victimhood with indemnification 
recognizing its concrete material impacts, this project demanded that the emerging 
social order in what later became West Germany not only reassess former 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion but also provide material compensation that 
might place former victims on more equal footing with their fellow citizens 
(Verdeja, 2006). To this end, the authority exercised during the immediate postwar 
years by former victims of the National Socialist regime contributed to the writing 
of reparations guidelines that were attuned to, and thus capable of recognizing, the 
recently lived realities of a wide variety of victim demographics within German 
society. 
 
2 Especially during the 1950s, West German diplomacy toward the regime of Francisco Franco 
actually manifested in limited forms of memory cultivation in connection with the Condor Legion. 
See Lehman (2006). 
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German antifascists who had ventured to Spain after 1936 numbered among 
the categories of political victims of National Socialism that were deemed eligible 
for reparations in this context. Indeed, early postwar guidelines published in a 1947 
edition of the Manual of Reparations identified the Spain-fighters explicitly as a 
category of persons who were persecuted under National Socialism. In response to 
the question, ‘Who can be recognized as a person persecuted by fascism?’ the 
manual divided persecuted persons into what were termed ‘Victims of Fascism’ 
and ‘Activists against Fascism,’ and it included among the latter group ‘the Spain-
fighters who fought in the International Brigades’.3 In addition to being identified 
by this clause, the Spain-fighters also satisfied more general standards of the 
activist classification, which extended also to ‘all antifascists who went into 
political emigration to escape the grip of the Gestapo, and, from there, continued 
to engage demonstrably in struggle against the Hitler regime alongside resistance 
groups.’ Pointing to the causal connections between political circumstances in 
Germany and those in Spain, legal appraisals of this kind reflected a concrete 
awareness, on the part of personnel within the West German reparations 
bureaucracy, of the particular challenges and hardships that antifascists who 
became Spain-fighters had faced under the National Socialist regime. 
While early reparations law offered grounds for optimism that transitional 
justice might be achieved, the intensification of the Cold War at the close of the 
decade had significant ramifications for the evolution of reparations law in West 
Germany. This heightening of East-West tensions, as well as the growing paranoia 
that accompanied it, precipitated a reassessment within relevant West German 
institutions concerning the political qualities that were appropriate in persons 
tasked with the writing of reparations law. This politically motivated reassessment 
led to the purging of communists, such as the esteemed Jewish lawyer Marcel 
Frenkel, who edited the Manual of Reparations, from the legal bureaucracy that 
oversaw the administration of reparations law (Spernol, 2009). In Frenkel’s case, 
this affair was facilitated by the ongoing circulation of antisemitic tropes in West 
German society, suggesting a link between Jews and communism. By eliminating 
personnel who were deemed unreliable on the basis of the very qualities for which 
they had been persecuted under National Socialism, conditions arose for 
transitional justice efforts to be subverted and, instead, yield transitional injustice 
(Loyle and Davenport, 2016: 133–134). That is, such restriction of access to 
participation in legal opinion-making not only drastically decreased the likelihood 
of positive legal outcomes for applicants but also had the effect of effacing the 
record of certain forms of National Socialist crimes. 
Amid these Cold War conditions, the homogenization of personnel and 
political views within those state institutions responsible for the administration of 
reparations law proved highly consequential for the fortunes of the Spain-fighters. 
With sympathetic and knowledgeable commentators like Marcel Frenkel removed 
 
3 While early reparations guidelines varied among the various Western zones of occupation, all zonal 
guidelines in which the Spain-fighters were mentioned explicitly identified them as a category of 
persons persecuted under National Socialism. Here, see ‘Anerkennungsfragen: Richtlinien vom 
8.11.1947’ (Frenkel et al., 1950: vol. 8, II, 2). 
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from the ranks of the West German reparations bureaucracy, reparations 
guidelines were gradually revised in accordance with the legal perspectives of the 
unsympathetic and even hostile bureaucrats who replaced them. As early as 1949, 
new reparations guidelines began to be published that contradicted earlier 
appraisals theretofore recognizing the persecution of the Spain-fighters at the 
hands of the National Socialist regime. These new appraisals rejected the notion of 
a causal connection between political phenomena in Germany and those in Spain, 
despite their involvement of a common set of actors. One new guideline focusing 
on physical injuries sustained by Spain-fighters during their time in Spain now 
stipulated that ‘Spain-fighters who suffered physical harm in the struggle against 
Franco […] have no claim to restitution because their injuries are not a 
consequence of National Socialist persecution measures’ (Wilden and Klückmann, 
1950: 26). By the following year, new and contrary guidance printed in the 
formerly sympathetic Manual of Reparations now rejected the legitimacy of their 
claims by attempting to disaggregate their struggle in Spain from the wider 
struggle against National Socialism. It read: ‘The Spain-fighters are not active 
participants in an effort to eliminate the National Socialist regime but rather […] 
participants in the fight against fascist rule in Spain’ (Frenkel et al., 1950: vol. 19, V, 
1). Later guidelines continued to elaborate on these inauspicious reappraisals, 
endeavoring through inscrutable logic to disentangle the German and Spanish 
pasts. One particularly puzzling legal opinion conceded that that German members 
of the International Brigades were later persecuted as political opponents by the 
National Socialist regime, but it nonetheless maintained that ‘Participation in the 
Spanish Civil War itself was, by contrast, no struggle against National Socialism as 
such, but rather a struggle for the existence of the Spanish Republic’ (van Dam and 
Loos, 1957: 56). The National Socialist regime’s past prosecution of the Spain-
fighters for the crime of ‘preparation for high treason’ — a category of offense 
directed unambiguously at the government form in Germany — went virtually 
unacknowledged by these emerging legal opinions. Instead, West German justice 
officials substituted their own, discrepant standard for that of the National Socialist 
regime, which had recognized the Spain-fighters as resisters and persecuted them 
on that basis.4 By failing to acknowledge how National Socialist repressive 
measures had targeted the Spain-fighters as a group, the West German state 
effectively revoked the symbolic recognition that had once been conferred upon 
this group by early postwar reparations guidelines (Verdeja, 2006: 455). Naturally, 
this change in the criteria for recognition was accompanied by the evaporation of 
any material obligation towards the Spain-fighters by the West German state. It 
was under these adverse legal circumstances that hundreds of veteran Spain-
fighters were to submit applications for reparations during the early postwar 
decades. While some veteran Spain-fighters challenged unsatisfactory application 
outcomes by engaging in appeals that sometimes lasted decades, virtually all were 
denied reparations linked in any direct way to their antifascist struggle in Spain. 
 
4 Legal theorist Carl Schmitt rejected the possibility of any such third-party evaluation. See Schmitt 
(1976: 27). 
GERMAN VETERANS OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 75 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 68-83.  
Even as the West German state disqualified the period of the Spain-fighters’ 
participation in the Spanish Civil War from eligibility for reparations, it also 
exploited knowledge of many Spain-fighters’ past and often enduring sympathies 
for communism to their lasting detriment. During the early 1950s, this presumed 
affiliation inspired the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) to surveil many former Spain-fighters, whom 
it — like the National Socialist regime before it — tended to refer to as ‘Red Spain-
fighters’ (NW 490 Nr. 141). This suspected and oftentimes actual political affiliation 
became especially significant in connection with the ongoing efforts of many 
Spain-fighters to secure reparations following the passage of the Federal 
Supplementary Law (Bundesergänzungsgesetz) in 1953, which made eligibility for 
reparations for all applicants contingent upon their noninvolvement in communist 
political activity. These restrictions, which were implemented at the instigation of 
anti-communist elements within West German society, applied retroactively to 
anyone who was deemed to have conducted themselves in a manner hostile to the 
‘free democratic basic order’ after the passage of the Basic Law in May of 1949 
(Spernol, 2014). The West German Ministry of Justice aimed, in this way, to deny 
reparations to anyone whom it regarded as an ‘adherent of a totalitarian system.’ 
Under suspicion of continued communist activity, the Spain-fighters were also 
surveilled at a local level — sometimes in direct connection with legal proceedings 
associated with their pursuit of reparations. The Cold War lens through which the 
West German state looked upon the Spain-fighters thus encouraged authorities to 
punish the very citizens who appealed to the state in search of justice. In this way, 
the Nazi-era exclusion of the Spain-fighters was effectively perpetuated in West 
Germany in a novel form. 
 
3.3 The Condor Legion 
 
Unlike the German veterans of the Spanish Civil War’s antifascist military units, 
those veterans of the Condor Legion who were fortunate enough to survive the 
Second World War and settle in West Germany possessed no claim whatsoever to 
victim status there. After all, in stark contrast with the former group, the veterans 
of the Condor Legion numbered among the perpetrators rather than the victims of 
National Socialist crimes. And yet, it was precisely in connection with their role as 
agents of National Socialist geopolitical ambitions that veterans of the Condor 
Legion shared in the pensions that were guaranteed to all civil servants of the 
former Nazi state by the 1949 Basic Law — a benefit extending to all professional 
soldiers who had not been too thoroughly compromised through their military 
service under National Socialism (Diehl, 1993: 141–162). In fact, veterans of the 
Condor Legion also received an additional pension benefit for the time of their 
deployment to Spain (Pross, 1998: 45–46). In this sense, the very German soldiers 
who had participated in National Socialist militarism and foreign aggression at the 
earliest stage enjoyed the greatest benefits of all. 
In view of these favorable circumstances, the recognition claims that 
veterans of the Condor Legion made upon the West German state were based not 
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on victimhood associated with the National Socialist era but rather with a different 
form of victimhood of distinctly postwar provenance. Namely, these claims were 
made by veteran Condor Legionnaires who had settled in the Soviet zone of 
occupation that later became East Germany. Over the course of the 1950s, 
numerous such veterans applied for asylum as political refugees in West Germany 
and also submitted applications to gain the pension benefits that West German 
citizenship afforded Germans of their professional background. In their 
applications, these veterans expressed concern for their safety in East Germany in 
connection with their personal histories as former combatants of the Condor 
Legion in Spain. Responses to these applications by the West German state offer 
further insight into the political dimensions of recognition struggles waged in Cold 
War West Germany. 
Whatever their basis in reality, the claims of the veteran Condor 
Legionnaires were premised on deeply ideological assumptions that perverted 
justice in their very claim to seek it. In most cases, it was not due to historical 
membership in the Condor Legion itself that applicants sought asylum in West 
Germany but rather on the basis of fears associated with their failure to disclose 
this facet or their biographies when prompted to do so by zonal authorities at an 
earlier stage in the aftermath of the Second World War. The decision to withhold 
this information in the first place necessarily derived from some combination of 
the subjective desire to escape justice for crimes committed under National 
Socialism and the subjective view that authorities in the Soviet zone of occupation 
were not legitimate arbiters of justice. Indeed, some applicants — seemingly 
content to live in East Germany as long as any reckoning could be avoided — 
appear to have been inspired to seek asylum only after efforts at their recruitment 
by the East German state into the German People’s Police, which they feared 
might prompt a more thorough investigation into their political biographies and 
thereby expose their nondisclosures. In effect, by concealing information 
concerning their roles under National Socialism, these veteran Condor 
Legionnaires transformed their complicity in National Socialist crimes into an 
ostensible form of victimhood in the Cold War present, which they in turn 
endeavored to construe as evidence of totalitarian repression.  
Much like the asylum claims themselves, state recognition of the victimhood 
of veterans of the Condor Legion appears to have rested quite heavily on 
ideological considerations. Indeed, certain of the West German bureaucrats who 
processed the claims of the veteran Condor Legionnaires framed their appraisals in 
distinctly ideological terms. Betraying the persistence of anti-communist sentiment 
in West German society, the West German official processing the asylum claim of 
one veteran described his past in terms that might have been used by the National 
Socialist regime itself: ‘In the years 1937 and 1938, he belonged to the Condor 
Legion, which was deployed to overpower Bolshevism in Spain’ (NW 130 Nr. 127, 
Hoffmann, 1). Adoption of such blatant tropes from National Socialist discourse 
was supplemented by various biases connected more directly with the Cold War 
present. For instance, another West German official justified an applicant’s attempt 
to conceal his past from East German authorities on grounds that he might 
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otherwise have been ‘subject to sociopolitical vilification due to his participation in 
the Spanish Civil War,’ elsewhere deeming the applicant's deception appropriate 
‘in view of the political outlook and methods of the Soviet zone’ (NW 130 Nr. 127, 
Höhno, 3–4). Because the authority of the East German state was regarded as 
illegitimate by asylum-seekers and the West German state alike, shows of 
resistance to that authority acquired a paradoxical air of legitimacy. 
Nor did the realization by West German authorities that the claims of 
certain veterans of the Condor Legion were dubious or even false deter the state 
from recognizing the applicants in question. Even after the allegations of 
repression by one veteran were determined to be spurious, West German 
authorities still chose to grant him asylum on ‘grounds of discretion’ (NW 130 Nr. 
128, Lupp, Report on Rationale for Flight, 5). Moreover, applicants who 
encountered skepticism from West German authorities could appeal for support 
from anti-communist organizations such as the Combat Group against 
Inhumanity, which was funded by the American Central Intelligence Agency and 
thus did not hesitate to substantiate allegations of iniquity by East German 
authorities (NW 130 Nr. 127, Hoffmann, 3). Such corroborations seemingly 
encouraged West German bureaucrats to reconsider their prior reluctance to 
recognize applicants whose claims they had deemed invalid. Indeed, one such 
bureaucrat reasoned that, while persecution was not demonstrable, it was 
nevertheless ‘thinkable,’ or it could be ‘assumed with probability bordering on 
certainty’ (NW 130 Nr. 127, Hoffmann, 4). The establishment of such subjective 
evaluative criteria effectively empowered these alleged victims of East German 
state repression to recognize themselves as such, thereby securing both the asylum 
and the pension benefits that such recognition entailed. The recognition granted to 
the veteran Condor Legionnaires by the West German state thus functioned to 
integrate these former agents of the National Socialist regime into West German 
society even as the state’s non-recognition of their antifascist counterparts 
perpetuated the ongoing exclusion of former resisters. 
By all indications, the recognition conferred by the West German state upon 
veterans of the Condor Legion in this context derived far more from the common 
ideological hostility by the state and applicants towards the East German state 
than from any basis in historical reality. Indeed, in addition to the inconsistencies 
acknowledged in the application materials, existing scholarship documents no 
systematic persecution of German veterans of the Condor Legion in East Germany 
— including with respect to veterans known by authorities to have falsely denied 
their membership in the unit (Schüler-Springorum, 2010: 238–240). For the 
veterans of the Condor Legion, like the veteran Spain-fighters, Cold War 
considerations had thus tilted the scales of justice. However, for the veterans of the 
Condor Legion, unlike the veteran Spain-fighters, it had done so to their distinct 
advantage. 
 
4. Recognition as legitimation in Cold War West Germany 
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As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, knowledge produced in West 
Germany concerning the German veterans of the Spanish Civil War tended to 
conform to the perceived exigencies of the Cold War and West Germany’s 
particular coordinates within it. In this sense, knowledge about the past was 
produced in a manner consistent with the principles of what sociologists of 
knowledge have termed a ‘symbolic universe.’ Theoretical constructions devised to 
refer to a mode of legitimation serving to ‘integrate different provinces of meaning 
and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality,’ symbolic universes 
‘operate to legitimate individual biography and the institutional order’ (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967: 95–97). These properties of a symbolic universe explain the need 
for a convergence of interest between those seeking recognition and the 
recognition-conferring authority. In West Germany, such considerations 
encouraged the state to prioritize the struggle against communism in the present 
over its avowed aim of atoning for the National Socialist past. The state’s inability 
to reconcile these tasks led to its selective and outwardly contradictory recognition 
of victimhood in connection with German veterans of the Spanish Civil War. 
Though this particular recognition struggle concerned only a relatively small 
number of West German citizens and thus never held more than a marginal place 
in the grander context of the Cold War, its foundational ties to the wider symbolic 
universe of the Cold War West suggest that it may nevertheless be understood as a 
microcosm of this grander struggle, simultaneously shaping that struggle and 
shaped by it through dialectical interaction. 
To appreciate the legitimating function of the West German state’s response 
to these recognition struggles, it is useful to consider these struggles’ connections 
to key conceptual tools through which the Cold War was waged (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967: 107–109). To this end, considering their relevance to the concepts 
of totalitarianism and antifascism is particularly instructive, as these concepts were 
fundamental to the legitimation struggles of the Cold War (Rabinbach, 2009: 7–25; 
2006: 111–112). These struggle concepts were of vital significance in this context 
not only for their political content but also for their immanent temporality. 
Namely, both concepts linked the National Socialist past with the Cold War 
present in much the same way as did the recognition struggles in question. In early 
Cold War West Germany, totalitarianism became part and parcel of the 
‘conceptual machinery of [symbolic] universe-maintenance’ (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967: 108), in that it assumed from ‘Bolshevism' the mantle of interwar 
and wartime anti-communism (Traverso, 2017: 101; Hanebrink, 2018: 200–236). 
The concept relativized fascist crimes by linking them with communist ones while 
also evoking the horrific crimes of the fascist past as a moral burden of the 
communist foe in the Cold War present. Offering anti-communists a powerful 
discursive cudgel with which to attack the communist East, the concept quickly 
acquired a sacred place within the symbolic universe of the Cold War West. 
Moreover, the concept of totalitarianism effectively negated the concept of 
antifascism, which had acquired a similarly sacred status in the symbolic universe 
of the Cold War East. Specifically, through its inherent allegation of an underlying 
synergy between fascism and communism, the concept of totalitarianism cast 
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doubt on the proposition that communism could truly be antifascist. In this way, 
validation of either the concept of totalitarianism or the concept of antifascism 
necessarily came at the expense of the other. Because these concepts played a 
vitally important role in the respective discursive arsenals of the opposing Cold 
War orders and were thus connected with the legitimacy of those orders as a 
whole, the stakes of recognition struggles of relevance to them transcended the 
stakes of the struggles themselves. 
With these considerations in mind, the outwardly paradoxical outcomes of 
the recognition struggles waged by veteran Spain-fighters in West Germany seem 
likely to have been a foregone conclusion. Unlike East Germany, West Germany 
had little to gain and much to lose from an honest reckoning with the details of 
German antifascist resistance in the Spanish Civil War. For this reason, 
acknowledgment of this historical phenomenon, which its East German adversary 
then touted as evidence of its superiority, would have constituted an unthinkable 
concession on the part of the West German state. The chicanery in which West 
German bureaucrats engaged to avoid recognizing the claims of the Spain-fighters 
thus reflected the harm that such recognition threatened to do in connection with 
contemporary legitimation struggles. Because the Spain-fighters comprised a 
distinct legal category of Germans whose pasts could be cited to validate the 
notion of communist antifascism, thus endangering the conceptual integrity of 
totalitarianism, the West German state endeavored to reappraise this history and 
thereby render it invalid.5 Once key personnel hindering this project had been 
expelled from the bureaucracy involved in the writing and implementation of 
reparations law, it became possible for the West German state not only to deny the 
veteran Spain-fighters recognition of their role in resisting National Socialism but 
also – in connection with the state's explicit exclusion of communists from 
eligibility for reparations – to reimagine these onetime antifascist resisters as 
aspiring perpetrators of totalitarian crimes in the context of the Cold War. 
At the same time, the West German state’s recognition of asylum claims by 
veterans of the Condor Legion rested on a priori assumptions of totalitarian 
repression. Allegations of East German persecution by veteran Condor 
Legionnaires satisfied narratives about the German past that then prevailed in 
West Germany. Namely, by sidestepping the matter of German guilt in connection 
with the National Socialist past, the allegations shifted attention to Germany’s own 
victimhood at the hands of a foe by which Germans were defeated in the Second 
World War and suffered ongoing humiliation in the Cold War present: the Soviet 
Union (Moeller, 2003). While the defeat of National Socialism had precluded the 
continuation of armed struggle against the former ‘Bolshevik menace,’ this prior 
enmity had found a new lease on life in both the ideological confrontation 
associated with the Cold War as well as the perceived geopolitical threat stemming 
from Soviet hegemony over East Germany. These considerations facilitated the 
 
5 Berger and Luckmann refer to such maneuvers as ‘nihilation,’ which they describe as a negative 
form of legitimation. See Berger and Luckmann (1967: 114–116). 
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recasting of veterans of the Condor Legion from historical perpetrators of National 
Socialist crimes into victims of totalitarian repression in the Cold War present. 
As a consequence of the dynamics considered here, the recognition that the 
West German state conferred upon German veterans of the Spanish Civil War 
might be most appropriately described as misrecognition. The seemingly distorted 
outcomes yielded by these recognition struggles resulted from the fact that 
recognition was conferred in these instances not chiefly to satisfy either the needs 
of recognition claimants or any objective standard of justice but above all to 
legitimate the West German state — the recognition-granting authority. Excluding 
from the emerging social order those Germans who had been victimized by the 
National Socialist regime even as they included those Germans who had 
participated in its crimes, these instances of misrecognition reproduced fascist-era 




To be sure, the recognition dynamics unfolding in Germany in connection with the 
Spanish past were in no way unique to West Germany. The abundant recognition 
that the East German state conferred upon its own veteran Spain-fighters, as 
prominent antifascist resisters, has been documented extensively by historians 
(Uhl, 2004; McLellan, 2004; Krammer, 2004). And yet, in spite of outward 
appearances to the contrary, the East German state’s recognition of these 
antifascist resisters shared with the West German state’s non-recognition of them 
the common goal of self-legitimation in the highly competitive dual moral 
economy of Cold War politics. 
Further substantiating the findings of the research into the neoliberal 
recognition dynamics that inspired this line of inquiry, this historical case study of 
recognition dynamics in the context of the Cold War evidences the existence of a 
symbiotic relationship between bottom-up struggles for recognition and top-down 
projects of legitimation. Demonstrating a recognition-granting authority’s 
acquiescence to demands made upon it to be contingent on a convergence of 
interest between the recognizer and the recognized, this paper has shown 
recognition struggles to be ideologically embedded and — as such — to operate 
firmly within the realm of the political. When examined in this broader context, 
recognition struggles can be found to have an instrumental, as opposed to 
meliorative, function within a sociopolitical system that has lamentably little to do 
with either justice or inclusivity.  
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The paper analyzes the mnemonic and political context of the 
occupation of the Roma Holocaust memorial in Berlin in May 2016, 
carried out by groups demanding the right to remain in the country 
for non-citizen Roma. Observing the actor strategies apparent in 
this event, as well as the governmental logics organizing 
memorialization, it argues that the pervasive contemporary 
phenomenon of ‘politics of recognition’ needs to be interpreted as a 
providing merely a frame for struggles for political agency. 
Normative symbolic clashes taking place in this frame require a 
more fine-grained analysis to establish whether certain mnemonic 
practices inhibit or empower the social groups they reference. The 
concepts the paper advances as better explaining the outcome of 
memory struggles are referentiality and productivity. These signify 
attempts to (re)organize the semantic spaces of memory, and, if 
successful, allow for political agency to operate in the reconstituted 
mnemonic landscape. Governmentalities, however, will frequently 
attempt to deny such reconstitutions of ‘settled’ memory, in which 
case any politics of recognition remains a hollow shell without the 
potential to re-orient societal and political practices in the present. 
In the case of the occupation, the memory conflict highlighted how 
the past may be use to challenge accepted boundaries and the 
practice of boundary-making in society, while also highlighting the 
importance of social and political coalitions to advance change. 
 
Keywords: housing policy, double movement, recognition, redistribution.
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1. Introduction: Memory work and meaning-creation 
 
The occupation of the space around the Memorial to the Sinti and Roma Victims of 
National Socialism on May 22, 2016 represented multiple conflicts over 
interpreting the past-present nexus, specifically the relationship between current 
governmental practices and ethical imperatives derived from historical knowledge. 
It was carried out by protesters seeking the suspension of forced returns to 
countries of origin (notably Kosovo and Macedonia) that had been reclassified as 
‘safe’ by German authorities. The event highlighted the multidirectionality of the 
memory of genocide, inscribing disparate histories and present practices of 
violence into the representation of its most tragic instance (Rothberg, 2010). 
Specifically, the Roma Holocaust was repositioned in the act of occupation as a 
normative origo for just, inclusive reactions to events from the recent past 
(ranging from anti-Roma attitudes, structural and occasional physical violence in 
former socialist countries to post-war atrocities in Kosovo), and as generating a 
moral imperative for German and European solidarity with Roma everywhere on 
the continent. The move also sought to de-legitimize the tacit bureaucratic refusal, 
inherent in the reclassification of countries of origin, to acknowledge that legacies 
of exclusion still render life precarious for Roma communities in many places. In 
so doing, it attempted to radically broaden the representational productivity or 
‘meaning-making potential’ of the monument (Meyer and Whitmore, 2020). 
The logic underlying the occupation subverted the sovereign boundary-
drawing between society at large on the one hand and those denied full 
membership in it. The latter group, composed of those to be sent back to their 
countries of origin and those who can stay (for now) without being admitted to the 
political community, represents an excess of society that is managed through 
government agencies largely out of the public eye. The occupation pursued the 
political and present-oriented aim of rendering visible these routinized and 
undiscussed processes of bureaucratic control that constitute the political economy 
of ‘the right to stay,’ or Bleiberecht. The action rested on the assumption that if it is 
accepted that the perpetrator legacies of the genocide against Roma impose a duty 
on majority society to welcome and protect present-day Roma facing 
discrimination at home, agency and political visibility can no longer be denied to 
the groups of asylum-seekers. Refusing these would mean violating the normative 
framework prescribing the abjuration of singling out and persecuting or denying 
opportunities to vulnerable ethnic and racial minorities. Rooted in the collective 
decision to ‘face history,’ first and foremost of the genocidal practices of National 
Socialism, this framework has been widely accepted as foundational to both 
German and a pan-European identity (Herf, 1997; Art, 2006; Olick, 2016; Wittlinger 
and Boothroyd, 2010: 489–502). The refusal to offer shelter constitutes, if the case 
of asylum-seekers is allowed to be interpreted under the aegis of Holocaust 
memory, a re-enactment of the trope of the ‘camp’ through the sustained 
relegation of asylum-seeking Roma to the limbo between residence permit and 
expulsion (Edkins, 2000). 
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The event-like and agent-driven character of the occupation of the memorial 
grounds underlines the fit between the case and the theoretical toolbox offered by 
contemporary streams of memory studies. In interpreting the occupation and the 
conundrum of opinions around it, this paper adopts a dynamic position which 
treats mnemonic practices as representing ongoing (re)negotiations of meaning, 
with multiple referent objects in the past and in the present alike. In doing so, it 
aligns itself with criticism levelled against more traditional frameworks of 
interpreting collective memory. According to this criticism, earlier studies, 
modelled on the sociological approach introduced by Maurice Halbwachs, had a 
structural bias, focusing on the ‘contents’ of memory and avoiding the issue of 
how memory performs its role in society (Halbwachs, 1997: 96–160). As a result of 
this, the once revolutionary Halbwachsian understanding does not provide 
sufficient tools to investigate agencies that shape and contest memorialization. 
The shift away from memory towards remembrance represents moving the 
focus from the exploration of the ‘contents’ of memory towards its ‘makers’ and 
‘uses’; that is, the process of memory. Through this shift, memory has come to be 
seen as performative, constituted as the sum of mnemonic practices (Olick and 
Robbins, 1998). These practices represent instances of communicative/symbolic 
action embodied in re-enactment and commemoration (Fentress and Wickham, 
1992; Winter et al., 2010; Gutman et al., 2010). While Halbwachsian memory has 
been ‘understood as denoting an object,’ remembrance designates ‘a process’ that 
may be investigated in an interaction-focused framework, where participants 
create narratives to shape ‘social realities’ (Bottici, 2010: 342). As Jeffrey Olick 
summarized the essence of this change of perspective, memory has come to be 
seen as a ‘construct’ that references itself and practices in the present, rather than 
the past (Olick, 2007). 
Beyond the emphasis on memory as a process referencing conditions in the 
present, the occupation also highlighted the entangled character of remembering 
the European past. In fact, much of Roma memory work in Europe fits into what 
are described as emergent post-national communities of remembrance, conditioned 
by ‘[g]lobalized communication and time-space compression, post-coloniality, 
transnational capitalism, large-scale migration, and regional integration.’ In the 
case of the Roma, the main focus falls on the intersection of intra-community 
remembering and the transnational memory culture of the Holocaust. The latter 
corresponds to the structuring of Roma memory, since these communities share 
the characteristic that ‘the national […] cease[s] to be the inevitable or preeminent 
scale for […] collective remembrance’ (de Cesari and Rigney, 2014: 2). In the case at 
hand, it was a transnational group – with family and kin spread across several 
countries – that sought to establish the local relevance of its mnemonic practices 
by re-interpreting a key place of transnational memory (a reminder of genocidal 
persecution targeting Sinti and Roma) constructed within the framework of a 
national politics of history (German attempts at facing history). As such, the case 
provides also an opportunity for the ‘investigation of transnational memory 
linkages on the European level, comprising the analysis of cross-border social 
relationships of non-state and other actors’ (Sierp and Wüstenberg, 2015: 323). 
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The action channels of the event analyzed here highlight the work 
undertaken by agents of remembering who are also creating meaning in the 
undertaking. The notion of post-memory emphasizes the work-like, dynamic 
aspect of remembering by subsequent generations and is rooted in the 
acknowledgement that through transmitted (familiar, cultural) memory we 
remember that which we have not lived through. Memory work involves, 
therefore, rounding out, interpreting, ordering that which was passed on in 
fragments as a result of trauma or forced silencing. As Marianne Hirsch argued: 
‘[p]ost-memory’s connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall, but 
by imaginative investment, projection and creation’ (Hirsch, 2012: 4–5). 
In the specific instance of occupying the memorial, a pre-existing memory 
construct – connecting the universality of the Holocaust with the diachronic 
continuum of structural aggression against marginalized Roma – was mobilized 
and also added to in the process being ‘performed’ in the act of occupation. The 
central component of Roma post-memory, definitively formulated during the post-
1989 wave of deterritorialized identity building, is the emphasis on the Roma 
Holocaust representing the symbolic culmination of persecution and 
discrimination faced by members of the minority both before and after World War 
II, which operates as a metonymy of persistent oppression (Hancock, 1997; 
Gheorghe, 1991). The ‘imaginative investment’ of the original referent object was 
carried out during eruptions of a kind of insurrectionary knowledge, created by 
Roma activists during the preceding decades and sufficiently disseminated to 
operate as a unifying cognitive frame for participants. As Michel Foucault argued, 
disciplinary power-knowledges can be challenged by agents of 
 
an insurrection of subjugated knowledges […] referring to the historical 
contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or 
formal systemization. […] Subjugated knowledges are thus those blocs of 
historical knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of 
functionalist and systematizing theory and which criticism […] has been 
able to reveal. (Foucault, 1980: 81–82) 
 
The definition offers a very precise fit for the event of the occupation of the 
memorial grounds. The actors set themselves the goal of recasting ongoing 
expulsions and bureaucratic uncertainty over them as inacceptable for the broader 
political community because these bear resemblance to past violence which has 
become canonized in public memory as the ‘Other’ of the European self. Yet the 
canonical variant remains mute with regard to the present. In the process of 
occupation, the participants restored the productivity of canonical memory by 
linking it with contemporary, personal experience and subjective knowledges 
about supposedly ‘safe countries’ and the persistent precariousness of Roma life. 
As the above paragraph suggests, productivity can imply challenging 
prevailing norms and institutions that legitimize and promote certain relationships 
of referentiality, while muting and marginalizing others. It therefore also means 
restoring a greater degree of polyvalence to the memorial object. The success of 
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the attempt hinges on the ability of agents of change and reinterpretation, of 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ of memory, to create (or imbue new meaning into) objects 
and discourses that become disseminators of these meanings (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998; Finstad, 1998; Bratberg, 2011: 19). The new meaning – i.e. having the 
memory of Sinti and Roma Holocaust victims brought to bear on the ongoing 
expulsions affecting Roma mainly from the Western Balkans – clashed with the 
tacit practice of (p)reserving the memory of genocide for referencing in the present 
the responsibility of non-Roma majorities and governments to ensure 
compensation for victims and offer a place in their respective national societies for 
Roma. The latter frame has characterized mainstream German Sinti and Roma 
memory work and the resulting government-sanctioned institutionalization of 
Roma Holocaust remembrance for decades. With the occupation, a long 
controversy about the insufficient character of such recognition, which had come 
under increased scrutiny from dissenting organizations promoting deterritorialized 
Roma nationhood and rights, once more burst into the open. 
The following sections investigate and contextualize the occupation, 
focusing on the challenge it represented to the prevailing governmentality – 
understood as the milieu of actors deploying relevant knowledges to administer 
aspects of social organization, or ‘in the broad sense of techniques and procedures 
for directing human behavior’ (Foucault, 1997: 82). This includes both the know-
hows and capabilities of government agencies and civil society actors who, in this 
case, had successfully constructed a niche for themselves during earlier decades of 
gradual progress towards recognition of German minority Sinti and Roma as 
victims of the Holocaust and citizens of the new Germany. Beyond the tension 
between a politics of recognition conducted in the name of a minority and one 
referencing a deterritorialized, nascent Roma nation (an opposition discussed 
below), the event and its contexts demonstrate the problematic linkage between 
recognition and political agency in general. Governmentality works towards 
denying such agency to non-coopted actors that threaten the discursive stability of 
memory, along with its relevance for organizing and managing society. The action 
carried out by asylum-seekers, activists, and allies targeted this intersection of 
canonical memory and present-day political contestations. While its effects 
remained limited, it generated an exchange that highlighted the struggles to 
determine the referentiality of memory. Viewed as a complex event where the 
various aspects may be disentangled through tracing the multiple streams of social 
debate converging around the occupation, the case ultimately permits an analysis 
of how governmentality limits the productivity of mnemonic practices in a politics 
of the present, meaning the extent to which such practices are allowed to (re-
)configure norms of governmental action and social life. Such analysis investigates 
the settings in which multidirectional memory operates, highlighting how this 
multidirectionality, far from being fixed, represents successive rounds of 
negotiating and contesting meanings. Remembering as a social process is neither 
neutral, nor does it ever escape politics – the question that arises is rather how 
political and social actors struggle over configuring the memory-present nexus. 
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In the context of the above nexus, the shift towards the recognition of 
victims as a main goal of memory entrepreneurs and a frequent outcome of 
memory work has been highlighted across diverse disciplines as a prominent trend 
of the past decades (Chaumont, 1997; De Guissmé and Licata, 2017; Zombory, 2019: 
12–17). The history of Roma Holocaust remembrance demonstrates that the 
demand for the recognition of victim status did in fact configure activism from the 
very beginning, predating the formal emergence of politics of recognition 
(Anerkennungspolitik) in the Federal Republic and the world at large. However, 
recognition can also figure as a depoliticizing move by governmentalities 
promising what Maria Mälksoo defined as ‘ontological security’ to the memory 
community while stripping it of direct interpretive power over political challenges 
impacting members of the community in the present. Registering the 
acknowledgment of historical suffering is therefore insufficient for assessing the 
social meaning of recognition in the present – in other words, the productivity and 
referentiality of memory.  
Moving beyond the generalizations that impede disentangling the operations 
of power-knowledge, this paper focuses on modalities of recognition rather than 
the binary dilemma of what acknowledgment or the lack of such signifies in the 
context of memory politics. This is all the more necessary, as recognition of 
victimhood has become a prevailing mode of ‘settling’ and ‘synthesizing’ contested 
and conflictual interpretations of the past, especially of past violence. (Nadler and 
Shnabel, 2008; Kelman, 2008) The analysis that follows argues that ‘recognition’ is 
best seen as an empty signifier that only acquires social meaning as agents of 
memory clash over and circumscribe its symbolic productivity. It is depoliticized if 
governmentality preserves what has been recognized (past suffering caused by 
wrongdoing) decoupled from a political vision for the present and the future. At 
the same time, if norm entrepreneurs achieve the institutionalization of the linkage 
between a politics of the present and what is remembered, recognition can 
function as the source of disruptive knowledges that empower agents of change. 
This bifurcated analytic constitutes a warning about how in the era of a putatively 
universal right to remember, governmentalities can nevertheless advance preferred 
modes of memorializing to the detriment of other modes and the groups 
promoting these alternatives. While a rich repository of disruptive, even 
insurrectionary and often group-specific knowledges, memory needs to be 
questioned as mnemonic practice and social event to highlight the struggle over 
meaning-making in the socio-political setting of the present. 
 
2. Elusive synergies of a Europeanized Roma memory and 
Holocaust remembrance 
 
The event of the occupation fits into the ongoing pan-European undertaking to 
construct a non-homogenized, transnational Roma identity on the basis of shared 
historical experience. Such identity establishes a common historical dimension 
amongst groups, but also preserves regional and local differences between diverse 
communities. Roma remembering represents an excess of national memory, as 
90  GERGELY ROMSICS 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 84-114.  
Roma themselves are an excess of national society, and unifying their mnemonic 
practices into cross-border ‘national and ethnic memories […] in the age of 
globalization’ would synergize with the emergent cosmopolitan memory culture 
theorized by Levy and Sznaider. The post-Westphalian character of the latter 
would be able to accommodate the Roma excess of national memories, while 
connecting the geographically bounded frameworks in the process (Levy and 
Sznaider, 2006: 3; Hirsch, 2012: 20–22; Feindt et al., 2014). This conception of 
nation-building with mnemonic practices constituting a core dimension of identity 
reaches back to the early 1990s, when leading activists of Roma nation-building, 
such as Andrzej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorghe, embarked on marking out the place 
and status of the Roma Holocaust within a global remembrance culture and the 
symbolic universe of a de-territorialized Roma nation (Gheorghe, 1991; Gheorge 
and Mirga, 1997; Kapralski, 1997; Gheorghe and Rostas, 2015; van Baar, 2010; 2015; 
Reading, 2012). 
The Roma post-memory of the Holocaust, as originally conceptualized by 
Gheorghe and Mirga, would synergize with an emergent European politics of 
memory by virtue of its non-territorial character, simultaneously post-national and 
emancipatory. It points to a common symbolic core in the experiences of 
geographically and politically distant, yet culturally connected groups, 
multidirectionally interpreting many local pasts and presents through the 
universal signifier that Holocaust memory has become (Conrad, 2003: 86; 
Rothberg, 2009). In its fully developed form, it would have the potential to function 
as a ‘rhizomatic network of temporality and cultural reference’ that exists in a 
mutually constitutive relationship with Holocaust memory at large (Rothberg, 
2010: 7). 
In the struggle for emancipating Roma memory, this mutually constitutive 
relationship is of paramount significance. The historical representation of the 
exclusionary aspect of Europe is centered on the Holocaust, which is the anchor of 
the future continental ‘memory community’: it constitutes ‘the first circle’ of 
European remembering (Assmann, 2013: 32–35, Leggewie and Land, 2011: 23–24). 
Work on this foundational trope of historical identity is ongoing, in part because 
its remaining ‘hot’ memory – memory in a living, dialogical relationship with the 
present and representations of the self – is seen as an important symbolic exercise 
(Rigney, 2014: 343; Bottici, 2010: 345; Turai, 2009: 99; Tyszka, 2010). Keeping the 
memory of the Holocaust ‘at work’ sustains ‘the potential to challenge basic 
assumptions – about the sovereign law of nation-states […] and to create a 
cosmopolitanized public and political space that reinforces moral 
interdependencies’ (Sznaider, 2012: 61). Such mnemonic practice synergizes with 
preventing a retreat of ‘Europe’ into its White/Western historical identity, and 
counteracts (if not always successfully) exclusionary practices rooted in 
essentialized images of the self. The resulting liberation of memory from being 
constructed as a national, or otherwise homogeneous narrative holds out the 
possibility of Roma co-appearing in histories alongside the respective majorities, as 
well as claiming separate visibility in other instances. A history that may be read 
as existing within and across state borders should be one in which European and 
THE MEANING OF OCCUPATION 91 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 84-114.  
Roma memory can be accommodated, representing parallel challenges to the 
national scale of remembering. 
The nation- or transnational community-building discourse about Roma 
pasts points towards three naturally interconnected referent objects. One denotes 
the historical experience and the unifying potential of memory that shared 
experience and subsequent memory work generates – this makes up its intra-
community dimension. It also refers to the Roma struggle to be included and 
represented in European cultures of remembrance. This constitutes the universal 
dimension of the Roma Holocaust. Finally, the Roma Holocaust as a trope of public 
remembering has also been deployed to challenge practices of marginalization and 
repression in the past and in the present. This may be termed the diachronic and 
emancipatory dimension, through which the Holocaust operates as the 
metaphorical condensation or synecdoche of a common aspect of centuries of 
otherwise divergent regional Roma histories (Kapralski, 1997: 277; Reading, 2012: 
121–140). It imbues Holocaust memory with a universal message about exclusion 
suffered by the Roma and re-interprets that history as prefiguring or echoing the 
Holocaust in instances of persecution and marginalization. 
Community of experience is crucial in conceptualizing nationhood, no 
matter how atypical, in the absence of a shared territory, language, religion, and a 
century-spanning shared historical situation (Kapralski, 1997: 277–278). As 
Gheorghe and Mirga argued, for the first time in history, a transcontinental Roma 
elite existed in the 1990s, but it originated from and sought legitimacy to represent 
divergent and geographically disparate groups (Gheorghe and Mirga, 1997). In the 
case of these Roma elites, translating across region-specific traditions of the past 
and identity, as well as navigating the intersections of Roma and cosmopolitan 
European traditions have had to be undertaken to sustain a project of identity 
construction (Fosztó, 2003: 119). The centrality of the Roma Holocaust in this 
project was reinforced from both directions: the need to construct common 
platforms for a fragmented identity conglomerate (‘the Roma’) and the opportunity 
of finding an interface for the emergent identity politics with mainstream 
European structures of memory and collective identity (Hancock, 1991; Mirga and 
Gheorghe, 1992). 
The second universal, and symbolic, aspect of the memory of the Holocaust 
is rooted in the understanding of persecution by the Nazis as racially motivated 
and genocidal in character. This layer repositions the Roma, excluded and 
discriminated against in European societies, as universal signifiers of human 
suffering. In doing so, it defines a place for Roma in mainstream memory and 
challenges contemporary racist discourses that sustain the conceptualization of 
Roma as alien and as an excess (of Europe or the nation), a characteristic of 
structural racism, and of governmentalities that consign Roma to marginal niches 
in society. 
The universal character of Roma suffering in the Holocaust ties in with the 
final, emancipatory dimension of Holocaust remembrance. The latter raises, even 
more directly, the question to what extent majority and governmental practices 
today are still sustaining logics of exclusion driven to their extreme in the 
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genocidal actions of the Holocaust. In practice, what is at stake is whether the 
traditional discourse about the ‘asocial’ Gypsy is accorded legitimacy within 
majority society. This discourse is organized around the image of the vagrant that 
represents ‘a “social problem” requiring “rehabilitation” and “reintegration”, who 
can – and must – be brought back into the fold of “society”’ (Liégeois and 
Gheorghe, 1995: 12–13; Crowe, 1995: 236–238). By virtue of its emancipatory 
dimension, Holocaust memory may be deployed to delegitimize current policing 
discourse directed against Roma, revealing its racism and Nazi genealogy through 
highlighting the shared logic of othering underpinning both. In reverse, 
governmentalities that sustain exclusion seek to divest Holocaust memory from its 
emancipatory aspect, refusing to acknowledge continuities in marginalizing and 
repressive practices. For this reason, this dimension emerges as the most contested 
and most productive one at the intersections of majority and minority politics. 
This productivity explains at least in part why Holocaust memory has been central 
in the ‘transition toward becoming an ethnically mobilized group, having a 
common stance and interests,’ while also functioning as a rhetorical resource in 
the civil rights struggle (Mirga and Gheorghe, 1992). 
Despite the paramount importance of Holocaust memory for Roma identity 
politics, the difference between the ways in which both Jewish and Roma suffering 
possesses universal significance is noted by most Roma activists and experts. The 
early contribution of Kenrick and Puxon to this question, a discursive origo for 
interpreting the Roma Holocaust, accomplished canonizing the difference and 
interpreting the specificity of persecution (Kenrick and Puxon, 1972: 183–184). 
Further elaborations of their thesis represent the majority opinion today. This 
interpretation argues that in the case of the Roma, decentered violence emerged 
out of the confluence of Nazi political will and ideology, often divergent decisions 
of Reich-level and regional functionaries, governmental decisions taken in allied or 
occupied countries, and the local, often ‘grassroots level’ willingness (both of 
occupiers and collaborators) to perpetrate the crimes (Margalit, 2002: 47–48; 
Barany, 2002: 103; Szász, 2015: 9–11; Armillei et al., 2016: 111). 
Since the beginnings of this transnational politics of identity/memory in the 
years following the fall of communism, examples of homologous mnemonic 
practices have emerged across Europe. The memory of the dispersed, decentered 
character of the genocide is re-enacted, inter alia, by an annual caravan revisiting 
memorial sites in Poland (Vermeersch, 2008; Tarnów Regional Museum, 2015). A 
synthesizing framing of the chains of events has become permanently inscribed 
into the master text of the Auschwitz site through the opening of a Roma 
exhibition there, juxtaposed as a simultaneously national and transnational place 
of memory to the state-sponsored exhibitions (van Baar, 2010a). Mnemonic 
practices, both governmental and civil society-driven, have taken shape across EU 
Member States around the anniversary of the liquidation of the Zigeunerlager in 
Auschwitz on 2 August, 1944. More recently, commemorations emphasizing Roma 
resistance to genocide and thus reaffirming the collective political agency of the 
subaltern have become institutionalized as well (Brooks, 2015: 53). The idea of the 
Roma Holocaust as a signifier that can and should be translated into local contexts 
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has also increasingly found its way into education, primarily through school 
projects on local history. Education that includes history of the genocide of the 
Roma is most advanced in Germany, but multiple reports of parallel efforts are 
available from other European states as well (Diercks, 2012). 
The above suggest a natural ‘fit’ between emergent Roma and European 
mnemonic practices and frameworks. But the more this initially largely self-
constituting memory becomes embedded in European and self-reflexive national 
frameworks, the more it becomes co-configured and potentially even colonized by 
various nationally or supranationally constituted networks of governmentality. 
Friction abounds, inter alia in cases where discursive and regulatory efforts to 
organize representations institutionalizes Roma as victims, while claiming 
authority to also mark out what victim status means for majority and minority 
relations. This threatens and challenges grassroots agency, which becomes locked 
in a struggle with the dominant logic of remembering over the right to use 
memory according to its experiences and synergies between knowledges about the 
past and about the present. Manifestations of insurrectionary knowledges 
therefore take place in a semiotically thicker and thicker environment in which 
control over historical discourse is slipping away from those who carry the legacy 
of historical experience. 
This problematic has been discussed repeatedly in a European context, 
where increased awareness of past wrongs has seamlessly co-existed with a lack of 
an emancipatory-integrative mechanism for Roma citizens or residents of the EU 
(Anghel, 2015; Agarin, 2014). A further pointed example of the clash of grassroots 
actors and dominant mnemonic frameworks is provided by the memory struggles 
around the Roma Holocaust Memorial, including the two-decade long, conflict-
ridden process leading to its construction and unveiling. The occupation itself may 
be interpreted as an eruption of knowledges that have been largely marginalized in 
this singularly drawn-out process, mounting a desperate attempt to reclaim control 
over the symbolic representation of the collective self and its history, as well as the 
meaning of the representation. Those represented find themselves in a situation of 
dis-identity by a politics of recognition that ensures commemoration and confers 
on Roma a victim status characterized by a non sequitur of political rights and 
agency. Such recognition severs linkages between the focal point of memory – the 
Holocaust – and those who carry its post-memory. Viewed in this light, the 
‘mnemonic rebels’ of May 22 mounted an attempt to restore the contiguity of past 
and present by assuming control over meaning and re-establishing the validity of 
the warning embodied in the memorial for contemporary practices rendering 
Roma lives precarious once more. 
 
3. Recognition in and by the nation: Roma minority politics in 
Germany 
 
Demonstrating the friction between Roma remembering and governmentality 
conferring victim status and compensation, the status of the Memorial has 
remained ambiguous. In theory, it could operate in a manner similar to the 
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Auschwitz exhibition, disseminating a transnational frame of the Roma Holocaust 
in Berlin, with the city understood as a symbolic locus of a dual, European, and 
German effort at mastering the past (van Baar, 2010; 2010a). While in theory this 
function is accepted by all stakeholders, the occupation and the responses it 
produced highlight the unsettled question concerning the productivity of the site. 
By extension, this peculiarity also throws novel light on German memory work 
about the Roma Holocaust and Sinti/Roma rights in general, often considered 
paradigmatic in relevant literature (Fosztó, 2003: 115). 
The explanation for this paradigmatic position is the product of several, 
mutually reinforcing observations about mnemonic practices and the way these 
are embedded into politics and society in Germany. German national politics of 
identity and memory explore with greater commitment practices of facing the past 
than is the case in most, if not all other societies with perpetrator legacies (Art, 
2006). After a long history of administrative discrimination spanning the better 
part of the first century of modern Germany, the Federal Republic also saw the 
emergence of the first well-organized, efficient Sinti and Roma civil rights 
movement in the 1970s (Matras, 1998; Gress, 2015). All of the above do not render 
the situation of Sinti and Roma unproblematic in Germany, yet efforts there 
undeniably represent a case where the environment was relatively advantageous 
for constructing both an intercommunity narrative about the past and a 
specifically Sinti and Roma memory in tandem. Enmeshed in processes of 
constructing such narratives, governmentality operates not against all forms of 
civil society and norm entrepreneurship, as in countries where minority mnemonic 
cultures are framed more as competitors, but in a far more nimble and adaptable 
manner, seeking to reinforce and co-opt some agents of change and fence off 
others.  
The history of anti-Roma discrimination in Germany represents an instance 
of bourgeois biopolitics, where the adjective bourgeois signifies that the 
disciplinary aspect of this biopolitics was directed at those who were construed as 
threatening the decent morals and lifestyles of the ‘average German.’ This has 
included the policing of individuals defined as asocial in the early twentieth 
century and, through that practice, of the nomadic différend in general (Kenrick, 
2010: 97; Hubert, 1999: 60–62). These early twentieth-century practices prepared 
the ground for radical persecution by creating vulnerable bodies assumed to be 
always already outside the law and later revealed themselves highly resilient, 
surviving into post-1945 democracies (Hancock, 2009: 87–88; Milton, 1995: 29–52). 
After 1945, in the Western, democratic half that became the Federal Republic 
of Germany in 1949, Sinti and Roma not only faced continued discrimination, but 
remained unrecognized as a victim group. Numerous former perpetrators (usually 
from the Security Service [SD] or the criminal police [KriPo] which had handled 
Roma affairs) served on (Mallmann and Paul, 2004; Knesebeck, 2011: 33–34; 
Margalit, 2003: 56 and 91). The period was one of political invisibility for Roma, 
whose communities remained largely abandoned to the operations of 
administrative authorities (Zimmermann, 1996: 381; Margalit, 2002: 56; Knesebeck, 
2011: 96–97, 233–234). Formal discourse showed continuities as well: substituting 
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vagrants for Zigeuner, the argument of ‘asocial’ behavior both predated Nazism 
and escaped being linked to Nazi ideology, remaining in received usage until the 
1960s (Gress, 2015: 49; Hedemann, 2007: 12–13; Margalit, 2002: 59–70). 
An opening to bringing Roma rights into the public eye was created after 
the student movements of the late 1960s created the discourse of not closing the 
book on, but instead radically questioning the past. When in 1973 Anton Lehmann 
was shot by the police in Heidelberg, the newly (re)formed Association of German 
Sinti organized demonstrations, engaged in dialogue with other NGOs, and 
eventually with national political parties. The precursor association had been 
founded by brothers Oskar and Vinzenz Rose as the Association of Persecuted 
People of non-Jewish Confession (Verband der Verfolgten nichtjüdischen Glaubens) 
in 1956 (Liégeois, 1994: 252). Their association was originally aimed at securing 
restitution, mainly for Sinti who were not recognized at the time as a victim group. 
The West German state had turned down numerous reparation claims on the 
grounds that internment, sterilization, and other violent interventions by the Third 
Reich state machinery were based on public security or health considerations, 
sharply distinguished from genocidal intent (Fings, 2016: 92–97). In contrast to this 
focus, the core message of the younger generation who turned ‘activists’ during 
the 1970s became the precariousness of Roma/Sinti lives in democratic Germany. 
As lawyer Romani Rose became more and more involved in the work of the 
association, it underwent a process of professionalization and emerged as a full-
fledged NGO with special expertise and familiarity regarding the administrative 
and legal environment relevant to its work (Fings, 2016: 102–103; Leggewie and 
Lang, 2010: 197). What did not change was the embeddedness of the activist 
discourse in the concept of German citizenship. Sinti active in the Association 
defined themselves as German, but different from ethnic Germans – a minority. 
While in the 1970s, the first international movement behind the international 
congresses of Roma in 1971 and 1978 (renamed the International Romani Union) 
promoted the emergent concept of a separate, de-territorialized nationhood, many 
Sinti in Germany resented the idea of excluding themselves from a successful 
society (Margalit, 2002: 199–200; Gress, 2015: 51; Fosztó, 2003: 110–117). 
The emergence of a standardized German Sinti and Roma discourse about 
the Holocaust occurred between 1979 and 1982. In the years immediately 
preceding this, the Association built close contacts with a New Left and strongly 
anti-fascist organization, the Society for Threatened Peoples. Its leader, Tilman 
Zülch, became an important ally, who accepted the Roma claim of being forgotten 
victims of the Holocaust at a time when the realization that Jehovah’s witnesses, 
gays, and other communities had also been targeted by Nazi persecution was 
gaining currency in society. Zülch was able to present Rose to Social Democratic 
and Green politicians, who subscribed to the need to revise German thinking about 
how victims of the Holocaust were conceptualized (Margalit, 2002: 160–179; Gress, 
2015: 49). 
Simultaneously to the opening up of channels of communication towards 
political actors with clout, the movement launched a large-scale campaign on a 
wave of renewed German interest in coming to terms with the legacy of the 
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Holocaust (Matras, 1998: 54; Knesebeck, 2011: 231–232). The Association’s chosen 
strategy was to link human rights violations today with the genocide committed 
by the Nazis. In the increasingly sensitized German media environment, the very 
respectable liberal weekly Die Zeit (December 7, 1979) afforded coverage to the 
movement and presented its slogan ‘gassed in Auschwitz, still persecuted today’ in 
print, as did Der Spiegel in October 1979 (Gress, 2015: 57). The Association’s 
memorial demonstration at the Bergen Belsen concentration camp in 1979, as well 
as the hunger strike of twelve Sinti in Dachau in 1980, broke the media barrier for 
good. These efforts mediatized the struggle for recognition the Sinti and Roma 
communities of Germany engaged in (Seybold and Staats, 2012: 158–163; Lewy, 
2001: 227; Hedemann, 2007: 70–74). 
In 1982, the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma was formed; an 
instance of institutional resource pooling that was dominated by the leadership of 
the Association with input from the Society for Threatened Peoples, which also 
had a key Sinto activist/official (Fritz Greussing). Romani Rose became the 
president of the Central Council. When the Council was granted a visit to 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, he recognized the crimes committed against Sinti and 
Roma as genocide, an acknowledgement later repeated by his successor, Helmut 
Kohl. These statements and a meeting with President of the Federal Republic Karl 
Carstens gradually elevated the standing of the Central Council to that of an NGO 
with a recognized voice in national politics. The years 1979–1982 brought the 
nationalization and politicization of the movement and saw the application of a 
combined memory policy and civil rights campaign model (Knesebeck, 2011: 232). 
Recognition and a sense of agency were the two most important dividends 
of the campaign. Recent research by Sebastian Lotto-Kusche has reconstructed the 
discursive aspect of the ‘storming’ of the Kanzleramt by activists: archival evidence 
shows that the terminology ‘Sinti and Roma’ was unknown to federal civil 
servants, to the point of requiring the superscript Zigeuner on some documents as 
late as 1980. The movement accomplished an instance of successful norm 
entrepreneurship. It introduced a marginalized problem, legitimized its 
presentation as an issue requiring political intervention and proposed a discourse 
for framing it, which was largely accepted (Lotto-Kusche, 2016). This finding is 
further reinforced through the partially quantitative evaluation of Roma issues 
appearing in the Bundestag, analyzed by Gabi Meyer. Her data bear out both the 
success of the mobilization and the amount of work that needed to be done after 
the breakthrough in visibility and participation: from 1949 to 1970, there is 
minimal attention to any Roma issue, while from 1970 to 1985 there is a slow 
trend, especially towards the second half of the period, of Roma breaking the 
barrier of political discussion, at least in terms of figuring on the agenda (Meyer, 
2012: 233–290). 
A key element in the continuing efforts of the Zentralrat remained the 
mutual co-opting of and by political partners. German Sinti and Roma calls for 
reparations had been endorsed by the Greens and some Social Democrats. While in 
opposition, in 1985 the Greens presented a comprehensive handling of the 
‘forgotten victims,’ a draft bill on ‘the regulation of the appropriate care for all 
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victims of national socialist persecution in the timeframe 1933–1945.’ The Social 
Democrats, less ambitiously, called for an amendment to existing regulation. The 
parties managed to prod the conservative government into a review of 
compensation policies, and a broader debate, in which the Sinti and the Roma were 
both on the agenda and given opportunity for participation, could commence. The 
first tangible outcome of presence on the national political agenda was funding 
received for a cultural and historical center, which has been operating under the 
Central Council’s supervision since 1987 (Knesebeck, 2011: 222–223). 
Despite pre-unification progress, the integration of Roma memory into 
canonical German remembrance occurred in 1993–1997. Recognition as a national 
minority, President Roman Herzog’s landmark anniversary address on the day of 
the liberation of Auschwitz in 1997 (juxtaposing Jewish and Sinti and Roma 
victims), and the beginning of the state-sponsored memorialization in public 
spaces all took place in this period (the first was the Buchenwald memorial, 
inaugurated in 1995) (Meyer, 2012: 276–291). The two decades since the 
canonization of a ‘Roma aspect’ in official German remembering have witnessed 
the dissemination of knowledge transferred by Sinti, Roma and allies to local and 
federal governmental agencies as well as majority NGOs through community 
initiatives, cultural production, and education. Roma mnemonic practices about the 
Holocaust could also draw on existing models of engaging with perpetrator 
legacies. These include a culture of local history research and a self-reflexive mode 
of cultural production. Imprints of this engagement are easy to locate, ranging 
from study projects (a regional survey is offered f.i. in the individual pieces found 
in Diercks, 2012) to theatrical productions (among them Das Verschlingen, the 
German equivalent of Porrajmos, at Galerie Kai Dikhas in Berlin) and exhibitions 
in symbolic locations, including the German Police Academy (Deutsche Hochschule 
der Polizei), the school of the organization once responsible for many of the 
decentred killings and the post-war refuge of several war criminals who had 
ordered the mass executions (Bak, 2014; Dierecks, 2012; Krahl and Meichsner, 
2016). 
The peculiarity of this evolution has been the sustained dominance of the 
Central Council of German Sinti and Roma as a partner of the government (a 
provider of key resources, both material and ideational). The achievements 
accordingly reflect the position and priorities of the organization, with the 
emphasis on an intra-German understanding between minority and majority, the 
main transnational aspect of which is to provide blueprints for the successful 
emancipation and protection of Roma minorities especially in former socialist 
countries. This implies solidarity, but also a markedly ‘Westphalian’ commitment 
that assigns Roma issues to national politics first and foremost. When the original 
plans for a Memorial to be built in a Berlin suburb – in Marzahn, where Sinti and 
Roma living in and around Berlin had been concentrated by Nazis prior to 
deportation – were first proposed, by virtue of the emphasis on local and regional 
histories, these concepts reflected a similar focus on the intra-, rather than the 
transnational challenges of mastering history. It was at first the desire for a more 
central location commensurate with the recognition of the community’s suffering 
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that set off a process of negotiations to relocate the Memorial to downtown Berlin, 
integrated into the symbolic geography of contrition constructed by other 
monuments there (Berg, 2010). By virtue of its importance, however, the Memorial 
also became a locus of contestation against the hegemonial logic of remembrance 
by other Sinti and Roma groups seeking more explicit expression of the 
transnational dimension of the genocide and the resulting ethico-political 
constellation in the present. 
The success of a specific grass-roots movement created, therefore, an 
ambiguous situation. The early and sustained instance of politics of recognition 
conducted with the aim of ensuring compensation and according collective 
political agency (in the form of institutionalizing national minority status) did 
make the German case ‘paradigmatic.’ At the same time, the reformed 
governmentality, moving from policing to acknowledgement, extended recognition 
exclusively within the multitude of citizens, decoupling German Sinti and Roma 
from the broader, transnational patchwork of communities. (Importantly, this 
occurred not despite resistance from, but through the integration and relative 
empowerment of the activist group driving the shift.) The boundary between 
Roma and non-Roma was not eliminated, but relocated and mapped onto the 
citizen/migrant divide. A peculiar aspect of this shift has been the inclusion of all 
Roma as victims, an outcome of the universal responsibility for facing the past 
assumed by the German state. As a result, recognition itself has not been contested 
in the German setting. It is the meaning of victimhood in the present and the right 
to define this meaning that has repeatedly triggered resistance against the 
translation of a memory that is simultaneously transnational and local/dispersed 
into a national grand récit that acknowledges victimhood in the same movement as 
denying citizenship and political agency. 
 
4. Competing politics of recognition 
 
Despite their seeming linearity, ‘unpacking’ the policy processes of the decades 
leading up to the unveiling of the Memorial reveals subsequent rounds of 
contestations about meaning-making through commemoration. A simple narrative 
would describe a straightforward dynamic of Roma activism and an increasingly 
receptive political class progressing through stages of recognition and towards the 
integration of minority perspectives into national mnemonic culture. None of these 
terms, however, is unambiguous, nor does the linear story enable a discussion of 
all Roma stakeholders in the movements towards recognition. To begin with, the 
demarcation of the political subject: the status of national minority, was granted to 
‘German Sinti and Roma.’ Belonging to the community was defined in an 
extremely narrow manner, excluding Roma guest workers as well as the increasing 
number of asylum seekers residing in Germany, sometimes for decades. This is the 
narrowest possible framing of Sinti and Roma identity (Sinti being identified as 
having lived in Germany since the late Middle Ages). Restitution and formal 
inclusion in German memory politics (through the engagement of the Zentralrat in 
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federal as well as regional projects and funding to its cultural center) has been 
extended to this group. 
In the face of this trend, alternative Roma identities have constituted and 
organized themselves in Germany, such as the Rom and Cinti Union (RCU), a 
Hamburg-based organization which is not a member of the Central Council, as 
well as the Sinti Alliance. These tend to represent a broader identity platform 
rooted in transnational solidarity and form a minority in Sinti and Roma 
communities of citizens. In public action, they are found allied to and speaking also 
for Roma residing in the country without citizenship or residence permits and in 
overt or latent resistance to granting minority status based on citizenship. Their 
positions converge around the concept of a deterritorialized nation existing in 
stateless solidarity with members, and as minorities in the individual home 
countries with which the German state needs to build a special ethical relationship 
as a consequence of historical crimes (Kawczynski, 1997: 25–26). This approach 
converges with broader European trends, especially those fostered by a 
transnational Roma elite embedded in intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations. The convergence can be traced through individual careers, as well: 
the Union’s founding president, Rudko Kawczynski, went on to become President 
of the Council of Europe partner organization the European Roma and Traveller 
Forum. 
These organizations consider the suffering of all Sinti and Roma during the 
Holocaust as indivisible (Knesebeck, 2011: 223). From this, it follows that the 
German state – having assumed responsibility for the perpetratorship – carries a 
certain moral burden towards all Roma (as it does towards Jews). While the 
Zentralrat’s political agenda focuses on Sinti and Roma citizens and their 
integration, as well as upward social mobility, in the latter case the plight of Roma 
in Europe at large serves as the framework for the present-day political agenda. 
During his tenure as president of RCU, Kawczynski argued that Germany ‘had a 
‘historical responsibility’ to welcome the Roma’ (Barany, 2002: 251). 
Accordingly, the RCU has advocated strongly for migrant Roma from the 
East and criticized the Central Council on numerous occasions. Kawczynski 
articulated this position as early as the fall of Soviet-style dictatorships around 
1989, when westward Roma migration, as a potential threat to society, first 
appeared in German mainstream media (Sternsdorff, 1989). In this perspective, the 
historical responsibility of the German state extended to all Roma, a practical 
consequence of which should have been prohibiting the expulsion of asylum-
seeking Roma from the East. Divergent interpretations of German responsibility 
underpinned the debate over expulsion between the Central Council and 
Kawczynski’s organization in the early 1990s. The RCU effectively accused the 
Central Council of enabling racist and anti-Roma policies, contributing to the re-
emergence of practices and mind-sets from the era of the Holocaust (Spiegel, 1992). 
The difference between the two campaign slogans precisely captures this 
cleavage. During its first major human rights campaign at the end of the 1970s – as 
a norm-entrepreneurial, anti-status quo movement – the Association of German 
Sinti and Roma provocatively chose the slogan ‘gassed in Auschwitz, persecuted 
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today.’ In 1992, the RCU sponsored the exhibition ‘1939–1989: gassed – persecuted 
– expelled,’ extending the normative framework to asylum seekers. At the same 
time, Hugo Franz, a Central Council spokesperson, publicly announced their 
acceptance of various repatriation measures, most importantly the German-
Romanian agreement on the repatriation of up to 50,000 Roma holding Romanian 
citizenship (Spiegel, 1992). In terms of the emphasis on action by Roma for Roma 
and the positioning of Holocaust memory as a source of a shared transnational 
identity, as well as the positing of a moral imperative for majority society vis-à-vis 
all Roma, Kawczynski’s platform appears as representative of transnational Roma 
nation-building and self-empowerment (van Baar, 2010; Kapralski, 2013). 
The same logic can be seen periodically reappearing when the nexus of 
Roma and German memory is activated by administrative or political choices on 
the part of the government. Following the decision in 1992 to repatriate Roma to 
Romania and re-classify the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a safe 
country, the occupation of another symbolic location occurred. Jasar Demirov of 
the Roma Union of Southern Germany (Roma-Union Süddeutschland) co-organized 
protests in spring 1993 in Dachau, telling the leading German daily Süddeutsche 
Zeitung that the Republic’s expulsion policy re-enacted the practices of the 
concentration camp (‘Once gassed, expulsed today’), and argued that the victims of 
the former camp could offer protection to the threatened lives today. In a clear 
move to enlist the universally acknowledged warnings of the past, he re-iterated 
the logic of the 1992 exhibition and challenged the Central Council’s position, 
which proposed tackling threats to Roma in the countries of origin (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 1993). 
It is similarly important to unpack the other side of the equation – national 
politics. German memory culture, with some fits and starts, has moved towards 
increasing recognition of victims and acceptance of responsibility, both material 
and moral, over the course of the past half-century (Herf, 1997; Olick, 2016). At the 
same time, national political leaders have control over the legal and administrative 
aspects of memory politics in the country, which, in a way, is reflected in the 
empowerment of the Central Council. By preferentializing and accepting as the 
only partner a distinctly national organization, they provided resources and 
legitimacy to the actor within the broader Roma NGO universe that refused to 
position anywhere near the top of its agenda the twin questions of German 
responsibility for non-citizen Roma victims and the rights of migrant Roma in 
Germany (and elsewhere) today. German mainstream political culture and the 
Central Council could cooperate on the basis of conferring mutual legitimacy on 
each other, with the effect of downgrading the voices propagating for an 
alternative approach. 
The final determination of the Central Council’s position, emphasizing the 
bond of citizenship as the source of responsibility for states, did not become 
unequivocal until the crisis brought on by an influx of Roma asylum-seekers 
around 1989. With regard to Roma citizens of other states, the Central Council sees 
itself as a disseminator of best practices and as an advocate promoting inclusive 
and compensatory policies in other states. It has developed a culture of 
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transnational commemoration and national activism, which harmonizes with the 
German governmentality structuring identity politics in the country. The message 
of empowering Roma in their native countries can appear in a symbiotic 
relationship with discourses of population management that frame repatriation as 
a desirable instrument and outcome for the German state (Rose, 2005; Heuss, 2013; 
End, 2015: 2 and 13). 
In contrast to the success of early Sinti and Roma norm entrepreneurs, 
advocates of recognizing the standing of European Roma in Germany as a former 
perpetrator country have managed to build a mutually reinforcing relationship 
only with Die Linke (The Left), a hard left-wing party uniting reformed East 
German communists and New Marxists. The position of the party is peripheral 
despite its popularity in some federated states. Importantly, it does not have the 
influence on legislation and official politics of memory that the Social Democrats 
possessed around 1980 and after. Despite decade-long cooperation against 
repatriation measures, Roma and Die Linke have had little success in 
‘mainstreaming’ their interpretation on the memory-civil rights nexus (Pau, 2012; 
Groth, 2017). 
In sum, Holocaust memory in Germany revealed itself in the past three 
decades of increasing institutionalization as a common platform where Roma 
organizations with divergent identity politics could meet, but also come into 
conflict. The domestic/minority politics focus of the Central Council has been 
paradigmatic, providing blueprints for the first generation of civil rights activists 
in former socialist countries, while succeeding in a process of institutional 
consolidation that has not been matched in other societies. The dynamics of the 
German case, however, were co-determined by the political choices of the national 
political elite. Successes resulted when normative pressures could be brought to 
bear on the political class and a winning coalition of Sinti/Roma and majority 
representatives could be assembled. Domestic norm shifts (the discovery of the 
‘forgotten victims’ in the 1970s) had an important facilitating impact (Margalit, 
2002: 160–179). When these scope conditions for normative chance and 
institutionalization were missing, a second wave of norm entrepreneurship, 
seeking to similarly mainstream mnemonic practices referencing European Roma 
at large, met with little success, and has left the question of solidarity with asylum-
seeking Roma in Germany unresolved. 
The dynamics of Roma memory politics were condensed into the difficult 
process of creating a memorial to Roma victims of the Holocaust in Berlin. 
Resistance to the original Marzahn site united all NGOs, until the government 
acquiesced to having the memorial in symbolic proximity to that of Jewish victims. 
The inauguration of the work was stalled for years, however, to the point that 
Israeli architect Dani Karavan, who was 62 years old when he received the 
commission, doubted if he would see his design realized in his lifetime. He was 82 
by the time the inauguration happened. Part of the delay, after an acceptable 
location and funding were secured by the government, resulted from the 
unresolved dichotomy of thinking about Sinti and Roma both within the NGO 
ecosystem and in majority society. Seeking to avoid controversy, majority 
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politicians wanted to see an a priori consensus regarding the memorial, the 
planned inscription of which (Zigeuner) was found to be reflective of past racist 
practices especially by the Central Council and Romani Rose. The proposed term 
‘Sinti and Roma’ proved unacceptable from the transnational perspective espoused 
by the Rom and Cinti Union and the Sinti Alliance (Berg, 2010; Dowling, 2011; 
Bunjes, 2011; Kuhla, 2017). The debate lasted throughout the second half of the 
aughts. 
In the end, a poem by Santino Spinella, entitled Auschwitz was deemed 
acceptable as the main inscription by all organizations making their voices heard. 
Zigeuner is referenced on the memorial grounds only as the term used by the 
Nazis, in a strictly historical statement to which examples of Romani groups from 
all over Europe are added in the commentary. The text, however, lists Sinti and 
Roma specifically as well, which is standard reference to the minority holding 
German citizenship. It thereby creates ambiguity, reflecting the unresolved identity 
politics with which Roma remembrance remains imbued in Germany (Bunjes, 
2011; Kuhla, 2017). As in previous decades, the country-specific identity of the 
main activist organization, the Zentralrat, did not imply lack of international 
solidarity: in a statement given at the inauguration, Rose defined the memorial as 
representing the success of the struggle in Germany, specifying its meaning in the 
present as a warning that abroad – in Hungary, the Czech Republic, France, 
Montenegro, etc. – violence and exclusion against Roma are still widespread. At 
the same time, the Rom and Cinti Union’s long-time president, Rudko Kawczynski, 
has continued to focus on German politics, referencing a transnational ethics and 
Roma solidarity, in directing attention to the exploitation of migrant Roma 
workers by a governmentality that retains, but does not legalize them. 
The radically ‘open text’ – in terms of the spatial composition – of the 
Memorial was conceived by Dani Karavan as fostering reflection rather than 
prescribing meaning. It does not resist the divergent considerations of its relevance 
for the present, while representing both politics of recognition: an intra-German 
one acknowledging the political agency of victims, and a transnational-
cosmopolitan one that, however, denies agency to those co-commemorated by it. 
Potentially, however, it could just as well reference a transnational subject 
acknowledged as possessing a voice in negotiating the future lives of non-citizen 
Roma. 
 
5. The occupation of the Memorial 
 
The divergent interpretations about the functions of the Roma Holocaust memorial 
symbolically placed across the memorial for Jewish victims in Berlin have 
continued to animate mnemonic practices. The previous sections of this paper 
sought to highlight how these divergent readings emerged and what sustains them 
in stark opposition to each other. As in 1992-1993, it was the recategorization of 
countries of origin in late 2015 and the expected rise in forced repatriations in 2016 
that triggered a chain of protests (Die Welt, 2016). The administrative move was 
especially contested since violence suffered by Roma during and in the aftermath 
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of the war in Kosovo had been the worst since 1989, and finding Kosovo on the list 
of safe countries of origin represented a direct challenge to the experience and 
communal memory of many asylum seekers. Coordinated actions against the 
planned repatriations were ongoing since April 2016. While undoubtedly the 
apogee of these protests, the occupation was not pre-planned, but rather occurred 
as the quasi-spontaneous choice of potentially affected Roma and their allies 
(Bundes Roma Verband, 2016). 
The occupation demonstrated the symbolic potential of such a location for 
present-oriented, transnational political action (EPD, 2016). In moving to the 
memorial, the majority’s responsibility was evoked by the protesters for a past 
crime. At the same time, they also conjured up the memory of Roma agency and 
the ability to resist – increasingly commemorated on 16 May across Europe, a few 
days prior to the occupation. The demonstration of the ability to resist was both 
retroactive (seeing ourselves as more than victims) and oriented towards the 
present, seeking to engage/restore the productivity of the site for the transnational 
Roma minority in a political arena of paramount significance for them. 
The occupation ended after negotiations with the police and continued as a 
series of events at Marzahn and elsewhere, with a permanent demonstration 
running for ten days next to the Memorial. Mainstream German media, however, 
did not report on the other events. The Central Council of German Sinti and Roma 
condemned the instrumentalization of the memorial site, which the organization’s 
press release interpreted as purely commemorative in character (Zentralrat, 2016). 
The Zentralrat did express opposition to the increasing stringency of both asylum 
regulations and the way they are observed in practice, but essentially held on to 
the identity politics compromise that had emerged by the late 1990s. It emphasized 
the tribulations of Roma in especially the Western Balkans, but in terms of political 
actions it suggested targeting their living conditions in their native countries. In 
doing so, it acknowledged the reality and ethical validity of the problem that Roma 
are being forcibly repatriated to unsafe countries of origin, challenging the 
bureaucratic reclassification. At the same time, in keeping with its position stated 
authoritatively on the occasion of the opening of the Memorial, it did not 
recognize a de-territorialized Roma nation as the referent object of the site and 
continued to define the communities as separate minorities of titular nations 
(Dokumentations- und Kulturzentrum Deutscher Sinti und Roma, 2012: 8). This 
discourse reinforces the limited platform of ‘solidarity in Westphalia’; i.e. where 
states (territorially bounded governmentalities) still control and administer 
populations. Such governmentalities may (and should) integrate a moral 
commitment to observe universal human rights into their logics of managing 
populations, but cannot be made responsible for the fates of individuals exposed to 
harm in territories administered by other sovereignties (Heuss, 2016). 
The policing which removed demonstrators from the memorial grounds was 
re-enacted with a few days’ delay in the discourses about Roma political agency 
and its right to interpret and even instrumentalize its past. The foundation 
managing the Holocaust memorials in Berlin stated unequivocally that ‘the 
Memorial for the Sinti and Roma of Europe murdered under National Socialism is a 
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place for remembering the up to 500,000 victims of genocide and no place for 
political protest’ (Stiftung Denkmal, 2016). With this move, a key operator 
organization, possessing specialist competence and embedded in the network of 
the prevailing governmentality, reiterated the separation of remembrance and 
recognition as victims from the political struggle of these victims and their 
descendants. The move denied the inherent politicalness of managing a memorial, 
contrasting recognition through remembering with the pursuit of specific policy 
goals. At the same time, the call to de-politicize the symbolic universe is itself a 
political move, since it is aimed, ultimately, at denying a symbolic resource to 
proponents of a norm shift. It is through such situations and procedures of 
supervision and control, according and denying legitimacy to political claims or 
promoting depoliticization as ethically superior that the adaptive and fluid 
operations of governmentality reveal themselves as appropriating and governing 
the memory of others. Ultimately, these operations invert recognition itself, since 
they limit its validity to discussions of the past exclusively rendering the 
recognized subject an extension of history into the present. 
 
6. Conclusions: Agency and reconfiguring politics of recognition 
 
The German case is usually considered ‘paradigmatic’ in histories of Roma civil 
rights movements because of the perceived linear progress achieved through 
successive campaigns and through persuasion and co-optation directed at the 
political classes of the country. Yet co-optation also operates the other way: 
through governmentality that seeks to accommodate, but also discipline and 
control populations – in this case, German and non-German Roma. In practice and 
in the specific German situation, this has included the drawing and sustaining of a 
delineation between two groups defined on the one hand as a German minority 
and as ‘alien’ Roma on the other. Since interpreting what the memory of the Roma 
Holocaust means in German society today has a direct bearing on configurations 
of citizenship, residence, and solidarity, mnemonic practices can challenge these 
imposed boundaries, as it happened in the act of occupying the Memorial to the 
Sinti and Roma Victims of National Socialism. 
In this respect as well, the Roma Holocaust represents entangled memory 
where a transnational horizon of historical experience and its corollary, 
universalist ethics, meet national horizons configured around emancipation in the 
pre-existing political community. The two both reinforce each other – with regard 
to the largely uncontested recommendation that countries with large Roma 
populations should be encouraged to pursue policies of emancipation and 
recognition – but also clash over whether transnational solidarity rooted in 
Holocaust memory or nationally focused minority agendas should function as the 
primary frame-orienting political decisions. In articulations of these positions, 
victim status and political agency also vie for relative prominence. 
Governmentality navigates this entangled memory, seeking to control it through 
concessions and boundary-drawing. It is not the Sinti and the Roma minority, 
symbolically accommodated in German society, but the de-territorialized Roma 
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nation that appears here as the uncontrollable ‘excess’ of memory that resists 
normalization and exile from the lieu de mémoire through which governmentality 
would confer ‘universal’ victim status while limiting the group’s political agency 
to define the present from the vantage point of the commemorated past. 
Transnational Roma solidarity and solidarity with the Roma embodies criticism 
from the outside (of the political community and of the Westphalian order), 
resisting the reduction of mnemonic practices to frameworks defined by 
geographically bounded histories. Altogether, the multi-layered conflict transforms 
Holocaust remembrance, and the Memorial in particular, into a ‘knot’ where 
opportunities for action reside tangled up with the imprints of boundaries that 
determine access to and use of civic rights, including the right to stay, in the 
present. Occupation of the grounds is, inter alia, a struggle for preserving the 
normative productivity of this transnational excess. 
Evaluating the undertaking itself, the scope of the symbolic act of 
occupation appears as a rare instrument of mainstream visibility. Without ready 
access to mainstream media and in political alliance with a single, institutionally 
marginal, if politically not insignificant party, the interest representation of Roma 
in Germany has not been nearly as successful in engineering a second paradigm 
shift in thinking about the nexus of Roma rights and German memory as the first 
generation activists of the 1970s had been. Compared to the virtual mainstream 
invisibility before and after the event, challenging prevailing categorizations of 
symbolic sites and bringing Holocaust memory to bear on current practices of 
exclusion in the act of occupation has worked as a strategy. Yet the larger question 
concerning the success of restoring a broader and permanent productivity to the 
site, of extending its referentiality to redefine the moral imperative of Holocaust 
memory, has to be answered in the negative. This also signifies the failure, at least 
up to the present day, of attempts to position it as a guarantee of political agency 
and public voice for the broader group (all Roma murdered in Nazi-controlled 
Europe) recognized as one of its referent objects and as victims. Momentary 
visibility in memory struggles does not compare to the longer processes of 
institutionalization, the outcome of acknowledgement as partners, by the federal 
government. Against the insurrectionary knowledges of transnational Roma and 
allies, governmentality musters far greater resources and ultimately controls those 
symbolic locations which would be instrumental in creating new meanings 
through novel mnemonic practices. A permanent disruption is likely to be possible 
only through broader social and political coalitions, which, in a setting where new 
fears of migration and old prejudices against ‘asocial elements’ reinforce each 
other proves difficult to outline. This negates neither the pioneering and very real 
achievements of Sinti and Roma rights movements in Germany, nor the 
groundbreaking integration of Roma memory into national frameworks. It serves, 
however, as a reminder about the operations of governmental power-knowledges 
that use, inter alia, memory and mnemonic practices to blot out disruptive 
knowledges and precarious lives from the cognitive maps and self-images of 
democratic societies.  
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The policy area of housing is associated with a set of contradictory 
claims over its subject and scope. This includes tension between a 
market-based understanding of housing, a social-rights-based 
approach, and a traditionalist approach (as patrimony). Debates 
about housing intensified after the financial crisis of 2008, 
especially on Europe’s periphery. The present research focuses on 
Hungary and Spain, two countries with diverging housing paths 
after the crisis, in which crisis management and housing debates 
resulted in a number of housing policy changes. The paper is based 
on a critical frame analysis of interview data and policy documents 
about these two sets of policies. It combines Karl Polanyi’s double 
movement theory with Nancy Fraser’s perspectival dualism to trace 
recognition and redistribution frames in housing policy discourses 
in an investigation of the dynamics that led to policy changes. It 
argues that market expansion and social protection, the two 
movements in Polanyi’s theory, should not be understood as forces 
that always clash with each other, but as a set of recognition and 
redistribution claims that mutually enable or limit each other as 
they are mediated through policy-making. 
 
Keywords: housing policy, double movement, recognition, redistribution.
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Housing is a site of social struggle, and policy changes reflect the dynamics of this 
struggle. This includes ideational struggles over housing as property, asset, 
patrimony, or social right, and material struggles related to housing deprivation, 
homelessness, and indebtedness. The financial crisis of 2008 became a 
problematizing moment (Bacchi, 2009); a moment when the reframing of housing 
and housing struggles occurred. The crisis was a result of housing financialization 
processes that opened up political space for different understandings of housing 
and the crisis itself. 
Crisis management and the contestation of existing housing policies 
together led to a number of policy changes in Hungary and Spain (Bohle, 2014; 
2017; Colau and Alemany, 2014; Csizmady and Hegedüs, 2016; De Weerdt and 
Garcia, 2015; Habitat for Humanity, 2017; 2018) – two countries on Europe’s 
periphery that were severely affected by the crisis, and ones in which pre-crisis 
policies were contested by various political actors. 
Most studies about housing policy change (Aalbers, 2008; 2017; Kemeny, 
1992; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011; Bohle, 2014; 2018; Bohle and 
Seabrooke, 2019) understand housing struggle as a form of redistributive struggle, 
and concentrate either on the financialization of housing (housing increasingly 
understood as an asset and collateral in financial transactions), or the institutional 
responses of redistribution to financialization. However, studies about Spanish 
housing policy changes after the financial crisis of 2008 (Colau and Alemany, 2014; 
De Weerdt and Garcia, 2015) often focus on the role of recognition struggles in 
these changes. Namely, how the housing movement and the Platform for Mortgage 
Victims (PAH) empowered mortgage debtors to participate in activism and 
mobilize for the right to housing by reframing mortgage debt as systemic injustice 
rather than individual failure. This framing involved a struggle for recognition, as 
it removed the social stigma of indebtedness and offered recognition to the 
indebted. 
The aim of this paper is to propose an analytical framework that explains 
how both struggles of recognition and redistribution contributed to housing policy 
change. For this, it is crucial to understand the dynamics of the former struggles. 
Therefore, the paper analyzes them through a Polanyian (1962) lens: 
understanding housing policies as mediators of the tension between market 
expansion (movement) and social protection (countermovement), and, as such, as 
reflections of the dynamics between movement and countermovement. It argues 
that housing struggle can be understood by focusing on both the processes of 
market expansion and its political contestation at the same time. 
The paper’s analytical framework combines Polanyi’s theory of double 
movement (1962) with Fraser’s (2003) perspectival dualist analysis of recognition 
and redistribution, which is then used to investigate the dynamics between market 
expansion and social protection. 
Thus, the aim of the paper is threefold. First, it proposes an analytical 
framework that combines Polanyi’s (1962) double movement theory with Fraser’s 
analysis (2003) to analyze how claims of recognition and redistribution influence 
the dynamics of market expansion and social protection in housing, and thus the 
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dynamics of housing struggle. While the paper does not specifically engage with 
debates about recognition/redistribution and identity politics, both its theoretical 
and empirical sections support Fraser’s (2003) argument that recognition and 
redistribution are co-constitutive, and it is at the specific dynamics between the 
two where the analytical focus should be directed. 
Second, the paper aims to explain how the various claims of recognition and 
redistribution in the double movement led to housing policy changes on Europe’s 
periphery. The literature on housing and housing financialization primarily 
focuses on housing as a site of redistributive struggle (Aalbers, 2008; Fernandez 
and Aalbers, 2016; Aalbers, 2017; Pósfai and Nagy, 2017). While the variety of 
residential capitalism (VORC) frameworks (Kemeny, 1992; Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011) include some ideational/cultural factors in their 
analysis of housing policies, these studies do not systematically analyze them, and 
do not understand them as claims of recognition. Due to the lack of focus, these 
perspectives do not explain why Hungary and Spain, two countries on Europe’s 
periphery that are defined as familialist housing regimes due to the significant role 
of family and private property in housing access, diverged so much from their pre-
crisis understanding of housing. The empirical findings of this paper show that 
both claims of recognition and redistribution played a decisive role in these 
changes. 
Third, the paper offers empirical insights into housing policies from on 
Europe’s periphery that were influenced by forces of social protection that sought 
to depart from the paradigm of housing financialization through a variety of 
frames of recognition and social protection. Hungary followed a path of reframing 
housing based on familialism and nationalism, while Spain reframed it as housing 
rights. The analysis of these two paths through a Polanyian lens offers insight into 
the complex dynamics that exist between market expansion and various forms of 
social protection. 
The contribution of the paper is, first, an introduction to the concept of 
recognition in both Polanyi’s (1962) theory and the housing literature, and second, 
the use of an analytical framework based on these concepts that helps investigate 
the dynamics of housing struggles in Hungary and Spain without solely focusing 
on the redistributive or recognition perspective. By concentrating on both 
dynamics, it is possible to explain how double movement dynamics contributed to 
policy changes. 
 
1. The double movement and Fraser’s perspectival dualism 
 
As I argued above, housing is a site of social struggle. This struggle is reflected in 
the different conceptualizations of housing. Housing is, on the one hand, a form of 
private property, and, due to processes of financialization, increasingly considered 
an asset (Aalbers, 2008; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011; Fernandez and 
Aalbers; 2016). However, housing is also the basis of participation in social and 
political life and patrimonial systems, as it is passed on from generation to 
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generation (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011). Housing policies in 
capitalist societies are both the result and the reflection of these different notions. 
Redistributive practices and principles in the case of housing therefore 
reflect Polanyi’s (1962) concept of a double movement: the tension between the 
forces of market expansion (housing privatization, then financialization) and the 
forces of social protection (social policies aimed at the decommodification of 
housing, or the protection of specific social groups affected by the negative 
consequences of market expansion).  
In The Great Transformation Polanyi (1962) argues that capitalist societies 
operate through this double movement. Market expansion is a force of 
commodification based on ‘veritable faith in man’s secular salvation through a 
self-regulating market’ (Polanyi, 1962: 135), while social protection is a defense 
mechanism that occurs because ‘leaving the fate of soil and people to the market 
would be tantamount to annihilating them’ (Polanyi, 1962: 131).  
Both of these forces have material and ideational elements. Market 
expansion involves not only a process of commodification, but also the 
dissemination of a particular theory (economic liberalism). Social protection is not 
merely the contestation of these ideas, because social problems themselves are not 
merely economic: ‘a social calamity is primarily a cultural not an economic 
phenomenon that can be measured by income figures or population statistics’ 
(Polanyi, 1962: 157). To put it simply, the struggle described by Polanyi is social: it 
is not purely economic or political, but a struggle that encompasses the entirety of 
society. 
Polanyi argued for a holistic perspective in the social sciences that captures 
the complexity of the double movement and takes into consideration specific local 
and historical contexts. The dislocation caused by market expansion varies based 
on the context, as do responses to it. The changes that market expansion consists 
of challenge society as a whole, but the ‘“response” comes through groups, 
sections, and classes’ (Polanyi, 1962: 152). According to Polanyi, social protection, 
no matter its form, is always a response to a real need for protection from market 
expansion. However, some forms of social protection set into motion harmful 
forces. In Polanyi’s (1962) case study about the Nazi regime, he calls the specific 
regime that emerged from the need for protection a degenerative force. Thus, 
social protection is not a normative term: it does not necessarily mean a 
progressive force, but rather a set of responses that emerge from needs as a result 
of change. 
In Polanyi’s view, however fragmented the force of social protection may be, 
claims to social protection always enter into conflict with the forces of market 
expansion, and the site where this tension is relieved is the political sphere – 
namely, political institutions. This is why this paper focuses on policy change. 
Although Polanyi does not specify public policies as a phenomenon through which 
the double movement can be traced, he draws attention to the importance of 
political institutions as mediating forces of the tension between market expansion 
and social protection. 
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Apart from the idea of holism and the importance of the political sphere, 
Polanyi nevertheless offers little guidance about how to carry out holistic analysis 
that could trace the double movement. Yet conceptual guidance is important, 
especially in cases when the forces of social protection co-constitute a 
degenerative, anti-democratic force. I argue that this conceptual gap can be 
bridged by incorporating Fraser’s (2003) perspectival dualism and her notions of 
recognition and redistribution into Polanyi’s theory. In one of her feminist 
analyses of capitalism in the neoliberal era, Fraser (2013a) argued for a modified 
version of the Polanyian framework. She suggested adding another ‘force’ of social 
struggle to the theory and rephrasing it as triple movement. The struggle that – 
according to Fraser (2013b: 230) – mediates between the forces of market 
expansion and social protection is emancipation, which ‘aims to overcome forms 
of subjection rooted in “society”.’ Fraser argues for including emancipation in the 
framework on the basis that Polanyi, in her view, tended to romanticize the 
societal forces in which the market was embedded and the forces of social 
protection without taking into consideration the fact that the market is not the 
only locus of domination in society. While it is true that Polanyi did not 
systematically engage with all structures of domination, neither did he romanticize 
either social protection or society in general, and nor did he conceptualize social 
protection on a normative basis (see the case of Nazi Germany above). 
The problem of systemic engagement rather lies in the fact that Polanyi did 
not offer a conceptual framework with which to analyze the societal elements of 
market expansion and social protection, and the processes that are set into motion 
once these elements clash. Fraser assumes that it is emancipation that mediates 
between the two, but, as argued above, not all processes of social protection have 
an emancipatory goal or the potential to overcome preexisting forms of injustice. 
Some may well be forces that represent sectoral, societal interests rather than 
groups suffering from any form of injustice. 
I rather rely on Fraser’s theory (2003) to conceptually refine the movement 
and the countermovement: to enable us to consider its elements and the tensions 
and clashes between the latter elements. Fraser’s perspectival dualism is rooted in 
similar dissatisfaction to that which drove Polanyi’s holistic approach; namely, 
dissatisfaction with theoretical approaches that focus solely on the 
material/economic or the cultural/ideational angle of the social struggle. Fraser 
argues that social struggle cannot be solely derived from claims for redistribution 
or recognition. Redistribution is not an epiphenomenon of recognition, and neither 
is recognition a derivative of redistribution. Fraser considers recognition and 
redistribution to be normative paradigms (philosophically) and families of claims 
(politically) of two different kinds that are co-constitutional. The redistribution 
paradigm ‘focuses on injustices it defines as socio-economic and presumes to be 
rooted in the economic structure of society’ (Fraser, 2003: 13). The recognition 
paradigm ‘targets injustices it understands as cultural, which it presumes to be 
rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication’ 
(ibid.). Consequently, the former paradigms offer different remedies for injustices. 
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According to Fraser, social struggles cannot be reduced to either recognition or 
redistribution. 
If the same logic is applied to Polanyi’s theory, and the market is understood 
as a force embedded in society, the clash between movement and counter- 
movement can be defined as a clash between claims of recognition and 
redistribution of various kinds. Market expansion does not solely involve a wave of 
redistributive claims that result in redistributive policies, but is rather a force with 
elements of redistribution and recognition claims that results in policies that are 
the products of these claims, and which may clash with the claims for recognition 
and redistribution of the countermovement. 
While redistributive claims in market expansion and social protection have 
been widely analyzed in housing studies, it is more difficult to integrate claims of 
recognition into housing analysis. The empirical findings of this paper suggest that 
the recognition claims Fraser and Honneth (2003) focus on in their theoretical 
debate about recognition and redistribution are distinct from the ones that appear 
in housing discourses. Fraser (2003) conceptualizes recognition as a process 
through which Weberian status groups subjected to cultural injustices interpret 
their own situation, or whose cultural injustices are thematized by other actors. 
Such recognition claims have not been at the center of the housing frames 
under analysis. Recognition has become detached from status groups, and has 
often been linked to solidified principles or structures such as private property, 
market autonomy, or individualism – which thus became recognized instead of the 
status groups Fraser’s theory focuses on. These principles and market (as a 
structure) appeared as social ideals to be recognized. They became not simply 
actors or principles that guaranteed the equal distribution of resources, but 
separate entities to be respected. Such claims could not be subsumed as 
redistributive, but nor do they fit perfectly with Fraser’s definition of status 
groups. In this framework, however, I understand them as social ideals that are 
systematically referred to in the same manner as status groups in such political 
contexts. 
To explain the dynamics of market expansion and social protection as 
redistributive and recognition struggles, it is crucial to focus on policy making as a 
force of mediation and representation. According to Polanyi, political institutions 
mediate the double movement. Polanyi understands political institutions as having 
a controversial role: they introduce measures of intervention (policies) in order to 
establish the free market, and others to defend society from the deleterious impact 
of the free marketeer. Fraser (2013a) also highlights the importance of the political, 
but she does not simply refer to this as a mediating force, but a source of injustice 
on its own. There are two kinds of injustices attached to the political: a formal way 
of denying certain groups access to the political (electoral laws, for example), and 
framing, through which specific social groups are misrepresented or silenced. In 
this paper, I understand policies both as mediating forces and sites of injustice, 
even though one definition focuses on its dynamic element and the other on its 
more static one. I bridge this difference by making a distinction between the 
processes of market expansion and social protection, and the struggles of various 
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redistributive and recognition claims within these processes, and understand them 
as different units in my analysis. Since the paper is more concerned with the 
dynamics of justice claims within the double movement and policy change, its 
primary focus is the dynamics of change, but in order to understand such 
dynamics, one has to decipher them and focus on the recognition and 




2.1 Claims as frames: Critical frame analysis 
 
As mentioned above, Fraser (2013a) refers to framing as a form of (in)justice within 
the political sphere. For her, framing is of great importance in (mis)constructing 
status groups. Her definition of framing is in line with how critical policy analysis 
focuses on frames when analyzing representations of policy problems and the 
power dynamics these influence,  as it understands the policy frame as ‘an 
organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a 
structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or 
explicitly enclosed’ (Verloo, 2005: 20). 
Since the scope of this paper is policy changes, I define claims of recognition 
and redistribution as policy frames and conduct critical frame analysis (Verloo, 
2005; Krizsan et al., 2012). However, unlike Fraser (2013a) I do not refer to framing 
as a separate form of injustice, but, similarly to Verloo, as an organizing principle 
that includes redistributive and recognition frames as well. Thus, while I consider 
frames as being of crucial importance in understanding policy change, I do not 
depart from Fraser’s (2003) perspectival dualism, meaning her focus on recognition 
and redistributive struggles, as critical frame analysis is (per se) aimed at 
unmasking misrepresentation and silence within policy struggles. Thus, framing 
struggles do not remain hidden in relation to recognition and redistributive claims. 
While ‘policy frame’ as a concept encompasses all types of frames in 
policymaking, I concentrate on policy frames of redistribution and recognition. In 
this manner, I am able to trace the power dynamics between market expansion and 
social protection by explaining the dynamics between frames of recognition and 
redistribution within both processes. These concepts, and critical frame analysis as 
a method, encompass enough specificity regarding market expansion and social 
protection, as well as redistribution and recognition, to permit the application of 
the analytical framework I have outlined above. In addition, they leave space for 
frames of recognition and redistribution that are not necessarily progressive or 
emancipatory by avoiding treating them as normative categories. 
I used critical frame analysis as a two-step process. First, I investigated what 
types of policy frames of recognition and redistribution appear in the data, and 
linked these to either the process of market expansion or social protection. Second, 
I analyzed the dynamics between market expansion and social protection claims: 
the interactions (or, sometimes, the lack thereof) between the following four 
categories: (1) market expansion recognition frames; (2) market expansion 
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redistribution frames; (3) social protection recognition frames; (4) social protection 
redistribution frames. 
It is important to emphasize that the study does not aim to compare two 
country contexts, but rather to identify and analyze the shared mechanisms 




This study is based on critical frame analysis of 40 semi-structured interviews 
conducted with MPs and city council member advocates in relation to housing 
problems, as well as housing activists and housing research policy experts in 
Barcelona, Budapest, and Madrid between November, 2016 and October, 2019. The 
larger proportion of interviews (n=28) were conducted in Barcelona and Madrid, 
since it was more difficult to reach out to the policy actors in Hungary 
(government officials) who had designed the housing policy changes in Hungary. 
Thus, I complemented the Hungarian interview data with a selection of policy-
focused documents and political speeches related to housing policy changes in the 
period between 2010 and 2016. 
 
3. Context: Housing policies on Europe’s periphery 
 
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the context and policy changes 
as well as theories about peripheral housing regimes and the specific country 
context of the housing policy changes 
 
3.1 Why Europe’s periphery? 
 
One of the most influential theoretical strands of housing literature, the Variety of 
Residential Capitalism framework (Kemeny, 1992; Schwartz and Seabrook, 2009; 
Lowe, 2011), classifies the Southern and Eastern European housing regimes as 
familialist states: i.e. regimes in which housing is primarily a patrimony, and 
where the dominance of home ownership is maintained through the inheritance of 
housing property. While the VORC framework focuses on shared patterns in these 
countries, it uses familialism as a common element. However, it is questionable 
whether familialism is a concept that can explain housing policies, and whether 
the approach can be applied in the same way in all peripheral contexts. For 
example, Hungary’s familialist housing policies, which involve offering a discount 
– the Family Home-Making Discount (FHMD; CSOK in Hungarian) – to families if 
they have, or agree to have, a certain number of children (Habitat for Humanity, 
2016; 2018), would not be possible in other contexts. 
It is thus more fruitful to concentrate on these countries’ shared geopolitical 
position, since these states depend on the economies and investment, including 
financial investment, of core Western European countries (Lopez and Rodriguez, 
2011; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016; Aalbers, 2017; Bohle, 2014; 2017; Pósfai and 
Nagy, 2017). This dependence has multiple layers: economically and financially, 
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these countries depend on such investment and are prone to external shocks. 
However, this dependence also translates into political constraints in the form of 
sensitivity to political decisions made in core countries, particularly in crisis 
situations in which policy measures aimed at tackling recession are decided by 
creditor countries or international organizations. The dependence also has a 
cultural component: such core countries are perceived as examples to which 
peripheral ones should and could converge and achieve the same level of 
development (Melegh, 2005; Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011). Thus, it is a cultural belief 
that following the advice and the path of core countries is key to creating a 
prosperous society. 
 
3.2 Why Spain and Hungary? 
 
While all peripheral countries share certain characteristics, for the purpose of my 
research I was interested in cases in which there was a variety of post-crisis 
housing policy changes. Among these countries, two extreme cases (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008) emerged that represent two ends of a spectrum in terms of the 
direction of policy changes. Both countries have similar housing structures and 
characteristics to other countries in dependent positions, thus, in this regard, there 
is nothing unusual about them. What makes them more unique is that the housing 
sector of both countries was severely hit by the financial crisis (García, 2010; Lopez 
and Rodriguez, 2011; Bohle, 2014). In addition, several new housing policies were 
implemented after the crisis. Both countries introduced social protection measures 
that curtailed existing forms of market expansion, and forms of social protection 
that resulted in the transformation of their housing and housing finance policies. 
Hungary and Spain are also extreme cases in relation to each other. Social 
protection has taken extremely divergent forms in these two housing regimes. On 
the one hand, Hungary introduced new governmental policies constructed on 
nationalist and familialist grounds (Bohle, 2014; Habitat for Humanity, 2016; 2018). 
These policies include the prohibition of mortgage lending in foreign currencies, 
nationalization of the bank sector, moratoria and other measures to help mortgage 
debtors, the establishment of a state-level housing agency, the introduction of a 
variety of home-ownership subsidies for families with children, along with 
curtailing funding for the system of shelters and criminalizing homelessness as a 
form of ‘social help.’ 
On the other hand, social protection in Spain was introduced as a form of 
self-defense against the financialization of housing, the anti-democratic 
entanglement of politics with financial interests, the violation of consumer rights, 
and the right to housing (García, 2010; Colau and Alemany, 2014; De Weerdt and 
García, 2015). The changes included a moratorium on evictions in the case of 
mortgage debtors, the introduction of dación en pago (fully discharging all 
mortgage-related debt in exchange for mortgaged real estate), stricter consumer 
protection laws against financial institutions, rental protection for tenants, policies 
enabling the nationalization of financial institutions’ real estate in the case of long 
periods of vacancy in Catalonia and mediation services between financial 
124  KATALIN AMON  
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 115-138.  
institutions and mortgage debtors in many regions and local authorities. The 
majority of these changes were accepted by regional parliaments and local 
authorities, and some by congress. All the policies resulted from the pressure social 
movements put on national and regional governments, or were due to actors from 
social movement becoming members of local councils. Thus, the two extreme cases 
provide an opportunity to analyze a wider variety of frames and processes. 
Since there were a large number of new housing policies after 2008, I have 
narrowed down the scope of analysis to two types of policy changes: policies that 
directly responded to the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008, and policies 
targeted at housing support following 2013. See Table 1 for an overview of the 
policies that were analyzed in the paper. (These policies were identified as the 
most relevant ones by my interviewees.) 
 
Table 1: Relevant housing policy changes in Hungary and Spain after 2008 
 Spain Hungary 
Housing policies related 
to the management of 
the mortgage crisis  
• Establishment of 
FROB (a government 
agency for overseeing 
financial institutions) 
in 2009 
• Establishment of 
Sareb (a semi-private 
‘bad bank’ for 
cleaning up toxic 
assets from the 
financial market) in 
2009 
• Measures for 
mitigating the impact 
of the financial crisis 
(Laws 6/2012, 27/2012, 




• Code of good bank 
practices in 2012 
• Law 1/2013 on 
protection of 
mortgage owners 
• Modification of the 
Law on Civil 






• Bajnai package (one-
year action plan by 
the crisis-
management 
government) in 2009 
• Code of good bank 
practices in 2009 
• Prohibition of 
mortgage lending in 
foreign currency in 
2010 
• New laws on 
protection of 
foreign-currency 
mortgage debtors in 
2011–2015 
• Establishment of the 
National Asset 
Management 
Agency in 2011 
• Establishment of the 
Ócsa housing project 
for mortgage debtors 
in 2011 
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 Spain Hungary 
Housing support from 
2014 
• Catalonian laws 
(24/2015 and 4/2016) 
in defense of right to 
housing (including 
special taxes on and 
possible expropriation 
of bank property by 
the state in cases of 
long-term vacancy) 
• Plan for the Right to 
Housing 2016–2025 in 
Barcelona 
• Modification of the 
General Metropolitan 
Plan in Barcelona 
2018 
• New law on urban 
tenancy in 2019 
(Royal Decree 7/2019) 
• Establishment of the 
Family Home-
Making Discount 
and its expansion 
2014–2019 
• Establishment of 
National Home-
Making Societies in 
2016 





As the table shows, two sets of policies can be identified: the first are policies that 
followed the outbreak of the crisis that were aimed at both stabilizing the economy 
and providing relief to mortgage debtors. Another set of policies was accepted 
after 2014, but these were no longer addressed at mitigating the impact of the 
crisis, but offered alternative forms of housing support in addition to the pre-crisis 
housing policies. In Spain, these policies were implemented due to the pressure of 
social movements, while in Hungary they involved government action. The next 
section is a more detailed analysis of these changes and the claims that were made 
in relation to these policies. 
 
4. Recognition and redistributive frames in housing discussions 
at the periphery 
 
In this section, I concentrate on recognition and redistributive frames; more 
precisely, on how these are linked to market expansion and social protection. 
Throughout the analysis I identified six types of frames that mediated discussions 
about housing. Frame types included issues of recognition or redistribution that 
were both central in the construction of market expansion and social protection 
frames, even though these issues arose in different ways. The following section 
thus explains which main issues (types of frames) the market expansion and social 
protection frames were centered on, and how these issues were framed depending 
on their aim (market expansion or social protection). 
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4.1 Frames of recognition: Responsibility, authority, status groups 
 
As I mentioned earlier, recognition frames in the case of housing were not only 
centered on status groups, but also on social ideals, reflecting the autonomy of the 
latter. These were organized using three types of frames: responsibility, autonomy, 
and protected groups (groups deemed in need of support). Table 2 provides an 
overview of the frames. 
 
Table 2: Recognition frames in housing discussions in Hungary and Spain,  
2008–2019 
Types of recognition frames Market expansion Social protection 
Responsibility Voluntarism and private 
property 
Exploitation, inequality, and 
housing as public good 
Autonomy Market Nationalism, regionalism, 
and municipalism 
Protected groups Prudent households Familialism and social 
justice 
 
The main tension between the recognition frames of market expansion and social 
protection is found in where they assign responsibility. Market expansion frames 
emphasize individual responsibility. This appears as the idea that mortgage debtors 
are those actors who should bear the financial burden of the debt they took out 
because they had voluntarily entered into contracts in order to acquire private 
property, no matter how difficult it was to foresee the risk of this. Even though the 
interviewees who underlined the importance of individual responsibility did not 
deny that one who is indebted is in a more vulnerable position than one who 
provides a loan, they did not see this imbalance as exploitative or unequal, per se. 
The actors who framed mortgages in this way were mainly (the former) employees 
of government agencies or ministries responsible for economic policies. The latter 
presented individual responsibility in these frames as a principle that must be 
respected, but also as a type of moral imperative: this was based on the idea that 
people should suffer the consequences of their own individual decisions to some 
extent. 
This recognition frame directly conflicted with the frames of market and 
state responsibility, particularly in the discussions of mortgage relief in Hungary 
and Spain. Social protection frames of exploitation were most dominant in terms of 
placing the emphasis on the fact that the banking sector had profited from the lack 
of information about risk, and built exploitative relationships with their clients 
and/or with the peripheral states that were more dependent on foreign banks. 
While the concept of the periphery and its disadvantaged geopolitical position also 
arose in the Spanish crisis discourses (Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011), it was more 
relevant in the Hungarian case. In Spain, the concept of territorial exploitation was 
presented in the context of gentrification: international development companies 
who take over the city were frequently referred to as ‘vultures’ in the interviews. 
First, exploitation by banks and the support of this by governments is one of the 
reasons why social protection was justified for those who had suffered its 
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consequences. Second, in the Platform of Mortgage Victims’ campaign for datio in 
solutum in Spain, rejections of individual responsibility were more strategically 
employed: the latter not only entailed the shaming of banks for their exploitative 
practices, but also the rejection of the stigmatization of mortgage debtors, and 
their presentation as victims of exploitation rather than individuals responsible for 
their own debt (Colau and Alemany, 2014; De Weerdt and García, 2015). 
Thus, the claim to individual responsibility in relation to market expansion 
clashed with the promotion of social protection as represented in two frames: the 
idea that the crisis was the financial sector and the supporting governments’ 
responsibility, and the rejection of debtor stigma associated with the claim that the 
related debt was solely the responsibility of the individual. In some social 
protection frames, respect for individual responsibility as a principle was 
questioned by claims for frames of market and state responsibility, partly on the 
basis that mortgage debtors are a culturally disadvantaged status group that bears 
the shame for their debt, and partly on the basis of autonomy, which will be 
discussed below. 
In Polanyi’s theory (1962), market expansion is rooted in the freedom of the 
market. In market expansion frames, the autonomy of the market, like individual 
responsibility, was taken for granted as a guiding principle that had to be 
respected. In the social protection discourses, counterclaims of autonomy played a 
central role in tackling both these frames. Autonomy-based frames were not 
concerned with the equity of housing governance from a redistributive 
perspective, but the right of nation-states, regions, and municipalities to make 
their own decisions about housing. 
In Hungary, these types of frames were linked to ideas about the autonomy 
of the nation in relation to dealing with the consequences of the crisis, as well as to 
the introduction of regulatory measures related to housing finance, among other 
areas (this was considered a form of opposition to international frameworks that 
imposed conditions on the country). In Spain, regionalist and municipalist claims 
operated from a different perspective. Catalan policies aimed at the introduction of 
measures involving enforcing the right to housing (which was already part of the 
constitution) were embedded in discourse about the region’s autonomy in relation 
to implementing social protection measures during a housing crisis, as opposed to 
the government’s policies that promoted market expansion. In addition to this, in 
an interview with a member of a Catalan independence party the promotion of 
housing rights was framed as an issue of Catalan regional identity, which was 
associated with openness and an emphasis on equality and social justice. However, 
the interviewee also emphasized that he did not consider this a nationalist 
argument, because such sensitivity to social justice was rather rooted in the history 
of the region, and was also true for people who were not originally Catalans, but 
live in Catalunya. About the link between housing policies and independence, the 
former said that ‘independence will not simply be a change in the identity card, or 
a change in the passport, but an instrument for creating public policies so that 
citizens can live with dignity.’ Thus, these autonomy frames were embedded in 
self-identification (i.e. the interviewee as a member of a progressive region), but 
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also emerged in the claim that regions should have the right to introduce 
protective measures, even if this ran counter to the policies of the central 
government. 
The same discourse can be traced in the case of municipal autonomy. Many 
of the interviewees who were members of the housing rights movement in Spain 
and Hungary expressed disenchantment with the possibility of influencing 
housing policies on the national scale. The former framed autonomy as turning to 
local politics, local identities, and local housing policies; the level at which politics 
can truly address people’s needs in the form of political strategies for promoting 
universal access to housing, not achieving regional independence. 
Both market expansion and social protection frames referred to protected 
groups in the discussions. In the market expansion frames, again promoted by 
people engaging in economic policymaking, the social groups whose access to 
mortgages and even to mortgage relief was seen as desirable were claimed to be 
households with a stable income. This idea was partly framed in terms of 
redistribution, but was also linked to the individual responsibility frame because it 
assumes that mortgage lending itself should be protected from households taking 
out loans in an irresponsible way. In Hungary, one of the post-crisis goals of post-
crisis economic policy was to boost mortgage lending by prudent households 
(Hungarian National Bank, 2019; Government of Hungary, 2019) – the moral 
antithesis of ‘irresponsible mortgage debtors’ – thereby avoiding the risk of 
another subprime crisis. 
Social protection recognition frames nonetheless diverged or were even 
conflicted in relation to protected groups. In Spain, social protection discourses 
were centered on the recognition of the housing needs of people without secure 
housing and recognition of the right to housing. Housing was explicitly made a 
social justice issue by social movements and the parties that originated in the 
movement. In Hungary, there were two sets of claims for social protection. First, 
the government framed housing or ‘home-making’ as a means of starting a family 
or supporting families with children. Familialism is the normative basis of their 
housing policies, and this familialism is often linked to nationalism, involving the 
growth of the nation, because such policies are designed to increase birth rates. In 
a speech at the Third Demographic Forum, Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime 
Minister, referred to childbirth as a way ‘to biologically reproduce the national 
community’ (Miniszterelnok.hu, 2019). Second, the housing movement focused on 
people living in housing poverty and advocated for social protection based on the 
housing needs of those who were discriminated against by lawmakers (Udvarhelyi, 
2014). Thus, it was not the family as an ideal that was recognized and supported in 
these discourses, but, similarly to the Spanish social protection discourse, the idea 
that housing status is the basis of the subject position of specific social groups. 
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4.2 Frames of redistribution: Stability, intervention and housing governance 
 
Redistributive discourses concerning housing policies were centered on three types 
of frames: stability, intervention, and housing governance. Market expansion 
frames focused on financial stability as a means of enabling economic growth 
through helping the market to free itself from toxic assets (in Spain) and the 
expansion of mortgages and other types of loans for households with a stable 
income and providing subsidies for the construction industry (in Hungary) – no 
matter whether related to crisis management or after-crisis policies. Table 3 gives 
an overview of the frames. 
 
Table 3: Types of redistribution frames in housing discussions in  
Hungary and Spain, 2008–2019 
Types of redistribution 
frames 
Market expansion Social protection 
Stability Financial: economic growth Social: demographic goals, 
housing needs 
Intervention Voluntary forms of 
cooperation between the 
market and the state 
Restrictive measures against 
market actors; subsidies; 
social housing 
Housing governance Decentralization Centralization 
 
Redistributive social protection frames focused on social stability, although 
recognition frames about protected groups had an impact on how this social 
stability was framed. On the one hand, housing-rights groups in Spain and 
Hungary, as well as the political actors who had been members of these social 
movements, employed a very universalistic notion of access to housing, which 
according to them, should be understood as a right. The scope involved putting an 
end to the housing crisis, which was framed as a social crisis in all the interviews 
with social movement members. On the other hand, the Hungarian government 
framed housing as a tool for resolving a different type of social crisis and 
promoting social stability: the demographic crisis (see the quote from Viktor Orbán 
above). Discussions about demographic decline emphasized its negative 
consequences on society, and the fact that people who needed housing subsidies to 
start a family should be provided with the opportunity to access them. 
The other two types of redistributive frames were more focused on 
intervention and governance; namely, on how intervention in housing and 
housing finance should occur, and whose role it was to introduce those policies. 
Since these frames are more interconnected than others, I do not discuss them 
separately, but in relation to each other. Market-expansion claims of intervention 
and governance by the same economic policy experts mentioned above focused on 
voluntary forms of cooperation between the market and the state regarding crisis 
management and the provision of housing subsidies in a decentralized manner. As 
one of the Hungarian interviewees who had worked for a government agency 
responsible for the supervision of financial institutions put it, there is a need for 
social housing, and there are viable models for social housing constructions, but ‘it 
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cannot be expected that banks will make donations.’ He then suggested that local 
authorities should create social housing programs with subsidies through which 
banks could be incentivized to invest in social housing. Decentralization, thus, also 
means that the internal logic of housing capitalism remains intact. 
Interestingly, all social-protection-related redistributive claims in Hungary 
and Spain about intervention and housing governance emphasized the role of the 
central state in intervening in market processes and taking action in relation to 
housing policies to some extent. Even the actors who argued for limited housing 
support on a local scale agreed with the regulations concerning mortgage lending 
(regulation that enables the state to seize empty housing units owned by market 
actors to create social housing) and the regulation of rental contracts and rental 
prices. These initiatives clearly run counter to the social ideal of granting 
autonomy to market expansion as they refer to imposing or suggesting 
interventions related to the market. 
Second, the social-protection-related redistributive frames promoted by 
political actors (MPs, local council members, and public administration employees 
and civil actors in Spain, and policy experts, civil and political actors in Hungary) 
argued for centralized housing policies, but there was significant divergence 
within the frames about which kinds of policies should be created by the central 
government.  Social-protection-focused frames of housing governance and 
intervention slightly contradicted autonomy frames in Spain: all social-protection 
actors who argued for housing subsidies and social housing also argued for state-
level policies, and, more importantly, an increase in the budget for housing. 
However, due to their disenchantment with state politics, they also promoted 
decentralized, local, and regional housing policies. A leftwing MP whom I 
interviewed compared being a member of the parliament to entering a casino, ‘a 
dark place where light never enters,’ referring to the fact that parliament is an elite 
club entangled with the financial lobby, and a political space in which change is 
practically impossible. In spite of this, a local council member from the same 
political party emphasized that ‘housing must be given central space at all levels of 
administration; local, regional, and central, with a considerable budget.’ Many 
interviewees who worked in housing policy or housing research pointed out that 
the most important expectation from the central state, on which all regional and 
local housing policies depended, was the provision of an adequate state budget. 
Thus, centralization in the Spanish context meant that the state should have a 
leading role in financing housing. The disenchantment with state politics 
nonetheless resulted in relevant housing policy changes occurring almost 
exclusively at the local and regional scale, a fact that also illustrates the tension 
between the housing-governance-related redistributive frame of centralization and 
the autonomy-related recognition frames of municipalism and regionalism. 
In Hungary, housing policy experts and civil actors argued for an increase 
in, and the centralization of, state subsidies. All interviewees, regardless of their 
position, also expressed disenchantment with state-level politics, including the 
extremely centralized manner in which all types of policies were created. 
However, those who argued for housing policy change (housing activists, 
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researchers, and homeless care-providers) thought that the government should 
create housing policies for poor and low-income people, but with the meaningful 
participation of experts and civil actors. Thus, it was not the issues of 
centralization and decentralization that caused tension for the actors who 
advocated for social protection in the area of housing, but the issue of protected 
groups: the government had introduced housing subsidies aimed at tackling the 
demographic crisis instead of providing support for low-income groups, which the 
policy experts and civil actors in the interviews would have expected. All housing 
experts and civil actors criticized the government for its housing policies based on 
two redistributive claims. First, that the latter excluded low-income people from 
housing subsidy schemes, and, second, that they defined no upper limits in terms 
of income or the size of the housing units, thus, as one of the housing experts said, 
the government had not ‘prevented luxury use.’ Thus, while the government 
framed social stability as a means of stopping the demographic decline and 
pronatalism, housing experts, and activists as well as care employees for the 
homeless, framed the former in relation to housing access and housing-related 
inequalities. 
Overall, redistributive frames tended to be directed at action and concrete 
forms of intervention, while recognition frames were typically directed at social 
ideals. Interestingly, both the redistributive claims of market expansion and social 
protection conflicted with some of the recognition frames presented by the same 
actors. There were two main contradictions. While in terms of recognition, market 
expansion frames were concerned with responsibility, redistributive frames 
emphasized voluntary cooperation and the use of market tools in a decentralized 
manner in housing. Social-protection-type claims of intervention and housing 
governance conflicted with autonomy frames in Spain, and frames of protected 
groups in Hungary. In the next section, I provide a more thorough analysis of such 
dynamics between recognition and redistributive frames, and then between market 
expansion and social protection. 
 
5. The dynamics of market expansion, social protection, and 
housing policy change 
 
In the previous section, I outlined what types of recognition and redistributive 
frames involving market expansion and social protection were constructed in 
relation to housing. In addition, I mapped out where certain frames of market 
expansion conflicted with those of social protection, and I also identified tensions 
within frames of social protection. In this section, my aim is to increase 
understanding of how these tensions turn into mechanisms of change. Namely, 
how the dynamics of the double movement contribute to housing policy change. 
Based on the analysis, I mapped out three main mechanisms: clashes, mutual 
enablement, and limitations. In this section, I explain how these mechanisms 
operate, and illustrate each one of them with a policy case to show how they were 
reflected in housing policy changes. 
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5.1 Clash 
 
Clashes may be the most obvious dynamic between frames of market expansion 
and social protection. By clashes, I understand a form of political dynamics 
involving frames that openly and directly clash with each other, leading to policy 
consequences. Clashes do not necessarily occur between market expansion and 
social protection, but may exist in relation to the dynamics related to social 
protection. However, clashes within social protection did not contribute to housing 
policy change in the policy cases outlined in Section 2. 
Catalonia’s laws (24/2015 and 4/2016) in defense of the right to housing 
illustrate how clashes between market expansion and social protection frames can 
result in policy change. These laws resulted from a clash between frames of 
responsibility. The related regional laws were preceded by state laws that 
introduced the opportunity of dación en pago, or datio in solutum, as mentioned 
above, and the legal expectation that financial institutions should offer social 
housing to clients. While this was a significant achievement of the Platform of 
Mortgage Victims and its allies and a political result of the popular legislative 
initiative (ILP) to change mortgage laws (De Weerdt and García, 2015), the legal 
changes did not regulate who and what percentage of mortgage debtors could 
benefit from these opportunities. Most housing activists whom I interviewed 
expressed disappointment about these legal changes. I will expand on these 
arguments in the next section, but to understand the clashes that led to 
Catalunya’s housing rights laws, it is important to focus on the fact that, after 
these legal changes, housing activists directed their efforts at making legal changes 
that would involve legally enforcing the right to housing, instead of offering 
individual help on a voluntary basis. According to the interviews, these housing 
rights laws were accepted so as to create social housing stock by enabling the use 
of empty housing units owned by developers and financial institutions, and thus 
increasing access to social housing. Government actors responsible for financial 
policies rather saw these laws as breaching the right to private property. Thus, the 
Catalan laws were a result not just of disappointment with previous changes, but a 
direct clash between market expansion and social protection frames of 
responsibility, whereby the recognition of private property and voluntary help 
clashed with the recognition of housing as a social right and public good. 
As I explained in Section 4, clashes also occurred within the frames of social 
protection. For example, in terms of social protection in Hungary, the familialist 
and the egalitarian frames of recognition clashed. However, these clashes were not 
reflected in government housing policies, which were influenced more by the 
mutual enablement of market expansion and social protection frames. In Section 4, 
I also highlighted the tension between the redistributive frame of centralization – 
the push for state-level housing policies – with the autonomy frame because of 
political disenchantment with state-level politics. However, this tension was not 
represented as a clash between social protection frames by interviewees, but rather 
as a limitation caused by the market expansion frame of decentralization: a distinct 
mechanism I will expand on at the end of this section. 
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5.2 Limitation 
 
I mentioned above that Catalan housing policies were accepted after the 
disappointing results of the ILP for housing rights activists, who had expected 
more radical policy changes. The Spanish mortgage-relief policies hence illustrate 
how market expansion frames can limit frames of social protection by introducing 
a voluntary element in terms of a change towards understanding housing as an 
issue of social justice. These policy changes stemmed from the recognition of failed 
mortgage debts as the responsibility of financial institutions instead of that of 
individuals, and offered protective measures for debtors based on those recognition 
claims and the redistributive frames of social protection. 
For example, mediation services between financial institutions and debtors 
were also part of these changes, and were usually offered by organizations through 
contracts with local and regional authorities. One of the interviewees who worked 
at such an NGO explained that obtaining access to mortgage relief was completely 
voluntary, and depended on individual agreements with banks. She explained that 
banks that participated in such schemes usually signed a contract with the NGO 
that prohibited the disclosure of the financial institution’s name. In her view, such 
banks did not want to make it publicly known that they had participated in 
negotiation with debtors to avoid future claims, which illustrates how the 
voluntary frame limited the social protection frames of recognition and 
redistribution and resulted in ‘limited’ mortgage policy change. 
The market expansion frame of decentralization created limits to the 
redistributive claims made by actors demanding social protection in Spain. Even 
though housing experts and activists expressed that their goal was to achieve 
changes on the state level too, the decentralized frame about housing (namely, that 
housing was primarily the responsibility of regional and local authorities, as 
emphasized by financial agency actors) prevented such changes. This was 
mentioned as an important limitation by all interviewees, because without an 
adequate state budget it was not possible to create social housing. However, there 
were recognition-related responses to this limitation that resulted in policy change 
through mutual enablement. 
 
5.3 Mutual enablement 
 
Market expansion and social protection frames did not necessarily clash, but could 
also enable each other and, through this, affect the acceptance of housing policies. 
The modification of the General Metropolitan Plan in Barcelona in 2018 illustrates 
such a dynamic. As mentioned above, decentralization created significant 
limitations on local- and regional-level policies. However, these limitations were 
responded to by a municipalist strategy that was rooted in recognition of the 
democratic potential of local-level politics, as well as a desire to expand the 
boundaries of the latter. Policy efforts were concentrated on the local scale to 
create social housing. The modification mentioned above was a result of exactly 
this: it forced developers to offer 30 per cent of newly built housing units as social 
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housing, which was mentioned as one of the most important post-crisis policy 
achievements by local housing experts. 
In Hungary, the most important policy changes resulted from mutual 
enablement. An example of such a case is the Family Home-Making Discount 
(CSOK in Hungarian) which was primarily framed as a familialist policy tool and 
linked to the recognition frame of familialism and the  redistributive frame of 
social stability as demographic stability (Kopp Mária Institute for Demographic 
Growth and the Family, 2018; Habitat, 2018; Elek and Szikra, 2018). 
However, the approach is also very much in line with the recognition frame 
of the prudent household as a protected group, and as stability framed as financial 
stability. The context of this mutual enablement or reinforcement is that the crisis 
highlighted the risk of subprime lending and Forex mortgages, and therefore 
mortgage expansion frames changed: instead of undermining these risks, they 
aimed at promoting financial stability by offering mortgages to households with a 
stable income (Hungarian National Bank, 2019; Government of Hungary, 2019). 
Thus, the view of market expansion after 2015 consisted of a mix of recognition 
claims (‘prudent’ households as a target for mortgage lending) and redistributive 
claims (on financial stability).  
As one of the housing experts from Hungary pointed out, the conditions of 
access to the Family Home-Making Discount have become softer in terms of 
‘upper’ limits, meaning that the incentive has become increasingly accessible to 
financially stable households. Thus, even though its framing by the government is 
primarily based on recognition claims, these are mutually enabled by frames of 
market expansion. Very similar arguments were made by housing researchers and 
activists about the Hungarian mortgage relief policies that preceded the Family 
Home-Making Discount. 
Table 4 gives an overview of these mechanisms of change, as well as their 
results. 
 
Table 4: Overview of analysis 
Mechanism Double movement Frames mobilized Policy change 
Clash 




Right to housing 
laws in Catalonia 











policies in Spain 
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Mechanism Double movement Frames mobilized Policy change 

















Social protection – 
social protection 
Protected groups and 
autonomy 
Modification of the 
General 
Metropolitan Plan 





This paper, which complements Polanyi’s (1962) double movement theory with 
Fraser’s (2003) concept of recognition and redistribution, has offered empirical 
insight into the claims that shape housing policies in two countries on Europe’s 
periphery, Hungary and Spain. Instead of solely focusing on financialization, or on 
other forms of market expansion, it analyzed policies that reflect the dynamics 
between market expansion and social protection. The aim of the paper was not to 
compare the two country contexts, but to offer insights into the shared 
mechanisms and double-movement dynamics on Europe’s periphery, as well as 
their contribution to housing policy change. 
The paper first argued that both processes include recognition and 
redistributive frames. Instead of the recognition of status groups, these processes 
entailed recognition claims that were centered on social ideals or principles such as 
individual responsibility and market autonomy, as opposed to the recognition 
claims of status groups or other principles. It was not only the recognition and 
redistribution frames of market expansion and social protection that were found to 
conflict with each other, but I also identified tension within social protection 
frames. In the second part of the paper, I identified three mechanisms that 
contributed to the housing policy changes in these countries: clash, limitation, and 
mutual enablement. The analysis shows that recognition claims had an impact in 
all cases of policy change, and that this impact could be very diverse. The double 
movement dynamics were much more complex than simple clashes between actors 
or the frames of market expansion and social protection, and policy changes were 
often derailed or enabled in unexpected ways. 
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This analytical framework thus offers insights about double movement 
dynamics by offering a conceptual tool, which combined with Critical Frame 
Analysis enables the tracing of these dynamics, as well as the policy changes they 
result in. It also shows that describing housing regimes in Europe’s periphery as 
familial ignores the fact that familialism might not be a relevant factor in housing 
policy change in these countries, and it is more fruitful to focus on mechanisms of 
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A binary debate has developed internationally between 
abolitionists and sex workers’ rights (SWR) activists: this involves 
the so-called ‘sex wars’, which dominate the scholarship and 
activism regarding commercial sex worldwide. While abolitionists 
aim to eliminate prostitution, which they see as a manifestation of 
patriarchy and violence against women, SWR activists aim to 
recognize sex work as work, and to fight for better working 
conditions in the sex industry. Both movements have become 
institutionalized, and various local NGOs and international 
networks have been established to advocate for these political aims. 
These organizations try to influence national and international 
legislation regarding the selling of sex by building powerful 
alliances. The financial support of donors is also dependent on how 
compatible these movements are with neoliberal power relations. 
Furthermore, the development and political influence of local 
abolitionist or sex worker movements also depends on countries’ 
positions in the global economy. 
The paper analyses the political representation and the role of 
spokespersons within the prostitution/sex work debate and also 
reflects on the advocacy work of Hungarian organizations active in 
this field since 1989. It discusses the evolution of a politics of 
recognition in the struggle related to commercial sex, and how 
transnational power dynamics on a global scale have affected 
Hungarian movements and civil society organizations since the era 
of state socialism. 
 
Keywords: prostitution, sex work, politics of recognition, spokespersons, feminist movements.
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2015 I participated in an international conference on prostitution policies in 
Vienna with other researchers affiliated with a leftist German political foundation. 
The first keynote speech started with the happy acknowledgement that ‘we’ (the 
conference participants) finally do not need to start arguing again that sex work 
needs to be recognized as work. A week later I attended a Hungarian conference 
on leftist feminism, where the common sense approach to commercial sex was 
exclusively deemed to be an abolitionist one, and where I listened to talks on the 
serious harm that pornography and prostitution cause for society. At both 
conferences, scholars and activists considered their own position to be the 
vulnerable, minority position, and highlighted how suppressed they were by the 
powerful other opposing position in the same debate. While the pro-sex-work 
activists claimed that prostitution laws had shifted generally towards the Swedish 
model in Europe, abolitionists felt marginalized due to the growth of the sex 
industry and the changed preference of international NGOs and donors for 
supporting sex worker organizations. 
Conducting various research projects on prostitution and trafficking for my 
PhD and facing diverse and difficult empirical realities during my field work over 
the last decade have represented a great professional and personal challenge. 
However, entering into the academic field of prostitution research and getting to 
know the political and discursive contexts in Germany, Hungary, and 
internationally was also a very specific experience in itself that is worth analyzing. 
I would like to contribute with this article to the inquiry into the structure of the 
political and academic field of prostitution/sex work research, which intersects 
with different movements and organizations that shape the public debate and 
national and international policy making on prostitution. 
In this article I look at the development of the abolitionist and sex workers’ 
rights movements and their successes and challenges. I point out the role of 
different state, market, and civil society actors therein, and refer to the aim of and 
potential for addressing structural critique in these approaches. My analysis 
addresses wider neoliberalization tendencies, changing political representation, 
and a prevalence of identity politics and a politics of recognition in social 
struggles. 
All in all, I aim to show that these international struggles are shaped by 
global socio-economic and power dynamics, and that local organizations need to 
negotiate between local political challenges and environments and the 
requirements and influences of powerful international alliances, which are more 
influential in shaping international policy making. Therefore, I show that the 
Hungarian political struggles related to addressing prostitution are strongly 
defined by the country’s changing political environment since the democratization 
process of the 1990s until the emergence of the ‘illiberal’ Orbán regime following 
2010 on the one hand, but are influenced by relationships with international 
alliances in core countries on the other. In the following I summarize the evolution 
of a politics of recognition and the role of spokespersons, focusing on the feminist 
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movements in the USA by highlighting their global influence. Afterwards, I briefly 
analyze these issues in the context of the prostitution debate and feminist 
organizing around commercial sex. Finally, I look at the work of Hungarian 
organizations in this field. 
Throughout the article I use both the terms prostitution and sex work. I 
always apply the terms in accordance with the standpoint and terminology of the 
activist, author, or movement I refer to. When I refer to both standpoints, I apply 
both terminologies and add a slash symbol (/) between them. 
 
2. The rise of a politics of recognition and the infrastructure of 
political representation in second-wave US feminism 
 
The transformation of political representation in democracies and socio-economic 
contexts strongly defines the trajectory and potential of social movements and 
organizing. The transformation of democratic political systems has been 
thoroughly analyzed in political science. Literature on populism in the last decades 
has flourished, including that which has paid special attention to political 
development and the illiberal state in Hungary. Fukuyama analyzed in his book 
Identity how social struggles and party politics changed in line with the crisis of 
capitalism in the twenty-first century. He claims that ‘twentieth century politics 
had been organized along a left-right spectrum defined by economic issues, the left 
wanting more equality and the right demanding greater freedom’ (Fukuyama, 
2018: 6–7). However, in the twenty-first century politics in many regions has 
become more defined by questions of identity: the left focusing less on broad 
economic inequality and promoting more the interests of particular groups 
perceived as marginalized; and the right aiming to protect traditional national 
identity connected to race and ethnicity. These political processes are shaped by 
the crisis of neoliberal capitalism and Western hegemony, which has led to 
different political developments in various locations along the global accumulation 
chain. 
Nancy Fraser (1995; 2003; 2015) analyzed social justice struggles, focusing on 
the evolution of identity politics in the feminist movement. She highlighted the 
shift from a ‘politics of redistribution’ to a ‘politics of recognition.’ Fraser analyzed 
the ambiguous legacy of second-wave US feminism, which evolved with other 
revolutionary movements in the atmosphere of the 1960s. Despite the originally 
radical ideas of women’s liberation from male domination which essentially 
structures everyday life, work, and women’s position in capitalism, feminist 
struggles shifted away from economic issues towards cultural aims, focusing on 
recognition issues based on identity politics, instead of providing a systemic 
critique of the neoliberal global order. 
But why did the collusion between feminism and neoliberalism proceed? 
Fraser (2015) also raised this question in order to explore the potential and 
challenges of current, anti-neoliberal feminist struggles. She analyzed the shift 
towards a politics of recognition within the socio-economic and political landscape 
of the 1960s. Drawing on Polanyi’s (1944) idea of the ‘double movement’ of his 
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time as a two-sided battle between social protectionists and free market 
fundamentalists, Fraser described the 1960s as a triple movement of marketization, 
social protectionism, and empowerment (Fraser, 2015: 711). Fraser claims that 
emancipatory movements in the 1960s that undertook a fundamental critique of 
traditional authority and the paternalist state of the time found themselves on the 
same side as neoliberal actors in the other struggle between protection and 
marketization. Feminism has become capitalism’s handmaiden, and the ‘dream of 
women’s emancipation is harnessed to the engine of capital accumulation’ (Fraser, 
2015: 709), since the ideas of different women’s groups involving fighting for their 
dignity actively contribute to the capitalist ‘spirit’ of the time. However, Fraser’s 
analysis of feminism’s collusion with neoliberalism and its global export has been 
criticized for being ‘West’ or ‘Global North’ centered. Scholars from East-Central 
Europe also claim that local activism follows a more complex dynamic (Korolczuk, 
2016), as I also inquire into Hungarian activism that addresses prostitution. 
Analysis of the infrastructure of political representation and the role of the 
various actors who shape the political landscape is also essential for understanding 
the shift towards a politics of recognition in social movements, and in feminism 
especially. Csigó (2016) describes this shift in political representation as a 
transition from ‘party-based representative democracy’ to ‘mediatized populist 
democracy’ in which, instead of class-based political organizations, populist 
politics address the ‘people,’ which approach fits better an individualized, pluralist 
society. This increased mediatized representation opens up various questions 
regarding how spokespersons in politics are related to the groups and people they 
represent (Fáber, 2013). In professionalized, bureaucratized politics in mass 
democracies there is potential conflict between represented groups and their 
spokespersons. As Bourdieu explains, this involves a circular relationship in which 
a group appoints a spokesperson, and the spokesperson then creates the group 
through performative acts (Bourdieu, 2001, cited by Fáber, 2013). Moreover, 
spokespersons commonly move among different social groups and settings in their 
performative acts of representation when they represent marginalized groups in 
the language of intellectuals. Therefore, spokespersons who speak in the name of 
others have symbolic power. 
Concerning the ambiguous legacy of second-wave feminism in the USA and 
feminist struggles globally, it is also crucial to look at who defined what feminism 
should be about, and how women’s issues were represented. The second wave of 
feminism in the USA involved various groups and organizations. Struggles for the 
political representation of women and fights for legitimacy appeared among 
feminists based on distinctions in ethnic and social background. The political 
representation of all women by specific, dominantly white, middle-class feminist 
groups was strongly questioned by black feminist scholars (Hill-Collins, 1990). 
Generalizations concerning the universal experiences of women were criticized 
due to the multiple layers of inequality women may experience (Crenshaw, 1991). 
Susan Watkins (2018) points out the differences between radical, anti-systemic 
groups like the women’s liberation movement, and more neoliberalism compatible 
liberal feminisms that focus on anti-discrimination and women’s inclusion in the 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE PROSTITUTION VS. SEX WORK DEBATE 143 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(1): 139-163.  
labor market. She shows that such feminist ideas and groups became influential 
after ‘feminism begun its long march through the institutions’ in the USA 
(Watkins, 2018: 14), a process which went hand in hand with state and market 
interests in obtaining economic benefits through women’s employment. 
The anti-discrimination model focused mainly on the rights of groups who 
defined themselves through shared experiences of suffering, oppression, and 
marginalization, like people of color and women. The focus on the fight for 
recognition is manifest in the use of universalistic human-rights language that is 
centered on individual rights and treats gender inequality rather as a cultural issue 
while it conceals the global economic order (Kováts, 2019). This tendency – 
focusing on rights and legal solutions instead of providing a structural critique – 
has been much more suitable for the influential actors and donors who support 
these movements, like the Ford Foundation. Consequently, the anti-discrimination 
model became influential in the feminist movement by the 1980s when US 
feminism gained more global power and influence through international women’s 
congresses (Watkins, 2018). 
 
3. International sex workers’ rights and abolitionist movements 
 
Prostitution and pornography have been central issues for feminists, especially 
since the 1970s, although different standpoints and movements evolved around the 
issue of commercial sex. The so-called ‘sex wars’ debate first evolved between 
various groups of feminists in the USA, but due to the globalization of feminist 
movements, networks, alliances, and international campaigns, it influenced 
discourses regarding the topic worldwide. While NGOs and other organizations 
working on prostitution/sex work also compete for financial resources, the main 
battlefield concerns how they influence national and international policies. The 
successes or failures of these movements can be measured by their efficiency in 
relation to policy making in various countries. 
The feminist movement has always aimed to affect international politics and 
policies on prostitution, as manifested in international conventions and treaties on 
women’s rights and prostitution policies. International conventions, ratified by 
nation states, pose certain obligations for governments; therefore international 
advocacy targeting various stakeholders is highly important for feminist 
movements. In the following I briefly summarize the history and the main 
arguments of these movements, then introduce issues related to political 
representation. 
 
3.1 The abolitionist movement in the USA and Western Europe 
 
The feminist abolitionist movement dates back to the 1860s and the advocacy and 
lobbying of Josephine Butler, who was one of the first activists to claim that 
prostitution damages women’s rights and men are to blame for this (Bindel, 2017). 
Radical feminists, like Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon (1988; 1997), 
Kathleen Barry (1979; 1995), and Carol Pateman (1988), had a predominant role in 
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putting prostitution on the feminist agenda. Their activism is continued by 
important abolitionist feminists today, like Julie Bindel, Melissa Farley, and Sheila 
Jeffreys. MacKinnon (1989) approached sexuality as the root cause of inequality in 
patriarchy through which gender relations are created and expressed. She saw 
rape, prostitution, and pornography as examples of the objectification of women. 
Anti-porn activism evolved in the 1980s, including important new organizations 
and networks like Women Against Pornography, which held its first meeting in 
1985. 
The work of radical feminists problematizes the demand side of prostitution 
and its roots in neoliberal patriarchy. Pateman (1988) argues in The Sexual 
Contract that women sell themselves, and claims that prostitution is a specific 
form of self-commodification. Similarly, Jeffreys (2009) focused on prostitution as a 
form of sex slavery and argued that it is one of the foundations of women’s 
oppression. Thus, ‘radical feminists ascribe a particular value to sex, which is then 
used to argue against its commodification’ (Scoular, 2004: 345). The abolitionist 
feminist movement aims to eliminate the entire sex industry, since the 
commodification of sexuality involves harm to human dignity and the oppression 
of women. Proponents question the existence of voluntary prostitution and point 
out the connection between prostitution and human trafficking. 
Following the work of early abolitionists and their international lobbying 
activities throughout the twentieth century, the anti-trafficking movement and 
related policies have been a primary focus of interest for abolitionist feminists. The 
anti-trafficking movement has been successful in negotiating on the international 
level, and several conventions have been held to combat trafficking which 
addressed prostitution as a form of exploitation and violence against women and 
called for an end to it.  The anti-trafficking movement is supported by various 
organizations and international1 associations such as the Global Alliance Against 
Traffic in Women (GAATW), and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women 
(CATW), the latter which was set up in 1988 as the first global feminist 
organization. 
 
3.2 The sex-worker movement in the USA and Western-Europe 
 
In opposition to the abolitionist movement, the Coyote (‘Call Off Your Old Tired 
Ethics’) sex workers’ rights organization was founded in 1973. Carol Leigh and 
others initiated a ‘sex-positive’ movement, as they called it. They approached 
prostitution as a form of work that should be destigmatized and acknowledged. 
The First Congress of Whores, a campaign organized by sex workers, was an 
important event as it played a role in forming the sex worker movement. In 
Europe, the sex worker movement was highly influential in some Western 
European countries. The symbol of the birth of the sex worker movement in 
 
1 The International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic of Women of Full Age (1933), the 
Convention on Suppression of all Forms of Trafficking in Persons and the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others (1949), and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW, 1979). 
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Europe was when women involved in prostitution occupied the Church of St. 
Nizier in 1973 in Lyon, France, in order to demonstrate against police action. This 
also stimulated the development of several other sex worker organizations from all 
over Europe, including Hydra in Germany, the English Collective of Prostitutes 
(ECP), and others (ICRSE, 2015: 5). 
As Ekman explains, the SWR movement created the cultural image of the 
‘whore,’ which represents pleasure and joy in life, and which contributed to the 
social acceptance and success of the movement. The ‘sex-positive’ narrative, which 
includes associations of freedom and empowerment, was communicated in 
opposition to the ‘feminist’ narrative, which was portrayed negatively (Ekman, 
2013: 34–41). Cultural images which build on socio-economic relations play a 
crucial role not only in political representation, but also in political 
transformations. Drawing on Weber’s idea of Calvinism being capitalism’s ‘spirit,’ 
Fraser suggests that the ‘elective affinity’ between feminism and neoliberalism lies 
in the critique of traditional authority (Fraser, 2015: 710). While abolitionists 
advocated against patriarchal social order, the SWR movement campaigned for the 
liberation of sexuality from all forms of control. Thereby, they aligned themselves 
with neoliberal ideas of freedom. 
US-based advocacy networks, like the International Committee for 
Prostitutes’ Rights (ICPR), founded in the 1980s, and the Global Network of Sex 
Work Projects (NSWP), founded in 1998, have played a crucial role in the 
internationalization of the sex worker movement and its further progress in 
Europe. The ICRSE (International Committee on the Rights of Sex Workers in 
Europe) was founded in 2004, and is active in developing key advocacy tools for 
sex worker organizations. A second network that supports the sex workers’ 
movement at the regional level is the Sex Workers’ Rights Advocacy Network 
(SWAN), which was founded in 2006. SWAN brings together sex worker 
organizations from Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and provides 
mentoring, advocacy tools, and support in ‘harsh legal and social environments’ 
(ICRSE, 2015: 9). 
Sex work activists claim that human trafficking, coercion, and exploitation 
in the sex industry can be better tackled if the whole industry is legalized, because 
this provides more space for state control, more opportunities for victims to access 
legal aid, and better working conditions in prostitution. The aim of these 
organizations has been to advocate for sex workers’ rights: ‘struggle for the 
decriminalization of sex work, freedom from oppression and discrimination, and 
the protection of sex workers’ human rights, including their right to health, their 
right to work and their right to organize’ (ICRSE, 2015: 5). This approach refers to 
liberal concepts of ‘choice’ and ‘consent’ (Limoncelli, 2009). The use of human-
rights language and the focus on individual and group rights reflects a politics of 
recognition and a neoliberal approach that neglects structural constraints (Kováts, 
2019). Furthermore, the promotion of commercial sex conceals male demand for 
paid sex and its correlation with patriarchal hierarchy and has further implications 
for women’s sexual objectification. 
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However, activist groups, scholars, and organizations that promote the 
decriminalization of sex work are heterogeneous in their aims and argumentation. 
There are several leftist, Marxist groups in the SWR movement who approach sex 
work from a labor perspective and primarily aim to fight exploitation, defining 
capitalism as the main source of harm in the sex industry, not patriarchy. This 
approach, and the focus on capitalism and how it shapes prostitution, emerged in 
early socialist feminist thinking – e.g. in the work of Kollontai (1921). In the 
academic discourse, this neoliberalism-critical but not abolitionist approach is 
represented by scholars like Julia O’Connell Davidson (2014) and Elizabeth 
Bernstein (2007; 2010; 2014), who analyze the sex industry through a lens of 
broader global inequalities and commodification. Leftist organizations and trade 
unions are divided concerning the workers in the sex industry, while several trade 
union initiatives and federations worldwide support the decriminalization of sex 
work since they claim it ‘keeps women safe’ in the short term (Pritchard, 2010). 
However, evidence from criminological research projects contradicts this claim by 
showing that the exploitation and number of victims of trafficking has actually 
risen in districts where prostitution is legal (Huismann and Kleemans, 2014). 
Ekman depicts the rise of the unionism of ‘sex workers’ in the early twenty-first 
century as a misleading campaign, since the members and supporters of these 
trade unions (such as the British International Union for Sex Workers), are actually 
not the women involved in prostitution. Ekman (2013: 59–64) claims that trade 
unions represent and defend the interests of those who profit from the industry; 
the pimps, brothel owners, etc.; not those of workers. However, although Ekman 
cites various concrete cases involving illegitimate spokespersons, such as 
privileged middle-class men speaking in the name of all ‘sex workers’ and trade 
unions, her analysis rather builds on scandalous examples, not on a thorough 
analysis of trade union membership and international activity. 
 
3.3 Dilemmas of political representation: Who can speak for victims of 
prostitution / sex workers? 
 
In the polarized debate about prostitution it is also strongly questioned who can 
represent those who work in/are victims of prostitution. The debate around 
political representation started at the very early phase of the anti-pornography and 
sex worker rights movement. Abolitionists argue that prostitution is harmful to 
women individually, and to women as a class of people (Pateman, 1988), therefore 
they claim to act on behalf of all women when fighting against prostitution. They 
consider all women in prostitution to be victims: of the users of prostitution, 
pimps, procurers, brothel owners; thus, of all those who profit from and commonly 
exploit those working in prostitution. The writings and activism of radical feminist 
activists in the 1980s, when they started to address prostitution as a severe form of 
women’s oppression, represent prostitution as a women’s issue generally. In 
contrast to this approach, the sex worker movement emerged as a critical reaction 
to the abolitionist movement, and claimed that radical feminists cannot represent 
those working in the sex business. Their main claim is that only sex workers can 
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and should represent sex workers, thus they started to refer to the ‘nothing about 
us without us’ principle. ‘Nothing about us without us’ has been the main motto of 
various social movements since the 1960s (like the disability movement, see also 
Charlton, 1998), and sex worker organizations have also used it as their slogan for 
self-organizing (ICRSE, 2015). 
This motto refers to the demand of an identity-based, oppressed group to be 
recognized and participate in the discourse and policymaking that affects them. 
Furthermore, by using this motto organizations and networks can claim that they 
represent and speak for all people involved in sex work. The former thus not only 
refers to the inclusion of sex workers in policy making as a general principle, thus 
the individuals that are concerned, but actually advocates for the inclusion of sex 
worker organizations in decision making. Thus, the approach ‘nothing about us 
without us’ builds on the assumption that such organizations are the legitimate 
spokespersons for all of those involved in the sex industry. However, in reality 
participation in these movements and organizations is strongly dependent on 
social and cultural capital. Still, the internal hierarchy of the political 
representation of sex workers within such organizations is rarely addressed. 
Additionally, class background and social inequalities are typically talked about 
only by leftist, Marxist, SWR organizations. Generally, marginalization in legal 
terms is much more in the spotlight in the public appearances of the movement, as 
well as the participation of different identity-based groups such as LGBTQ sex 
workers, migrants, and Roma sex workers. 
Abolitionist feminist activists like Julie Bindel and Ekis Ekman strongly 
question who and what underlying interests such organizations represent in their 
lobbying. Bindel (2017) argues that sex worker organizations are supported and led 
by people who profit from prostitution, thus by those who exploit and hurt 
victims. Similarly, self-organized victims of prostitution and trafficking, like 
members of SAGE in the USA or SPACE in Ireland, strongly criticize the sex 
worker approach and the way that members of sex worker organizations claim to 
represent women’s experiences in prostitution. 
Standing against Global Exploitation (SAGE) was founded in 1992 in San 
Francisco as a resource and counseling center for women in prostitution. Its 
founder, Norma Hotaling, designed a program to address clients, thus the demand 
side of prostitution, which later became known as John Schools (Bindel, 2017: 49). 
SPACE (Survivor of Prostitution Abuse Calling for Enlightenment) is also a 
survivor-led organization, formed in 2012 in Ireland with the aim of changing 
attitudes towards prostitution, fighting for recognition as a sexual-
exploitation/human-rights organization, and promoting the Nordic model. SPACE 
has become an international organization led by women who were victims of the 
sex trade. Rachel Moran is an abolitionist activist at SPACE, and author of the 
book Paid for: My journey through prostitution (2013), which has been very 
influential in the abolitionist movement. 
Based on their own victimhood and survival stories, abolitionist 
organizations perceive the members of these organizations as the acknowledged 
spokespersons of people involved in prostitution, as the title of a Hungarian public 
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event in 2019, The Reality of Prostitution, which hosted Rachel Moran and other 
members of SPACE, also shows. Reference to ‘the’ reality implies that the 
experiences of the panel discussants who spoke about prostitution represent the 
experiences of all. Thereby, victim-led organizations are engaging in the same 
fight for legitimacy in the prostitution debate, as they claim to be the reliable 
spokespersons for people, primarily women, involved in prostitution. 
The binary debate between the two opposite standpoints and social 
movements and the fight to be ‘the’ legitimate spokesperson commonly results in a 
rather essentialist interpretation and representation of prostitution. Although this 
effect was criticized as early as in the 1980s by Ferguson (1984), and later on by 
Limoncelli (2009) and Bernstein (2010), essentialist argumentations still often 
appear in public and academic discourses that neglect broader structural analyses 
of the complex power and socioeconomic relations within the sex industry. 
 
3.4 Battlefields: policy making, financial resources, and powerful alliances 
 
The main political goal of these social movements is to influence policymaking.  
Representatives of sex worker and abolitionist organizations operate in various 
political arenas, aiming to influence national and international prostitution 
policies. Organizations in Europe are also engaged in advocacy at the European-
Union level, and global abolitionist and sex worker networks also actively lobby 
UN organizations. 
Advocacy and lobbying include a variety of activities and strategies: not 
only aimed at obtaining political influence, but funding is needed for the survival 
of these movements and organizations. Consequently, they need to institutionalize 
and operate as established NGOs, as they rely on the funding systems of states or 
international donors that require this institutional format. These international 
donors are therefore key players in the political battlefield of prostitution policies. 
Abolitionists in the USA received more grants and financial resources during 
the administration of President Bush for funding campaigns, research projects, and 
lobbying (Watkins, 2018). Nongovernmental organizations have become important 
actors in anti-trafficking efforts and commonly overtake duties of state by 
providing social services for victims. One result of this increased activism against 
trafficking was the introduction of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000 in the USA, while another is the current 
introduction of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and Allow States 
and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) passed under President 
Trump. However, the individuals involved in prostitution remain criminalized in 
most federal states, which shows the limited power of the movement. 
In the 1980s and 1990s the sex worker movement became stronger, in line 
with the development of the gay and LGBTQ movement. The upsurge of both 
movements was also connected to the rising fear of HIV and AIDS, and the 
increase in effort to combat these diseases. Many activities and projects led by 
LGBTQ and sex worker movements have been and are now financed by the anti-
HIV funds of national governments, the EU, and wealthy foundations (Ekman, 
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2013: 54–58). The first regional advocacy network of sex worker organizations in 
Europe was also based on an anti-HIV platform and funding: the TAMPEP 
International Foundation (European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health 
Promotion among Migrant Sex Workers) was launched in 1993 to support migrant 
sex workers in Western Europe to access health services and HIV/STI prevention 
programs, thus to reduce their vulnerability to HIV/STI transmission (ICRSE, 2015: 
9). 
Ekman points out that ‘as a result of the sudden increase in HIV/AIDS 
funding, the story of the sex worker started gaining serious ground’ (2013: 58), 
encouraging powerful international organizations to speak out in favor of the 
decriminalization of the sex industry. Large international organizations such as 
various UN bodies (UNAIDS, UN Women, etc.), the European Commission, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
and Amnesty International (AI), are influential actors in international policy 
making, and are therefore important targets of both movements. The WHO, the 
ILO, and AI promote harm reduction, and, in line with SWR activists, support the 
decriminalization model. ‘Harm reduction’ is a strategy of SWR organizations that 
primarily focuses on the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases; thus, in 
practice, it manifests most commonly in the distribution of condoms. Ekman (2013: 
55–57) criticizes the fact that organizations like TAMPEP promote and practice 
harm reduction and thereby keep exploited, trafficked women ‘safely’ in 
prostitution. However, since human rights organizations that focus on LGBTQ, 
women’s or migrants’ rights have also joined the network, SWR organizations 
seem to have been successful at lobbying, as the increasing number of supporters 
and member organizations of ICRSE in recent years also shows. Such large 
international organizations are not only helpful in terms of supporting the 
lobbying and advocacy of these groups, but are also important providers of 
funding. The Open Society Foundation became one of the main funding 
organizations of the SWR movement, similarly to Mama Cash, the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation, and the Red Umbrella Fund, which is especially 
dedicated to providing financial resources for SWR organizations.2 
However, prostitution is still a strongly debated issue at the EU level and in 
its policymaking. The ICRSE prepared the document Declaration on the Rights of 
Sex Workers in Europe, which is based on human rights treaties, and presented the 
Sex Workers Rights Manifesto to the European Parliament in 2005, in which the 
main demands of the movement were summarized. The latest publicly well-known 
discussion about prostitution policies was based on a draft resolution by MEP 
Mary Honeyball in 2014, which advocated for a resolution by the European 
Parliament that stresses that prostitution violates human dignity and should be 
tackled and not accepted. The resolution encourages states to introduce the Nordic 
model.3  The ICRSE developed the ‘Honeyball No’ campaign as a reaction to this, 
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TAMPEP International Foundation, and some individuals (Lehmann et al., 2014). 
The non-binding resolution was finally adopted in 2014, but European Union 
institutions and politicians are still strongly divided between the two opposing 
approaches with their large lobby groups. 
International networks have also been key players in the global sex worker 
movements with regard to influencing prostitution policies at the national level. 
The sex worker movement and lobbying has been very influential in Germany; the 
political activism of the latter resulted in the introduction of the liberal 
Prostitution Law in 2002, which legalizes prostitution as a form of work, as well as 
some forms of facilitating prostitution. The law was modified in 2016 when the 
Prostitution ‘Schutz’ Law was introduced, which includes some restrictions on 
how sex can be sold (i.e. compulsory condom use). In the Netherlands, prostitution 
was legalized in 2000 and liberal prostitution policies were introduced. In New 
Zealand a decriminalization model was introduced in 2003 based on NSWP’s 
advocacy, which differs from the German and Dutch legislation in that it is less 
controlled and regulated by the state. 
However, abolitionist and pro-sex work feminist movements have had 
different effects in terms of influencing prostitution policies in various European 
countries. In Sweden, the women’s rights movement has been strong since the 
1960s. This addresses prostitution as an issue of gender inequality and a form of 
oppression of women within the patriarchy. In 1999, at the same time as a law 
against sexual harassment, a prostitution law was introduced that criminalizes 
those who purchase sexual services and decriminalizes those who sell sex, while 
also earmarking funding for exit services. This kind of prostitution policy, known 
also as the Nordic model, has been influential in Europe since then, and similar 
legislation has been introduced in Norway, France, and Ireland. 
 
4. Feminist struggles in Hungary 
 
4.1 The infrastructure of political representation and the development of 
feminist struggles in Hungary 
 
The development of social movements and political struggles is shaped by the 
locality of the movement and its position in the global economy. The integration of 
different localities of the world system strongly defines what political concepts like 
democracy, left, right, or neoliberal actually mean in particular socio-political 
contexts, and how these are linked to broader structural order (Gagyi, 2017: 75). 
Therefore, when thinking about the crisis of democracies, neoliberalism, and the 
effects of the global economic crisis, how these phenomena affect social groups 
and political projects depending on their position in the core, semi-periphery, or 
periphery it. As Samir Amin also highlighted, the accumulation of social-political 
rights in Western democracies has engendered dictatorships on the periphery that 
execute the demands of the world market (Amin, 1991, cited by Gagyi, 2017: 67). 
The evolution of social struggles in Hungary is also strongly defined by the 
country’s semi-peripheral position and its historical development. The 
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democratization processes in the 1990s also meant an increase in political 
participation and growth in the number of civil society organizations. The 
conception of ‘civil society’ was imported from the West, and its meaning also 
included criticism of state socialism (Barna et al., 2018: 252), thus it became a 
powerful and popular concept in the 1990s. While in 1995 there were 
approximately 43,000 civic groups registered in Hungary (ca. 40 of them were 
explicitly women’s groups), their number had grown to 53,000 by 2001 (Fábián 
2009: 38, based on data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office). NGOs in the 
1990s were highly unstable because they overwhelmingly relied on international 
funds such as those from the Open Society Institute, which gave financial support 
to various cultural, educational, and human rights initiatives, including women’s 
and domestic violence shelter groups (Open Society Institute, 2002, cited by Fábián, 
2009: 37). This changed in the 2000s when forms of financial support radically 
changed, and NGOs started to fluctuate less dramatically since they became reliant 
primarily on state support instead of private funding (Fábián, 2009: 38). 
Funding and institutionalization have a great impact on the infrastructure of 
political representation and on who can represent specific causes, and how. Gagyi 
and Pulay (2017) argued civil society organizations in Romania and Hungary 
mainly include middle-class people who aim to represent marginalized groups and 
thereby attempt to build symbolic capital. The tendency for mainly middle-class 
people to be the acknowledged spokespersons of marginalized groups is also 
defined by the socio-economic transformation after state socialism. Gagyi (2018) 
interprets the fight for legitimacy and symbolic capital as a strategy of intellectuals 
in post-socialist countries to secure their shrinking social status in neoliberal 
socio-economic transformation on the semi-periphery. 
Due to the globalization of the feminist movement since the 1980s, US 
feminist groups have strongly influenced not only the infrastructure of political 
representation, but also the content of women’s issues in other regions. Global 
hierarchies in knowledge production also play a role in how ideas and political 
aims ‘travel,’ and thus in how feminist movements in core countries impact 
feminisms on the semi-periphery and periphery through their ‘epistemic 
dominance’ (Gagyi, 2017) and through concrete material dependencies. As Watkins 
(2018: 38) explains, ‘[c]ulturally, international feminist influence generally flowed 
from core to peripheries, but it was adapted, appropriated and sometimes 
bowdlerized along the way’. She shows that US mainstream feminism became 
hegemonic globally through its dominant role in the international Women’s 
Congresses in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Consequently, in the 1990s a more 
neoliberalism-conformable agenda was transmitted to feminists on a global scale 
which ignored the structural and political differences which result from the semi-
peripheral position of countries in the global accumulation regime (Barna et al., 
2018). The dependence on such international donors who promote legal advocacy 
of women’s rights and fighting against discrimination left less space for a more 
radical, system-critical movement. 
This also strongly impacted the development of Hungarian feminism after 
state socialism. ‘The material dependency on the core and symbolic subordination 
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defined the inner structure and epistemological framework of the East-Central-
European and Hungarian feminism’ (Barna et al., 2018: 252). In the 1990s, feminist 
activists and ‘educators’ from the USA and Western Europe came to Hungary to 
teach members of the feminist groups (Barna et al., 2018: 252). Between the 1990s 
and 2000s, women’s groups increasingly cooperated with various international 
organizations, and ‘women’s activism [...] changed from broad themes and loose 
organizations to small, often professionalized, and, most noticeably, globally 
interconnected groups frequently focused on a single or narrow set of issues’ 
(Fábián, 2009: 1). 
Financial dependency and the epistemic influence of international donors 
initiated NGO-ization within the feminist landscape in other countries in East-
Central Europe as well. ‘[...] NGO-ization should be seen not just as a trend 
towards [the] professionalization and institutionalization of social action, which 
changes [the] organizational logic of civil society groups, but as a complex process 
which stems from and results in profound de-politicization of civic and social 
activism’ (Roy, 2014, cited by Korolczuk, 2016: 34). Dependency on donors limits 
the capability of NGOs to make political claims and also resist neoliberal market 
logic. The project-based operation of NGOs also reduces their flexibility in relation 
to reacting to urgent political issues and their potential to offer more system-
critical projects and activities. However, the cooptation of NGOs is not equivalent 
to simple adaptation to states’ or international donors’ interests, but there is space 
for NGO representatives and activists to reflect on and critically engage with these 
tendencies (Ana, 2018). ‘On the one hand, they develop their own internal critique 
of hegemonic “Western” feminism; and on the other, they attempt to formulate 
their own geographically, historically, and culturally grounded and diverse 
feminist concerns and strategies’ (Fábián, 2009: 78). While the effects of the active 
engagement of international donors and Western organizations in the Hungarian 
feminist scene was critically questioned in the 1990s (Adamik et al., 1996), in the 
2000s such reflective, critical voices rarely appeared in the debate (Barna et al., 
2018: 254). 
In the first years of its existence, the primary goal of progressive grassroots 
women’s activism was to lobby against the criminalization of abortion. Later, after 
Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, women’s groups used the political moment 
to advocate for the criminalization of domestic violence (Fábián, 2009). In the early 
1990s, several feminist organizations were established. The Feminist Network was 
one of the most important of these. Its main aims were to encourage the political 
representation of women and gender equality, to strengthen consciousness about 
women’s issues in Hungarian society, and to fight violence against women. One of 
their first projects was a campaign against the tightening of the abortion law 
(Antoni, 2015). Another important, newly established feminist grassroots 
organization was MONA (Hungarian Women’s Association), which was founded 
in 1992 and was originally initiated to support women after state socialism. Its 
activities included advocacy work, service provision (including training and legal 
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aid), and conducting research into women’s issues.4  NaNE Women’s Rights 
Association was established in 1994 and is still one of the most important feminist 
NGOs in Hungary. Its main goal is to fight violence against women and children 
on various levels. NANE provides services to victims, but the organization is also 
engaged in fighting violence against women on a community and broader social 
level by providing training, organizing campaigns, lobbying, and writing policy 
recommendations. 
The challenges, successes and internal conflicts of the feminist landscape are 
connected to the specific political environment in which these groups need to 
negotiate, which is shaped by the country’s socio-economic position and the crisis 
of global accumulation processes. After the economic crisis of 2009 in East-Central 
Europe, it was mainly right-wing forces that gained political power and sought to 
question Western liberal hegemony (Barna et al., 2018: 255). The anti-genderism 
sentiments that emerged at this time were also a reaction to this hegemony. 
Grzebalska, Kováts and Pető (2017) describe anti-genderism as a form of symbolic 
glue, since it is used by populist politicians, and also the right-wing Hungarian 
government, to ‘mobilize against (neo)liberal democracy.’ They interpret it as a 
reaction to the evolution of a politics of recognition in feminism; and while there is 
intense debate about the meaning of gender among ‘progressive’ actors, in the 
right-wing narrative gender has become associated with the cultural colonization 
of the West (Korolczuk and Graff, 2018: 797–798, cited by Feró, 2019: 169). The 
anti-gender movement on the populist right in Hungary responds to an extreme 
understanding of gender as being ‘independent of bodily reality; that is, the gender 
one identifies with’ (Kováts, 2019a: 64). It is also a reaction to the Hungarian liberal 
media discourse on gender-related issues, which is influenced by a politics of 
recognition and mostly interprets gender as an identity-based, not a structural 
category (Kováts, 2019b). 
Thus, anti-gender ideology affects the potential and work of women’s 
groups and feminist activism in Hungary by framing all women’s issues as 
‘gender’ issues, and interpreting them as liberal ideological constructions. This 
tendency has become especially manifest, for example, in the Hungarian 
government’s non-ratification of the Istanbul convention because of its association 
with ‘gender ideology.’ This crucially important political case highlights what 
obstacles feminist organizations need to tackle when addressing violence against 
women and other important causes in their political advocacy. 
 
4.2 Abolitionist and SWR activism in Hungary 
 
Women’s groups in the 1990s were already addressing the harm in prostitution 
from an abolitionist point of view. The journal of the Feminist Network, 
Nőszemély, published various articles about prostitution, including an open letter 
by Mária Adamik to the mayor of Budapest in which she opposed the legalization 
of prostitution and problematized the male demand for sexual services (Adamik, 
 
4 https://nokert.hu/sites/default/files/csatolmanyok/noszemely_3_1993_aprilis_3._szam_0.pdf 
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1996). Adamik’s letter addressed the mayor’s support for the government’s 
intention of withdrawing from the New York Convention and legalizing the sex 
industry. Despite the opposition of feminist activists, a new prostitution law was 
introduced in 1999 in Hungary that followed a legalization model and prescribed 
that municipalities should designate zones where street-based prostitution is legal. 
The introduction of the new law was followed by an increase in the 
advocacy work of abolitionist feminist activists. The Prostitution-free Hungary 
movement was initiated in 2003 by nine private persons and involved, besides 
various public statements and publications criticizing the new law, launching a 
public campaign in 2006 called ‘Keresd a férfit!’ (Look for the man!). Members 
called on political decision makers and the Hungarian parliament to change the 
law, strongly criticizing the male demand that drives commercial sex, and claiming 
that the new law primarily suited the interests of the (male) political and economic 
elite.5 They further suggested that the law was initiated in support of the organized 
criminal groups that manage the prostitution scene in Budapest, which were also 
closely related to this elite. They advocated the introduction of the Swedish model, 
which criminalizes the purchase of sexual services.6  
The change in the law and the strong advocacy work of Hungarian feminist 
organizations initiated active public discourse around the issue of prostitution. 
Abolitionist feminist organizations were not only active in advocacy work, 
targeting decision makers, but contributed to research on prostitution and human 
trafficking and provided services for victims. MONA has actively collaborated in 
projects with feminist organizations fighting against prostitution and human 
trafficking for sexual exploitation in Hungary and has published reports 
containing legal and social analyses of commercial sexual exploitation and victim 
assistance (Betlen et al., 2010; Betlen, 2013). NANE is also committed to the 
abolitionist approach and has been engaged in providing assistance to victims of 
prostitution and trafficking. 
The sex workers’ rights movement is represented by much fewer 
organizations in Hungarian civil society. The most important actor advocating for 
sex workers’ rights is SZEXE (Szexmunkások Érdekvédelmi Egyesülete, the 
Association of Hungarian Sex Workers), which was established in 2003. Their 
activities include research projects, creating publications, providing social services 
for Hungarian sex workers, various advocacy activities, and holding public events. 
Their main aim is the decriminalization of sex work. In Hungary, therefore, they 
mainly advocate for the designation of so-called tolerance zones by municipalities, 
which has largely not taken place despite the prostitution law of 1999. SZEXE is a 
member of several international organizations, such as the Global Network of Sex 
Work Projects (NSWP), SWAN, and ICRSE; and in Hungary they cooperate with 
liberal NGOs such as the Civil Liberty Union, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 
the Hungarian Civil Aids Forum, and LGBT organizations such as Transvanilla. In 
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HIV prevention, human rights, and LGBTQI issues who advocate for the 
decriminalization of sex work. 
 
4.3 The role of funding in shaping advocacy concerning prostitution and sex 
work in Hungary 
 
All organizations engaged in advocacy and service provision related to prostitution 
and sex work operate in a primarily project-based way, therefore they rely on 
donors. Donors include private foundations, states, and suprastate actors, like the 
EU and international organizations. All these actors are targeted by international 
advocacy networks of global abolitionist and SWR organizations, as I have 
highlighted before. Therefore, the international battlefield of these networks 
impacts the survival, range of activities, and effectiveness of local Hungarian 
organizations. 
Matolcsi (2006) analyzed the effects of international discourses on trafficking 
for sexual exploitation on the work of Hungarian NGOs and highlighted that the 
relevant actors’ stances on prostitution have a great impact on what funds are 
available to them. Funds for anti-trafficking activities, which include those for 
victim assistance and awareness raising, are important sources for organizations 
working on prostitution. While some funds were available to organizations 
regardless of their stance on prostitution, others clearly targeted NGOs that 
represented the donor’s values. The US government, for example, explicitly 
supported abolitionist aims and was one of NANE’s important donors for several 
years (Matolcsi, 2006). At the same time, the EU had a rather ambiguous position – 
as I have highlighted before – and provided funding both to SZEXE and NANE. As 
a result of the successful international advocacy work of the SWR network, 
wealthy international foundations like the Open Society Foundations7 and Mama 
Cash increasingly took the side of decriminalization. SZEXE has been also a 
beneficiary8 of this tendency. 
The Hungarian state has also been an important actor, not only in terms of 
legislation, but also concerning funding. As mentioned before, in the 2000s 
Hungarian NGOs increasingly relied on state funds that provided them with more 
stability. However, in the specific field of prostitution and trafficking the state was 
rather absent, and mostly ignored the increasingly relevant issue – as members of 
the relevant NGOs reported, according to Matolcsi. While abolitionist activists 
attributed the lack of funding to the state’s opposing views about prostitution, 
SZEXE’s relation to the government was also reported to be poor (Matolcsi, 2006: 
40). While it cannot be confirmed why the different governments did not provide 
funding for anti-trafficking- and prostitution-related activities, their ignoring the 
issue suggests that the state simply did not perceive prostituted women and 
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4.4 Goals of political representation and advocacy in the Hungarian 
prostitution debate 
 
While both international abolitionist and SWR movements have a significant 
impact on Hungarian organizations and activism through their financial and 
ideological connections, the local political context and the semi-peripheral position 
of Hungary also define the development and potential for political representation. 
Hungarian debates partly react to international developments and political issues, 
and partly target issues in the local context that directly affect Hungarian women 
in prostitution. 
The change of law in 1999 was a highly important political event that was 
followed by an increase in the advocacy work of abolitionist organizations. 
However, it cannot be simply interpreted as the state taking the side of the SWR 
movement, because in practice people involved in prostitution are largely 
criminalized, which contradicts both sides’ political aims. Therefore, the primary 
advocacy activity of SZEXE targets police harassment and fights for the 
designation of tolerance zones by municipalities, thus for the implementation of 
the regulation of 1999. Abolitionists, on the other hand, still advocate for the 
introduction of the Swedish model and draw attention to the current regulation’s 
non-compliance with the New York Convention; at the same time, they also push 
for better victim protection. While Hungarian state actors, including the 
government and also municipalities generally, have not seemed to be responsive to 
any of these political claims, recently published legal changes and a new national 
strategy suggest a shift in support for the political causes of abolitionist feminist 
organizations, since they include more support for victims of trafficking and 
measures for preventing child prostitution and trafficking.9  
 
4.4.1 Debate about Amnesty International’s initiative regarding the 
decriminalization of sex work 
 
The stance on prostitution of important international organizations has also been 
widely discussed by the relevant organizations in Hungary. However, their 
activities in this regard are less relevant in terms of pressuring international actors 
directly, while their statements and analyses rather serve to shape public discourse 
in Hungary.  
In 2015 a debate evolved on the blog Kettős Mérce around an Amnesty 
International (AI) initiative promoting the total decriminalization of prostitution, 
which reflected the international development of the sex worker movement in 
terms of AI becoming an important ally. This decision of Amnesty International 
was strongly debated and criticized by abolitionists internationally, but it also 
provoked statements within the Hungarian scene. While Sárosi (2015) and Fedorkó 
 
9 The protocol of the meeting on the new national strategy (2020-2023) is available here: 
https://www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/87979/NR20200309_elfogadott.pdf/c7e50997-9b8b-dcfc-
6273-9587f6f8669b?version=1.0&t=1583760863558&download=true 
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(2015) welcomed the initiative as it served to uphold the rights of sex workers, 
members of abolitionist NGOs like NANE and Patent strongly criticized it (Dés, 
2015; Nógrádi, 2015). 
The blog posts were very much in line with the approaches of international 
SWR and abolitionist activists and scholars, with some additional reflections on the 
Hungarian situation, which also showed the embeddedness of both organizations 
in international SWR or abolitionist networks. The debate was less concerned with 
identifying what this AI initiative means for Hungarian women in prostitution/sex 
work, but served rather to introduce the related developments and debate from 
their perspective to the Hungarian leftist scene – the primary readers of Kettős 
Mérce. Therefore, the political work of these organizations in this case focused 
primarily on informing and shaping Hungarian public discourse and the 
representation of prostitution and sex work, but not on effectively influencing 
political decision making. 
 
4.4.2 Discourse about political representation in prostitution/sex work in Hungary 
 
The issue of political representation and who may be considered a legitimate 
spokesperson in relation to prostitution was an important element of the debate. 
While SWR activists put forward arguments based on the ‘nothing about us 
without us’ principle, their legitimacy was strongly questioned by abolitionist 
feminists. Nógrádi (2015) says it is ‘seriously debated whether sex worker alliances 
are legitimate representatives of prostitutes’ interests. In these organizations there 
are commonly pimps, who are former prostitutes, or simply pimps, and persons 
exploiting prostitutes.’ She also addressed the fact that while middle-class, 
educated women are often members of these organizations, it is actually 
marginalized, poor women who are not members of, nor are represented by these 
networks who overwhelmingly work in prostitution. Furthermore, she shared her 
suspicion about the industry and the donors behind it who welcome these 
organizations and legitimize their work, as the activity of the latter merges the 
interest of pimps and the women involved in prostitution in the discourse. Her 
argumentation strongly reflects the analysis of the UK-based abolitionist activist 
and public intellectual Julie Bindel, who has also addressed the involvement of 
pimps in SWR (Bindel, 2017). While the actual existence of personal and financial 
relations between SWR activists and the pimps who exploit women in prostitution 
have not been proven, members of feminist organizations commonly claim that 




Any explanation of what difficulties the abolitionist feminist/sex workers’ rights 
movement face, and what defines their achievements must be manifold. In this 
article I have highlighted the evolution of these social movements in the USA, 
Western Europe, and in Hungary. The development of feminist movements is 
defined by the rise of global neoliberalism, which incorporated the originally 
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radical movements of the 1960s in the USA. At the same time, this neoliberalism-
conforming feminism became highly influential on a global scale, shaping feminist 
organizing after the era of state socialism in Hungary through financial donations 
and epistemic dominance. It also affected what themes and issues local feminist 
organizations addressed, although they also focused on local political processes. 
Concerning the field of prostitution, the sex workers’ rights and the 
abolitionist movements have been variously successful at influencing political 
actors and building alliances internationally. The SWR movement has successfully 
built on neoliberal ideas of freedom, choice, and consent, and has obtained 
increasing political support from international organizations such as the ILO and 
AI. At the same time, the EU is still strongly divided regarding this question, and 
various EU member states have introduced the Swedish model, which is 
propagated by abolitionist feminists. 
The powerful networks, donors, and alliances of abolitionist and SWR 
organizations also have a strong influence in Hungary. Organizations on both 
sides are active in terms of service provision for victims of prostitution and 
trafficking/sex workers. Their advocacy work on the national level primarily 
involves changes in, or the implementation of, prostitution-related policies, 
although debates about prostitution and sex work have been strongly marginalized 
in the Hungarian political and public discourse. Feminist and SWR organizations 
are actively raising awareness about the issues by highlighting their perspective 
about such topics, and also report about internationally relevant events in this 
field, such as the AI initiative of 2015. 
The current political context of the Orbán regime and its anti-gender 
policies generally impacts how gender equality and women’s issues can be 
represented in Hungary. While the recent legal changes concerning human 
trafficking may be a sign of a more sensitive state response to victims of trafficking 
and prostitution, the political landscape suggests that feminist activism still faces a 
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Subotić, Jelena (2019) Yellow Star, Red Star. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 264 pages. 
 
Jelena Subotić’s Yellow Star, Red Star is an important book for all those who want 
to understand the changing memory narratives, politics, and strategies of the East-
European Holocaust after the regime changes of the 1990s. There are indeed 
similarities among the forms of Holocaust memory characteristic of this region 
alone, typical patterns that repeat uniformly. With similar trends in the history 
and fate of the European countries stuck between the East and the West, it follows 
that their remembrance strategies show parallels. 
Subotić has written about the narratives of the Holocaust and manipulation 
of memory in the context of the so-called ‘post-communist’ countries of Eastern 
Europe. Analogous events occurred in the East-European countries occupied by 
the Soviet Union after the collapse of the regime. We can name the desire to join 
the European Union and NATO among them, as well as the transformations of 
historical memory and forgetting. The construction of Holocaust remembrance, 
memory politics and strategies took completely different courses in the western 
world, in Israel and in the Soviet Union, or the East European, Balkan and Baltic 
countries belonging to its sphere of interests. 
The book consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical 
argument about state response to various ontological insecurities it faces in the 
aftermath of a great political transformation – the end of communism – and links 
this framework to the issue of political memory and Holocaust remembrance. The 
chapter introduces the notion of memory appropriation and describes various 
strategies of the post-communist states changing the European Union’s approach 
to the memory of the Holocaust. Chapters 2 and 3 explore Holocaust remembrance 
in the former Yugoslavia by focusing on the two deeply interlinked narratives in 
Serbia and Croatia. Serbia’s Holocaust remembrance narrative is centered on 
Croatia’s mass murder of ethnic Serbs. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the 
Holocaust in the Baltic states and explains the post-communist strategies of 
‘double genocide’ which conflates the Holocaust and the Soviet occupation. 
Subotić presents her research through illustrative examples, not ignoring her 
personal involvement either. She synthesizes theories and reframes the ideological 
backgrounds to post-regime-change Holocaust narratives. The main focus of her 
writing is to understand whose interests are served in post-communist countries 
by the trivialization, relativization and comparison of the Holocaust with the 
crimes of communism. What are the common traits to be observed in the 
nationalist, conservative, and anti-communist Holocaust narratives of Eastern 
Europe? Well known and less known examples of Holocaust relativization in the 
region demonstrate the points made, with distorting remembrance-policy issues in 
Serbia and Croatia discussed predominantly, grounded in personal experience. 
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Examples form the Baltics are also presented. Put simply, the new relativizing 
narrative is manipulative in presenting the crimes of the communist regime as 
greater, or at least of equal significance to the horrors committed during the 
Holocaust. This allows the criminal role of followers of the nationalist and 
conservative ideologies in the Holocaust to be ejected from the core of the 
discourse. Attention is diverted from the Holocaust onto the crimes of 
communism.  
In post-communist countries, prior to the change of regimes all that could be 
spoken of were the ‘victims of fascism’ and the ‘communist resistance’, the word 
Jew was painstakingly avoided. The manipulation of the memory of the Holocaust, 
its distorted exploitation for various purposes continues into our day. 
Jelena Subotić is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at 
Georgia State University working on international relations, memory politics, 
human rights, international ethics, especially as an expert analyst of the situation 
in the Western Balkans. She was a CNN and BBC expert on the Yugoslav wars. In 
her book she treats the questions of cultural appropriation, that is, the 
expropriation of memory, within the discourse of the social sciences. The concept 
denotes how various cultural and social symbols, memories, and their 
representations are expropriated for some hoped-for political or other gains, a 
better position in terms of social status. In the context of this book, appropriation 
does not signify borrowing, or even expropriation of a narrative, but rather the 
manipulation, distortion of memory, its transformation to meet personal interests. 
Not only does Subotić acknowledge being personally affected by her subject 
but she weaves her family history into the work that is much to the advantage of 
the book. The text does not turn too intimate or bring about too much pathos with 
the conjuring of the personal family history. The author’s motivations can be 
sensed from the beginning, as they provide a deep stratum within the book that 
offers relevant answers to real questions in place of dry scientific pretentions. At 
the same time, she builds on research, facts, and the impact of the book comes 
from the alloy of her evidence-based approach with her personal family history. 
Her family history is very complex, and this complexity characterizes the whole 
book. She writes about the conflicting personality of her grandfather who 
collaborated with the Nazis to a certain degree, but also rescued lives. He was the 
captain of the Belgrade Police during Nazi occupation. The Gestapo tortured him, 
but after Tito’s rise to power during communism he was also imprisoned and 
tortured. In fact, Subotić came to understand who her grandfather really was while 
working on the book. She also completes the reconstruction of her traumas and 
memories in the course of writing it. She shows by these means too that the 
subject has an affect to this day. All that occurred seven or eight decades ago has 
still not been processed or uncovered. She also took a good deal of her father’s 
traumas on, after he survived a Croatian Ustasha concentration camp. Though her 
grandfather saved many communists, the family did not sympathize with the Tito 
regime. It is one of the great virtues of the volume that it does not simplify the 
human fates scarred by the cataclysms of history. A victim often became a 
persecutor, and vice versa even in these times. 
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The book also strives to give a sense of the scientific theoretical background 
of memory politics by analyzing the memorial sites and policies of three larger 
geographical regions. The most essential theoretical background to her book 
comes from Michael Rothberg’s competitive memory theory (Rothberg, 2009), as 
well as Jeffrey Alexander’s analysis of the usually insensitive attitude of 
traumatized social groups to the traumas of others (Alexander et al., 2004). 
Culturally traumatized groups are often unable to acknowledge another likewise 
traumatized group, and moreover shift responsibility for it to others. The following 
three main areas or case studies are the focus of her study: Serbia, Croatia, and 
Lithuania with of course, Vilnius at its heart. She also mentions the curious 
memory politics link between Hungary and Poland. Each of her examples 
demonstrates how the history of the Holocaust is used, instrumentalized for 
political purposes, in contradiction to the experiences of the survivors and Jewish 
victims. She cites examples of symbolic, or sometimes markedly direct 
manifestations that offend the memory of victims or are insensitive and untrue to 
them. The Jewish victims were not memorialized in Tito’s Yugoslavia, or in any of 
the other East European communist countries. The ethnic or religious background 
of the partisans, their origins were irrelevant to them. Only the anti-fascist heroes 
were glorified.  
The book also presents the brutality of the holocaust as case studies from 
Croatia, Serbia, and Lithuania. 
The deportation of Jews began in September 1941, after the German and 
Italian occupation of the Yugoslav Kingdom, and its subdivision with the 
establishment of the Independent Croatian State. 70 concentration, extermination 
and transit camps were built across the territory of the country. The Jews collected 
here were transported to Auschwitz. One of the most brutal camps run by the 
Croatians was the Sisak children’s camp, where unaccompanied children were 
starved to death and raped. 
In 1941, the Germans decided to establish the ‘Semlin Judenlager’ in Serbia, 
on the bank of the River Sava. It was a forced labor camp at first, but from 8 
October they took women and children there as well. By May 1942 the Serbian 
Jews had all been wiped out. Survivors were mainly partisans, and also a few 
people in hiding. The extermination of Serbian Jews was the first modern, 
methodical system set up to murder in Europe. The first systematic, industrial 
scale genocide took place in Belgrade. Only in July of 2014 did they decide, on the 
proposal of the local Jewish Congregation, to make the 10th of May a Holocaust 
Memorial Day, as it was on this day in 1942 that the last groups of Jewish women 
and children were transported from Staro Sajmište in gas trucks. The captives of 
the Sajmište camp were commanded to get in the truck in 1942, then to leave for 
the forest at the other end of the city. This was one of the first experiments at 
killing Jews by diverting the fumes from the exhausts into the sealed back of the 
truck, with calculations even detailing how much time was needed for them to 
suffocate. The people of Belgrade looked the other way, but everyone knew what 
was happening. Subotić was shocked that an untended urban space had come 
about on the site of the genocide: including car mechanics bodegas, a garbage 
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dump, squares overgrown with weed. It illustrates perfectly how grotesquely the 
memory of the innocent people murdered there is kept, and the upsetting injustice 
of it, which is typical of the whole post-communist region to this day. The first 
modern systematic race-based human massacre of Europe may have happened 
under the eyes of the citizens of Belgrade. Subotić relates Hungarian and Polish 
examples as well, where the lack of memorial places or their warped form can be 
observed. She also analyzes the representations made by politicians, museums, 
intellectuals, and artists. An example of the latter is the Hungarian prime 
minister’s cynical inclusion of Horthy among the great statesmen. These are the 
same mechanisms, distorted memory politics with the purpose of political gain. 
Subotić discusses the Lithuanian situation in depth. She introduces a vast 
array of historical material, embracing the Holocaust history of Lithuania and 
Vilnius all the way up to the current memory politics of Holocaust representation. 
The comprehensive, serious research has led to a successful intricate analysis of 
the Lithuanian situation. This is one of the most thorough, most complex parts of 
the volume. The author gives an illustrative historical analysis of the historical 
memory of the Holocaust in Vilnius, or Vilna in Hebrew-Yiddish usage. Jewish 
community life was huge in Lithuania. Vilnius was traditionally compared to 
Jerusalem in Jewish folklore, as the Orthodox Jewish community living in this 
region before the Holocaust had achieved extraordinary results in religious 
scholarship. Between the two World Wars, Lithuania had been an independent 
country, though Vilnius belonged to Poland. However, in 1940 the three Baltic 
countries became parts of the Soviet sphere of interest. The Germans overran the 
Jewish population of Vilnius numbering 60 thousand in 1941. The Lithuanian 
police began to arrest Jews immediately, to be summarily massacred in the nearby 
Ponary forest by machine guns. Soon, nearly 20 thousand persons had been 
murdered by gunfire, and buried in mass graves by Lithuanians encouraged by 
Germans. Of the approximately 250 thousand Jews that lived in Lithuania, over 90 
per cent fell victim to the Holocaust. The Lithuanian Jewish community currently 
numbers around 3,500 persons. Since gaining independence, every government of 
Lithuania has preferred to play down the horrors perpetrated by the local 
collaborators of the Nazis. They have also tried to obscure the fact that every strata 
of society participated in the extermination of the Jews. It is no coincidence then, 
that proportionally, the Lithuanian Holocaust felled the most victims, a fact never 
noted in remembrances. A row of Lithuanian governments has put an equal-to-
sign between communist and Nazi crimes, trying to blur the line between 
totalitarian regimes. It is fully apparent that successive Lithuanian governments 
have not given up on rewriting the history of the Lithuanian Holocaust. In her 
detailed analysis, Subotić goes through the symbolic narratives of the more 
important memorial places, memorials and museums one-by-one, plus the reader is 
offered a broad range of factual information. The book concludes that apart from 
acknowledging the explicit fact of the Jews having been murdered, it is not 
accepted that Jewish life and culture could be an integral part of Lithuanian 
identity. Moreover, Lithuanians do not accept their own culpability in the 
Holocaust. They shift all responsibility to the Nazis. The Holocaust is not a part of 
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the Lithuanian national identity and image. The way they construe their identity, 
their own victimhood at the hands of the Soviets is placed at the forefront and in 
the center. 
Similar processes are unfolding in the rest of the post-communist countries. 
Under the influence of the European Union, and in an attempt to meet the 
conditions required for accession, the official remembrance of the Holocaust is 
merely a sham. The memory politics of the post-communist countries did not come 
about organically, but under duress from the European Union. It serves not to 
present the horror of the Holocaust, but rather to turn it into a tourist attraction. 
There is more of an effort by these countries to identify with their own suffering 
under Soviet rule and present the Holocaust as an illustration of their own 
traumas. It is not a matter of Holocaust denial, just of its utilization to emphasize 
their own suffering.  
It remains a question whether the effect the European Union had on Eastern 
Europe was one way, or if Eastern Europe has also had an effect on the EU? The 
question may be raised, has East European memory politics succeeded in 
convincing Western Europe that communism and Nazism were similarly horrible 
regimes? According to Subotić, equating the two totalitarian regimes represents an 
ideological struggle on the part of post-communist nations to trivialize their role in 
the Holocaust. For example, the children’s camp established by the above 
mentioned Croatian Ustasha is a symbol of the memory politics chosen by 
independent Croatia as it makes its way into the EU, memorializing their brutal 
Nazi collaborator regime. The response in Subotić’s point of view is, in fact, a lack 
of coming to terms, of forgetting, a rejection of memory-solidarity. 
Subotić tries to understand her own traumas on an individual and collective 
level but does not stop there. The work’s deeper meaning is revealed within its 
ethical and moral subtext. She tries to process the sufferings and traumas of 
individuals, various social groups, and societies or nations. So, through her 
analysis we can come closer to an understanding and acceptance of our own and 
others’ sufferings. In this book she proposes that if we do not accept each other, do 
not confront and understand each other’s crimes and traumas, we will only 
continue to suffer. For if we only shift blame, distort, and perhaps expropriate our 
stories, there will be no understanding or resolution born of it, and our traumas 
will live on. Acceptance of our own traumas and those of others is Subotić’s ethical 
message. This is the context in which all that the book has to say gains meaning. 
Yellow Star, Red Star is a scientifically well-grounded work recommended as a 
seminal volume, a must read for those with an interest in Serbian, Croatian, and 
Lithuanian history. It is a systematic, well-structured reading on the strategies and 
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